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ABSTRACT 
 
Memories Made in Seeing considers the relationship between memory and film through 
examining what is its cultural and experiential effect, how it can show and write memory and 
History.  Four post-war films - Muriel, or the Time of a Return (Resnais, 1963), (nostalgia) (Frampton, 
1971), Level Five (Marker, 1996) and Memento (Nolan, 2000) – that are complex manifestations of 
thought in practice, which trace and examine film’s ability to distinctly embody and produce 
memory, and are part of a dialogue in form and time. 
 
To contextualise and consider memory’s effect, it is charted from the advent of film (the 
nineteenth century’s ‘memory crisis’, the founding and understanding of modern memory, the 
related ideas of Proust, Bergson and Freud), through the twentieth century (the development of a 
more subjective reckoning, the seeming impossibility of memory (and understanding) that 
followed World War II’s trauma), till its millennial disposition (multi-various considerations, the 
inception of prosthetic memory, the seeming need for nostalgia). The case studies’ varied forms 
and alignments consider the tension between the demands of narrative resolution and the 
mutable and open-ended nature of memory, and how different film practices seek to utilize and 
appraise its perceived function, relevance and production.  
 
These films are also a record of viewing experiences, which influence one another and create a 
narrative of personal engagement that forms and substantiates recollection. To examine this 
conceptual process further I contend the tension between narrative (something fixed by duration 
and intention) and memory’s imperatives (formal and personal) form an axis of experimentation 
and exploration and this correspondence is central to comprehending the ways in which films 
represent and invoke forms of subjective and cultural recollection. I propose that film’s unique 
and associative account of memory’s evolving resonances becomes a series of palimpsests, which 
emphasize that the experience of film is an act of re-writing and recollection and misrecollection. 
This context tethers the subject, is the point of initiation, and explores how memories, which are 
made when seen, are mutable, historical and present, essential.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Fig. 1 Muriel, or the Time of a Return (1963) 
 
 
Memories Made in Seeing is concerned with the entwining of film and memory; it will 
consider the conceptual advent of this pairing, its historical precedent, theorised and recollectable 
affect. This evolving relationship will be traced through a succession of four independent but 
connected case studies - Muriel ou le Temps d'un retour (Muriel, or the Time of a Return, Resnais, 1963), 
(nostalgia) (Frampton, 1971), Level Five (Marker, 1996) and Memento (Nolan, 2000) - films that 
encompass contrasting approaches to practice and production and emphasise different forms of 
aesthetics and techniques, but all, in their own ways, offer distinct authorial visions borne of a 
disciplinary and critical awareness, and an ambitious and mindful commitment to film’s processes 
and its history. These films treat and relate memory through a set of particular conceptual 
approaches, and this study will analyse these relationships, questioning what is memory’s exact 
filmic purchase - does this time-based medium offer a unique treatment, which makes manifest a 
distinct form of memory.  
 
A number of filmmakers and theorists see film as being a peculiarly compliant and appropriate 
vehicle for an engagement with memory, as Ben Brewster observes, ‘film has functioned as a 
machine to produce and reproduce what is outside the cinema as a set of memory images. These 
images are retrospective, but they are insistently immediate.’1 However, Belinda Morrissey 
cautions that ‘while memory is the bedrock of cinematic representation, allowing us to “see” that 
which we could never and have never seen; it remains a most unsatisfactory foundation for any 
                                                
1 Brewster, B. (1977) ‘The Fundamental Reproach (Brecht)’, Cine-Tracts, 2, Summer, p.48 
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sort of understanding.’2 Memory’s meaning is contextual, changeable and determined by a myriad 
of social, historical, personal factors and these definitions can be understood in a number of 
different ways, as R. J. A. Kilbourn elucidates, ‘(1) the process of recollection or retrieval; (2) the 
form or “place” in which memory-content is both stored and lost (the archive); and (3) the 
mnemic content itself.’3 The case studies all, one way or another, deliberately invoke memory, 
they consciously suggest and reinforce its presence, and considering their varied examples 
proffers the question, what is to be gained from this invocation - how, and why, do these films’ 
seek to be part of this compact? 
 
Film, through its technological imperative, binds images to time and has the ability to take on the 
appearance of reality. As one image, shot, sequentially follows another, until its total durational 
limit has been reached, film is seen, and remembered, like no other medium. Part of film’s appeal 
is that it exists seemingly for, but apart from, us, the audience, as Stanley Cavell observes ‘film 
awakens as much as it enfolds.’4 Films’ movements may be fixed, but they transcend time when 
they become part of our world, our consciousness, with certain scenes and images becoming 
‘tangible and self-conscious’,5 familiar and powerful memories. Film and memory seem in many 
ways to be intrinsically connected, for as Cavell writes, ‘Memories of movies are strand over 
strand with memories of my life.’6 This sense of instinctive oneness concerns the influence of 
social and cultural imperatives, the affect of time and experience, but how do films foster this 
relationship, what is it about their form - how do they make and become memories, part of 
history?   
 
 
 Approach, method, application 
 
Memories Made in Seeing’s method and composition emerged from a combination of 
deductive and inductive approaches that came into focus during the process of research. 
Through this investigation certain questions suggested themselves; a number of films, identified 
by themes and tropes, have an evident correlation and interest in memory, but does this 
                                                
2 Morrissey, B. (2011) ‘Impossible Memory: Traumatic Narratives in Memento and Mulholland 
Drive’, in: Sinha, A. and McSweeney, T. (ed.) Millennial Cinema: Memory in Global Film, London and 
New York: Wallflower, p.97 
3 Kilbourn, R. J. A. (2012) Cinema, Memory, Modernity: The Representation of Memory from Art Film to 
Transnational Cinema, London: Routledge, p.3  
4 Cavell, S. (1979) The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film, enlarged ed., Cambridge, 
Massachusett/London, U.K.: Harvard University Press, p.19 
5 Grainge, P. (ed.) (2003) Memory and Popular Film, Manchester: Manchester University press, p.9 
6 Cavell, S. (1979) The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film, enlarged ed., Cambridge, 
Massachusett/London, U.K.: Harvard University Press, p.xviii 
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propensity adhere to any particular period, how does this reflect History, what are the cultural 
implications, how do form and content affect this process?  
 
This study comprises of two parts; the first, ‘Out of Time: Memory and its Relationship with 
Film’, establishes the context and range of this study through considering the founding of 
modern memory (and the continuing influence of its conception), how memory’s definition is 
mutable and contextual – something which is emphasised by the analysis of films in Part 2 - the 
relationship between memory and film (how it has been proposed, theorised and given form) and 
film’s viewing space (how this plays a part in what is remembered), it also acts as a filter to view 
film’s memorious compact through; the second part, ‘In Time: Films and Other Memories’, 
consists the four case studies - Muriel, (nostalgia), Level Five and Memento - which consider 
memory’s effect and presence through film and its developmental application in post-war 
cinema.  
 
In this study memorious is understood to mean memorable, to evoke memories, to be full of 
memories, for instance in Jorge Luis Borges’ short story Funes the Memorious,7 the subject, Ireneo 
Funes, remembers everything he encounters, he cannot forget. The endevour to discern film’s 
memorious compact is central to this enquiry and the that memory’s evolution and development 
can be known through films’ distinct articulations, which in turn offer an essential means to 
examine form and subject. Memory’s perceived meaning and importance, which is context 
reliant, will become defined through the theoretical and contextual analysis in Part 1 and the case 
studies in Part 2.  
 
Part 1, ‘Out of Time: Memory and its Relationship with Film,’ traces, over three chapters, how 
film’s cultural and theoretical relationship with memory has evolved. (Ch. I) ‘Crisis and Intuition: 
Proust, Freud, Bergson and Memory’s Revelation’; considers the advent of modern memory, 
how it arose out of the nineteenth century ‘memory crisis’, which will be discussed in this 
chapter, the way in which it corresponds to the emergence of film, and how much of the early 
twentieth century’s intuitive conceptualising, particularly the ideas of Marcel Proust, Sigmund 
Freud and Henri Bergson, still mark today’s reckoning of what memory may mean.  
(Ch. II) ‘Against History’s Grain: A New Century and the Need to Remember’; considers Walter 
Benjamin’s vision of historical materialism, the emergence of subjective historicised narratives, 
the trauma of post-World War II and the necessity to remember, but its seeming impossibility, 
and the need to find the appropriate means to show, describe what had happened – working with 
this dilemma was fundamental to the development of a critical form of filmmaking which sought 
to answer these complex questions and came to establish a way of approaching memory and film. 
                                                
 
  21 
Also, the primary case studies will be placed in an historical context, their particular 
manifestations, indicating the timeliness of their respective methods and how these works offer a 
way of approaching and understanding, the relationship between creative concerns, form and 
history. (Ch. III) ‘Attributed Importance: Appraising and Describing film Memories’; considers 
how film is discussed, invoked, and endeavours to place it within a theorised and philosophical 
framework (if this is possible), whilst acknowledging the inherent difficulties in quoting film, the 
effect of transposing its movement into text, what this mediation can contribute to our 
understanding and the effect of recounting and analysing memories. It will elucidate how film 
tropes, aesthetics and techniques, like flash-backs, have come to be associated with memory, and 
how certain themes, subjects, types of filmmaking, like noir, are thought to have memorious 
value, and in conclusion it offers a contextual analysis of film’s contemporary place, its 
relationship with new media and what this may suggest about the representation of memory.  
 
Part 2, ‘In Time: Films and Other Memories,’ considers, through four case studies, the 
development of post-World War II film - a time unlike any before it that saw the constitution of 
new formulations and insights - and its relationship to memory. These films will introduce 
different formal and conceptual interests, concerning historic, personal, future, post-modern 
forms of memory production and their representation. (Ch. IV) ‘Muriel, or the Time of a Return: 
About Memory (and Imagination)’; Alain Resnais’ film suggests an aware and challenging set of 
specific post-war conditions - ruination, lost inhabitants, a forlorn post-war nation (and 
continent), history’s trace and the need to rebuild - asking how can the past be remembered, 
what is the purpose of remembrance and how can a film represent these questions?  
(Ch. V) ‘(nostalgia): These Times are Personal’; Hollis Frampton’s film consists of a series of 
photographs that are seen to burn and turn to ash, which are accompanied by seemingly related 
narrated autobiographical incidents. The film’s construction invites recollection, and the viewer is 
an active element in its memorial scheme as its form and content embody memory’s necessity 
whilst emphasising its uncertainty; however, does his material and method become overwhelming 
and render his film a conceptual sleight-of-hand? (Ch. VI) ‘Level Five: History, Technology and 
the Melancholic Turn’; Chris Marker’s film searches for, and endeavours to make sense of, 
History (and his own practice). It considers how private and public experience can be made 
known, reflected upon, how technology, personally and institutionally, affects the past’s 
representation and recollection; can History ever be made present? (Ch. VII) ‘Memento: Fettered 
and Systematic Recollection’; Christopher Nolan’s film offers a puzzle to be solved, and its 
solution is to be found within the film’s generic lineage, its referential relationship to all that 
proceeds it; what is the effect of its strategic hybridity, which would suggest creative intelligence 
within the safety of genre, and how is memory represented in this form?  
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These films exemplify specific alignments of history and form, the development of memory over 
the latter half of the twentieth century, before the true advent of digitisation – john Mullarkey 
writes that ‘there is no such thing as film per se but only and ever particular films, and that the 
singular empirical reality of each.’8 It is my contention that by going back, remembering these 
responses to memory’s incessant necessity, that its contemporary filmic development and the 
complexity, significance of these relations can be further contextualized, historicized, as that 
which is deemed past becomes present once again. This combination of works aims to produce 
telling conjunctions and elucidate advances in subject awareness; each film has a discernible 
resonance, place and position, which are filtered through an instinctive and critical appreciation.  
 
These films all have distinct relationships with memory and their importance, as culturally and 
memory film exemplars, is initially related and defined in the second chapter ‘Against History’s 
Grain’, and in further detail in their individual chapters.  The meaning attributed to memory, as 
mapped through these films’ varied practices, develops through each chapter and the accrued and 
coalesced understanding - this aids and abets the contextualising of Part 1 and develops its ideas 
further by thinking through practice. The films are sequenced chronologically, their particular 
forms, histories and associations all contributing to analytic consideration, and are conceived like 
a film programme, a purposeful collection, with the examination of one film informing the next, 
and so on, as each individual film influences, in some way, what proceeds and follows it. The 
selection is a new constellation and its connections reveal a particular understanding of film and 
memory’s process and purpose over this most formative of times; this contention is explored in 
‘Against History’s Grain’ and further elaborated through the case studies connections and 
associations. This combination of works attests to film’s unique memorious purpose, how their 
rendering of memory creates a distinct understanding of recollection and emphasis the 
importance of communicative method.  
 
A number of publications have been devoted to this subject, and my consideration of these 
various sources and my memories of films, compliment and compound one another, the 
experience of one associating, suggesting another and this additive process forms a disciplinary 
framework; this is one of the ways in which this study contributes to subject-related knowledge; 
an overview of the relevant literature is part of the proceeding theoretical considerations. The 
effort to bring something of a film into a text is to invoke its memory and this moving from one 
medium to another foregrounds the subjective nature of this undertaking where experiences are 
retrieved, re-visited and newly constituted. Film’s expansive cogitations are, as Mullarkey 
                                                
8 Mullarkey, J. (2009) Philosophy and the Moving image: Refractions of Reality, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, p.216 
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suggests, ‘resistant to one theory alone’9, and are open to interpretation, personal and critical 
reflection, which, of course, can alter with time and thought, and as Deleuze suggests, ‘a theory 
of cinema is not “about” cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are 
themselves related to other concepts.’10 Memories Made in Seeing’s textual analysis is attuned to 
film’s purpose and potentiality, aware that the memory of a film can actually produce many 
connected, and sometimes unexpected, other films.  
  
                                                
9 Ibid, p.6 
10 Deleuze, D. (1989) Cinema 2, Tomlinson, H. and Galeta, R. (trans.), London: Continuum, p.268 
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PART 1. 
 
 
OUT OF TIME:  
MEMORY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH FILM 
 
 
Memories 
Are hunting horns whose sound dies in the breeze 
Cors de chasse, Guillaume Apollinaire (1910-12)  
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I.  CRISIS AND INTUITION:  
 PROUST, FREUD, BERGSON AND MEMORY’S REVELATION  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat (1895) 
 
 
 In order to understand (and define) what might be termed as modern memory it is 
necessary to place it in context and this development originated in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. This chapter will trace this conceptual shift, how it came out of a ‘memory 
crisis’ and came define the next century’s forms of remembrance. Essential to this consideration 
are the perceptions of Proust, Freud and Bergson, who were all instrumental in the formulation 
of a new, intuitive, subjective understanding of memory. These ideas were to become the 
twentieth century’s guiding references. Their influence will be contextualised and their memory 
models’ relationship with film (and its theorization) assessed: what relevance do these notions 
still have? 
 
These new ideas of memory emerged concurrently with film first being seen. Film’s century, 
which could be measured from the Lumières’ L'Arrivée d'un train en gare de La Ciotat (Arrival of a 
Train at La Ciotat, 1895) to Godard’s Histoire(s) du cinéma (1998), and in this time film had 
expansive social and cultural purchase as its technological innovation and creative application 
came to describe this period, a task that it was perfectly suited for, as Benjamin wrote, ‘a certain 
art form aspires to effects which could be fully obtained only with a changed technical standard, 
that is to say, in a new art.’1 The Lumière’s and Godard’s films, in distinct ways, encapsulate 
                                                
1 Benjamin, W. (2007) ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, in: Illuminations, 
Arendt, H. (ed.), Zohn. H (trans.), New York: Schocken, p.230 
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cinema’s promise, Alison Landsberg writes that the Lumières ‘inaugurated the cinematic era on 
December 28, 1895, at the Grand Café in Paris, with the projection of Arrivée d’un train’,2 the 
film’s onrushing locomotive, speeding directly at the camera (and therefore the audience) 
symbolising film’s emotive power and future shock. Antoine de Baecque perceives that these 
works denote the beginning and end of the twentieth century3, and, considering this, Laura 
Mulvey suggests that, ‘cinema will increasingly become a source of collective memory’,4 a 
development that James Monaco emphasises: ‘Film is our collective memory.’5 This awareness, 
that the way we view film has changed, and that it will increasingly become a means to review the 
previous century, has also affected its production. Regarding Godard’s film, Giorgio Agamben 
comments, ‘cinema enters a zone of indifference where all genres tend to coincide, documentary 
and narrative, reality and fiction. Cinema will now be made on the basis of images from cinema.’6 
Cinema may depict the collective history of the twentieth century, but according to Kilbourn this 
period’s collapse of memory is ‘largely cinema’s fault’, as all has become subjective and personal.7 
This suggests that all that would make film a persuasive advocate renders it questionable, that its 
memory value must be understood within the context of film and its attendant disciplinary and 
cultural considerations and associations.  
 
Film’s century may have passed, and it is apparent that digital developments may have surpassed 
it as the cinematic material of choice, but its influence, and memory, is still very present in the 
audio/visual conception and division of space and time. Film is in many ways defined by 
technology and arguably this can be best understood in its waning – Rosalind Krauss observes, 
‘obsolescence, the very law of commodity production, both frees the outmoded object from the 
grip of utility and reveals the hollow promise of that law.’8 This sentiment, ‘like the last gleam of 
a dying star’,9 would suggest the end of a technologically driven cycle, one which began with the 
expression of need, as Krauss’s, by way of Benjamin, metaphorical notion, a de-coupling of form 
and function, allows for film to become a prized commodity, once again, only now a more 
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exclusive one; film is essentially unique, as D. N. Rodowick emphasises, ‘the aesthetic experience 
of cinema is in essence non-repeatable’, as each screening leaves a print marked by history and 
hastens its ultimate decay.10 Considering cinema, and its time, Frampton wrote, in 1983, that 
‘Cinema is the last machine. It is probably the last art that will reach the mind through the 
senses;’11 does it then follow that once this machine is gone the form will be irrevocably altered? 
Mulvey links film’s materiality, and the possibility of decay, to human consciousness and the 
‘recognition of the intractable nature of time itself.’12 This conjunction, of life and film, would 
suggest that with film’s virtual replacement, an instinctive understanding is lost, and that new 
standards of definition and preservation break, or at least change, the nature of moving images’ 
relationship with the individual and their recollection.  
 
 
 The nineteenth century’s memory crisis    
 
For the Greeks ‘Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory, was also the goddess of wisdom, 
the mother of the muses [and was then] the progenitor of the arts and the sciences’,13 a 
confluence that suggests pertinent links between film’s form and function, and its mnemonic 
potential and as the twentieth century progressed the primacy of mechanical media and the 
technical verisimilitude that came to symbolise it challenged the written word. In doing so it drew 
on the traditions of the older theatrical arts and transplanted its methods of narrativisation14 into 
a new spectacular form, compressing and linearizing its forbear, showing what was once 
described, developing its own adaptive methodology as Kilbourn contends, ‘cinema has evolved 
into not merely a “reflection” but an indispensable index of human experience – especially our 
experience of time’s passage, of the present moment, and, most importantly perhaps, of the 
past.’15 This ability, to show and encounter the representation of recognisable occurrence 
suggests that film is imbued with memory and cannot be understood without considering it as an 
essential part of its affect.  
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Memory is a complex set of actions, a subjective process of recollection and forgetfulness - we 
are often unconscious of a memory until we retrieve it - the past is never gone, and through an 
individual’s existence memories are always being recast anew. As Eric Kandel, the Nobel Prize 
winning biologist, observes, remembering ‘frees us from the constraints of time and space and 
allows us to move freely along completely different dimensions.’16 Remembrance implies 
personal relations with what has been, and as time draws an event away, and its direct actuality 
decreases, memory evolves and alters with each recollective context and this process of 
reiteration contributes to the rationalisation and narrativizing of past experience. Neuroscience 
now suggests that when we remember, our neuronal structure changes, a process termed 
reconsolidation (this is similar to Freud’s ‘retroactivity’, a ‘mode of belated understanding or 
attribution of sexual or traumatic events.’)17 Kandel divides memory into explicit (or declarative) 
and implicit (or procedural) memory; the former refers to what we say we remember, the 
‘conscious recall of people, places, objects, facts, and events’, and the latter unconsciously 
‘underlies habituation, sensitization, and classical conditioning, as well as perceptual and motor 
skills.’18 These memories can be short or long term, the former denoting immediate impressions 
and responses, thoughts and reflections, and the latter, what we might term knowledge, that 
which has been learnt and processed. All that is encountered is initially stored in the short-term 
memory and, if these experiences are deemed important, necessary, they are transferred to the 
long-term memory, and it is at this stage that meaning is really attributed.  
 
Memory is created in time and takes on different meanings at different times. This formulation, 
the acceptance of subjective reckoning, of different experiential plains, emerged towards the end 
of the nineteenth century. Prior to this, Landsberg writes, ‘Whether in the form of “organic 
memory” or national history, memory in the nineteenth century was commonly imagined as 
collective, handed down from one generation to the next.’19 The development of another 
(seemingly more contemporary) understanding of history, one imbued with interpretation and 
preference,20 arose out of the ‘memory crisis’ in which ‘the perceived discontinuities between the 
past and the future were questioned and was partly ‘prompted by fears that the past embodied in 
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cultural memory was irretrievably lost.’21 The fear, that Susannah Radstone indicates, equated to 
the desire to formulate an understanding that better suited the newly constituted age; as Scott 
McQuire suggests, this period ushered in ‘a new consciousness of time: the desire to leave the 
past behind in order to create the present competed with the sensation that time was running too 
fast, or in some way out of synch with itself.’22 This was a conscious, even antagonistic23, 
demarcation, one that was most distinctly expressed in the observational and intuitive models of 
memory and time created by Proust, Freud and Bergson.  
 
The late nineteenth century saw a different set of societal relations emerge. Marx and Engels’s 
visionary work, The Communist Manifesto (1848), encapsulated emancipatory aspirations and 
proposed a new future: 
‘All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices 
and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they 
can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at 
last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and relations 
with his kind.’24    
 
These sentiments are imbued with a conviction that change is immanent, that the old order must 
be replaced. 1848 was to be a year of unprecedented insurrection with uprisings all over Europe. 
However, these actions were all ultimately repressed, but these bloody defeats were to be a 
salutary lesson for future revolutionaries and in 1917 the Romanovs were deposed and the first 
Communist state was founded. This was a time of opportunity but also uncertainty. Marshall 
Berman writes that Marx and Engels’s words ‘resonate at once with self-discovery and self-
mockery, with self-delight and self-doubt.’25 A radical modern spirit, with a designated terrain was 
fermenting as Berman, quoting Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (1886), iterates:  
‘At times like these, “the individual dares to individuate himself.” On the other 
hand, this daring individual desperately "needs a set of laws of his own, needs his 
own skills and wiles for self-preservation, self-heightening, self-awakening, self-
liberation.” The possibilities are at once glorious and ominous.’26 
 
Individuals were attuned to change and the city was becoming the symbol of modernity - a site to 
trace history’s movement, a place of seemingly irrepressible energy that tamed natural elements, 
social and formal invention - where modern man (and woman) was situated. Baudelaire, in Crowds 
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(1869), observed, ‘It is not given to every man to take a bath of multitude; enjoying a crowd is an 
art; and only he can relish a debauch of vitality at the expense of the human species.’ His 
conurbation has a dynamic menace, an intoxicating and unnerving air and is populated by 
restlessness, driven, faithless individuals. This was also a time of rapidly developing technology, 
and the development of the film camera, by Louis Le Prince in 1888, enabled durational 
experience to be captured and reviewed for the first time. Benjamin believed such development 
occurred out of necessity, writing that ‘technology has subjected the human sensorium to a 
complex kind of training [and] There came a day when a new and urgent need for stimuli was 
met by the film.’27  Kilbourn connects this innovation with memory’s intuitive orientation, 
writing that ‘the collapsing of History into personal, subjective memory, via the photographic 
image – an image that prompts the memory of another image, in an endless vista of petite 
madeleines.’28 His allusion to Proust’s transformative encounter suggests the interjection of 
external stimuli, its unconscious passage and the connectedness of memory’s trajectory.  
 
 
Modern times, new recollections 
 
‘[If we were to] seek in our memories to ascertain what were the impressions that 
were destined to influence us to the end of our lives, the outcome is either nothing 
at all or a relatively small number of isolated recollections which are often of 
dubious or enigmatic importance.’ ‘Screen Memories’, Freud, 189929  
 
Freud suggests that memories can have a seemingly arbitrary element, that significant and 
insignificant recollections can arrive unannounced and correspond with and/or confuse in equal 
measure, that any notion of an authentic, unchanging memory is problematic, he observes, ‘I feel 
surprised at forgetting something important; and I feel even more surprise, perhaps, at 
remembering something apparently indifferent.’30 Freud’s screen memory (deckerinnerung) is a 
composite memory – where a later memory masks a repressed earlier experience – the former 
memory is recognized and it endeavours to defend the individual from the consequences of the 
latter. Kandel writes that, ‘for a memory to persist, the incoming information must be thoroughly 
processed. This is accomplished by attending to the information and associating it meaningfully 
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and systemically with knowledge already well established in memory.’31 The unconscious, a place 
out of time, was where Freud believed that perception and memory came together; Derrida 
observes that ‘Memory [for Freud] is thus not a psychical property among others; it is the very 
essence of the psyche.’32 This prioritises personal experience, locating memory in the present 
rather than distant past, making it the stuff of personal understanding rather than that of History. 
This also indicates the ‘crucial role of memory in the structure of the individual psyche’,33 how 
identity is formed (and found) from conscious (ego derived) and unconscious drives. The search 
for identity, personal knowledge, memory, is perceived as being like a ‘labyrinth’ in which 
‘protagonist must journey as in the katabases’34 Freud, in ‘A Note upon the “Mystic Writing 
Pad”’ (1925) uses a child’s toy as a material metaphor to explore memory’s method:  
‘If we imagine one hand writing upon the surface of the Mystic Writing Pad while 
another periodically raises its covering sheet from the wax slab, we shall have a 
concrete representation of the way in which I tried to picture the functioning of the 
perceptual apparatus of our mind.’35  
 
His description of the Mystic Writing Pad suggests that memory is like a palimpsest, that traces 
of preceding memories always remain, marking the unconscious, impervious to time. This recalls 
the classical art of memory, an orator’s tool, in which the first act was to fix memories on to a 
series of loci (places), which ‘are like wax tablets which remain when what is written on them has 
been effaced and they are ready to be written on again.’36 This perception also resonates with 
Proust’s memorious narratives; his testimony to memory’s enveloping power is his seven volume 
magnum opus, À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time), which was originally published 
between 1913 and 1927. In the first volume, Du Côté de Chez Swann (Swann’s Way), he describes a 
fateful, now totemic, occurrence:  
‘I raised to my lips a spoonful of tea in which I had soaked a morsel of the cake. No 
sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my palate than a shiver 
ran through me and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary thing that was 
happening to me. 
 
Undoubtedly what is thus palpitating in the depths of my being must be the image, 
the visual memory which, being linked to that taste, is trying to follow it into my 
conscious mind. But its struggles are too far off, too confused and chaotic; scarcely 
can I perceive the neutral glow into which the elusive whirling medley of stirred-up 
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colours is fused, and I cannot distinguish its form, cannot invite it, as the one 
possible interpreter, to translate for me the evidence of its contemporary, its 
inseparable paramour, the taste, cannot ask it to inform me what special 
circumstance is in question, from what period in my past life.’37  
 
The madeleine became a symbol (for memory); a means to re-encounter what has been and make 
it present once again. In ‘Picturing Proust’ Benjamin observes that ‘an event remembered has no 
bounds, being simply a key to all that came before and all that came after it.’38 Recognition is 
aided by familiarity, as previous knowledge influences understanding, drawing upon established 
schemas to aid this process, and that which is seemingly incongruous is filtered out. Proust 
communicated his dawning awareness in meditative prose; the rhythm of his words have their 
own memorial form, embedded in the desire not to forget, as Benjamin writes: ‘As everyone 
knows, Proust did not, in his work, describe a life as it had been but a life as the person who had 
lived it remembered that life.’39 Proust’s practice was one of self-absorbed contemplation of 
(re)imagining life in textual detail, interpreting and interrogating his memory, reworking and 
refining his writing - his polymorphous sentences were only curtailed at the point of no return, 
the actual printing of the manuscript.  
 
Taste may have been a catalyst, but it is the image that follows that demands further inspection - 
Benjamin writes that ‘most of the memories we seek come to us as visual images. And even the 
things that float up freely from mémoire involontaire [which is ‘much closer to forgetting than what 
is usually referred to as memory’40] are largely isolated visual images – as well as being somewhat 
mysteriously present.’41 This is contrasted with mémoire volontaire, ‘the memory of the intellect.’42As 
with Freud’s conception of the unconscious, that which settles upon us unexpectedly and is 
unbound by time and exists ‘beyond the reach of the intellect, but can enter consciousness as a 
result of a contingent sensuous association’,43 is prized and is the key to accessing all that cannot 
be forgotten.   
 
Landsberg, considering Freud’s ‘Screen Memories’, emphasises the developmental importance 
and collative affect of memory and images, writing that ‘Freud seemed to recognize that this 
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problem arises from the fact that memories are mediated through representations.’44 Sight has 
always been entwined with memory, as Bertrand Russell contended, in Analysis of Mind (1921), 
‘memory demands images.’45 The philosophical privileging of images seems to have had its 
origins with Aristotle: ‘there is something in us like a picture or impression.’46 This is further 
emphasised by Frances Yates, who writes, ‘Simonides’ invention of the art of memory rested not 
only on his discovery of the importance of order of memory, but also on the discovery that the 
sense of sight is the strongest of all senses.’47 The linking of memory and image is based on an 
empirical truth, that when we see an image we instinctively understand it has discernible pastness, 
as it represents a time before our encounter. 
 
 
 Memory is like cinema 
 
For Proust past and present flowed freely through time and his insights, in part, would 
seem to be indebted to Bergson, whose lectures on intuitive philosophy he attended at the 
Sorbonne. Bergson was the first philosopher to appraise film and the mechanical reproduction of 
images; he elucidated that photography stops time and cinema shows it.48 In Creative Evolution 
(1907) he sought to consider film’s effect and how it might be a metaphor for memory; he saw 
an analogy between the process of thought and film, how cutting from one shot to the next in 
some ways aped our comprehension of reality, as he observed in a 1914 interview:  
‘I realised it [cinema] could suggest new things to a philosopher. It might be able to 
assist in the synthesis of memory, or even the thinking process. If the circumference 
[of a circle] is composed of a series of points, memory is, like the cinema, composed 
of a series of images. Immobile, it is in a neutral state; in movement, it is life itself.’49 
 
Actuating a different, new, philosophical axis, which Russell perceived as ‘the revolt of the 
modern man of action against the authority of Greece’,50 was indicative of Bergson’s 
ambition, and in surveying his metaphysical influence (in conjunction with Freud’s 
psychological insight) John Ward writes: ‘Rejection of intellect in favour of life, which is 
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characterised by its continuity and its susceptibility to intuitive understanding, is neatly 
compatible with the belief that through dreams, drugs or automatic response we can arrive at 
some deeper awareness of ourselves.’51 Writing in the era after Méliès and the Lumière 
brothers’ initial cinematic presentations, Bergson was concerned with film’s apparatus, rather 
than its aesthetics and technique. He considered the film camera, because of its inherently 
mechanistic nature, unable to truly represent human perception: ‘The application of 
cinematographical method therefore leads to a perpetual recommencement, during which the 
mind, never able to satisfy itself and never finding where to rest persuades itself, no doubt, 
that it imitates by its instability the very movement of the real.’52 In ‘Bergson and Cinema: 
Friends or Foes?’ Paul Douglas observes that for Bergson cinema may be ‘flawed in its 
technological heart, film may never represent the indeterminacy of immediate experience. 
Nonetheless, it can evoke the mechanisms of memory.’53 Bergson’s interest in filmic 
temporality reflects what Mary-Ann Doane has described as ‘the emergence of cinematic 
time.’54 Mulvey contends that there are ‘three different kinds of cinematic time: the past of 
registration, the fictional time of the story, and the present, or remembered, time of 
viewing.’55 Film has a controllable temporal and spatial facility, and when a film cuts into 
continuous durational time a radical displacement occurs, and all film plays with, in one way 
or another, this division. 
 
Bergson believed that time could not be replicated, that no two moments are identical, and the 
present will always be inscribed with the memorial residue of the past, a notion that could 
describe the viewing of film. He perceived of two forms of time, a linear time of mechanical 
motion and intellect, and a heterogeneous time that is intuitive and continuous. For him 
‘duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely 
new’,56and cinema was seen as the perfect means to investigate this understanding. He saw the 
workings of memory in the indivisible, unstoppable nature of time, a coming together of past and 
present, whilst looking towards the future and he hypothesised that intuition enabled an 
understanding of reality and its mobility, while intellect bestowed the pragmatic ability to grasp 
this situation.  
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Freud asserted that ‘time and memory are incompatible’57 because consciousness is part of, and 
in, time, whereas memory is outside time. With this regard Doane writes that ‘Memory is 
representation itself; time is inconceivability. Time is antithetical to the notions of storage and 
retention of traces.’58 She comments that this was a ‘rare point of contact between Bergson and 
Freud.’59 Freud believed that time, leaving no trace, could not be represented, and his interest 
was in ‘that aspect of time which is not accessible to ordinary vision.’60 This undertaking was the 
preoccupation of Étienne-Jules Marey, an early pioneer of cinema, who strove to reveal the 
reality of actual movement through his chronophotograph - the photography of time.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Arab Horse Gallup (1887)  
 
 
Benjamin writes that only ‘photography, with its aids (slow-motion sequences, close-ups), will tell 
him [the spectator, how people really are]. Only photography can show him the optical 
unconscious, just as it is only through psychoanalysis that he learns of the compulsive 
unconscious.’61 The camera allowed that which previously went unnoticed to be revealed. This 
facility, Richard Allen writes, also ‘redeems aspects of shared experience and invests it with new 
inter-subjective experience’,62 as the artwork takes on communal possibility. However, Benjamin 
cautioned, mechanical reproduction also ‘reduces the scope of the play of the imagination’63 - like 
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Proust he gave importance to mémoire involontaire and mémoire volontaire, privileging the 
former and placing photography and film in the less authentic realm of the latter. Landsberg 
observes whilst Benjamin was composing his Arcades Project, his last and incomplete work, ‘the 
opposition between mémoire volontaire and mémoire involontaire’,64 lost their original application. 
Located in the Paris arcades, once the most modern of urban apparitions, and conceived as a 
study, the consolation of place, history and the individual, ‘an account of memory in which 
memory is lodged not in the individual body as either mémoire volontaire or mémoire involontaire but in 
configurations of material objects.’65 This new culture invoked mediated memories and that 
which can be expressly identified as authentic diminished. In this conception he foresaw the 
commodification of experience and new forms of mass identification.  
 
In 1916, the year of D. W. Griffith’s Intolerance, Hugo Münsterberg published The Film: a 
Psychological study: the Silent Photoplay. His consideration of film’s effect would seem to be 
influenced by Bergson’s observations: 
‘The motion which he sees [the spectator] appears to be a true motion, and yet is created by his 
own mind. The afterimages of the successive picture are not sufficient to produce  
a substitute for the continuous outer stimulation; the essential condition is rather 
the inner mental activity which unites the separate phases in the idea of connected 
action.’66 
 
Münsterberg, like Bergson, knew cinema to be illusion, which has the affect of reality. He 
believed the film spectator was responsible for bring its succession of images together and 
making sense of them. When describing memory Münsterberg offers a conception similar to 
Bergson’s conjecture. He contends that ‘Memory looks towards the past, expectation and 
imagination toward the future.’67 For Bergson there are two types of memory, ‘image-memory’, 
habitual and representational, and ‘pure memory’ - Mullarkey writes that ‘pure memory is not a 
mental duplicate referring to the historical past, rather, the past really persists into the present 
and this survival actually manifests itself in our recollections!’68 Bergson believed that the past 
may seem to overwhelm the present, with only the most pressing ‘snapshots’ managing to insert 
themselves into our memory, and that cinematographical technology provided a means to 
describe this time slice. Our memories may resonate, like chimes at midnight, but the actuality of 
what we have experienced soon dissipates, and memory finds its own purpose. Ward writes that 
‘pure memory which is “perfect from the onset” alone has aesthetic value because it forms the 
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raw material of art.’69 This suggests that time is overwhelming and only art can make sense of its 
passage (and our consciousness); memory is more than a preserving agent, it is also a creative 
catalyst.  
 
Münsterberg, unlike Bergson, was interested in film’s content and technique and through it he 
found a different metaphorical application, one in which the cutting between different temporal 
plains, and narrative strands, informs an understanding of memory and its place in time:     
‘Memory breaks into present events by bringing up pictures of the past: the 
photoplay is doing this by its frequent cut-backs, when pictures of events long past 
flit between those of the present. The imagination anticipates the future or 
overcomes reality by fancies and dreams; the photoplay is doing all this more richly 
than any chance imagination would succeed in doing.’70  
 
This linkage was to become influential, as Maureen Turim’s observation emphasises, ‘Memory, in 
its psychoanalytic and philosophical dimensions, is one of the concepts inscribed in flashbacks.’71 
Intolerance’s photoplay indicated film’s narrative and temporal complexity, how it could describe 
the world in a unique fashion, and in stressing ‘the active mental process of phenomenon’, 
Monaco writes, ‘Münsterberg established a vital basis for theories of film as an active process.’72 
His sense of film’s material disposition, the communing between shots, the memories that they 
invoke, describes sentient inference, all that potential exists in, and in-between, times, film’s 
manifest possibility.   
 
Bergson saw the advent of cinema and he lived to witness its development. Citizen Kane (Welles, 
1941) was released in the year of his death, but he never recanted his fundamental criticism, that 
film's technological reliance made it unable to truly represent experience. For Bergson, cinema 
was but one of the many metaphors he utilised to fathom space and time. His method, according 
to Russell, may have been ‘mere play on words’,73 an ‘imaginative picture of the world, regarded 
as a poetic effort… in the main not capable of either proof or disproof’ and which ‘always exalts 
the sense of sight at the expense of the other senses’,74 but it is arguably Bergson’s turn of 
metaphorical phrase, and other-worldly countenance that continues to make his theories 
approachable and productive. Gaston Bachelard observes that ‘in the last analysis, his images are 
                                                
69 Ward, J. (1968) Alain Resnais, or the Theme of Time, London: Secker & Warburg, p.14 
70 Münsterberg, H. (1970) The Film: a Psychological study: the Silent Photoplay in 1916, New York: 
Dover Publications, p.74 
71 Turim, M. (1989) Flashbacks in Film: Memory and History, New York and London: Routledge, p.2 
72 Monaco, J. (1981) How to Read a Film: The Art, Technology, History, and Theory of Film and Media, 
revised ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.315 
73 Russell, B. ‘The Philosophy Of Bergson’ in: (1992) Logical and Philosophical Papers 1909-13, 
Slater, J. G. (ed.), London/New York: Routledge, p.333 
74 Ibid, p.336 
  39 
rare, it is as though, for him, imagination were entirely metaphorical.’75 Even though Russell 
found scant reward in Bergson’s writings, he became curious enough to visit the cinema for the 
first time, and later wrote to his lover, Lady Ottoline Morrell, ‘At last we went out to a 
cinematograph to see if it bore out Bergson’s philosophy, which it did.’76   
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Citizen Kane (1941) 
 
 
In his consideration of cinema Bergson chose to concentrate on its mechanised deliverance. He 
saw its technological bias as a fundamental hindrance to its ability to communicate thought, so 
imbued as it was with illusionistic manipulation. The rapidity of edits has increased over time, 
with shots being afforded less duration, but this, according to Bergson, is of little consequence, 
as he was interested in the metaphorical application of film’s ability to specify duration, for he 
believed, ‘Time is an invention or it is nothing at all.’77 His confrontation of new technology and 
its claims of visionary emancipation continue to have interest as his thesis challenged the material 
conceit of moving images (and the illusion of movement that they create) and drew attention to 
the discrepancy between our perception and the actuality of what we encounter.  
 
In distinct and connected ways, Proust, Freud and Bergson elucidated memory’s procedure in a 
way that foreshadowed later neuro-scientific approaches, as Kandel observes, ‘idea that different 
aspects of visual perception might be handled in separate areas of the brain was predicted by 
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Freud at the end of the nineteenth century.’78 Adorno, with regard to Proust, had also 
acknowledged this insight, stating that his work ‘is a single effort to express necessary and 
compelling perceptions about men and their social relations which science can simply not 
match.’79 The contemporary efforts to map memory’s composition indicates instinctive 
reasoning’s profound realisation, an understanding that preceded the molecular evidence, as 
Proust and Freud prized unconscious memories, perceiving them to hold more revelatory 
importance, personal truth.80 This perception was to be taken on by Benjamin, and others, in the 
developing century. The next chapter will consider this conceptual progression, the need to 
remember and represent a time of great change and bloodshed, the challenges in formulating an 
appropriate response to History. 
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II.  AGAINST HISTORY’S GRAIN:  
A NEW CENTURY AND THE NEED TO REMEMBER	  
 
 
  
Fig. 5 Angelus Novus (1920) 
 
 
As the twentieth century advanced radicalism and tragedy seemed to be its twin 
imperatives. Benjamin, considering history, envisaged an angel, after the Paul Klee drawing 
Angelus Novus, who would ‘awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed.’1 This 
entity is being propelled into the future by a storm that Benjamin terms ‘progress.’ These winds 
make no distinction, some would wish to intervene, but the storm ‘blowing from Paradise’2 is 
beyond the angel’s powers, and the twentieth century’s trajectory reinforces this sense of fatalistic 
burden.  
 
This chapter will consider Benjamin’s historical materialist vision, its relation to subjective 
histories, the trauma of the World Wars, and, for film, World War II particularly, the need to 
remember seemingly impossible actions and find the means to articulate them. A number of 
post-war films were to take on these memories and new critical practices were to offer a way into 
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this inconceivable subject. Film’s creative and conceptual response to time and its infractions will 
be considered and how cinema became an essential expression of remembrance, with films such 
as Hiroshima Mon amour (Resnais, 1959), Le Chagrin et La Pitié (The Sorrow and the Pity, Ophuls, 
1969), Tout va bien (Dzigia Vertov Group, 1972), Shoah (Lanzmann, 1985), indicating the concerns 
of their own eras and aspiring, in their own ways, to make, and be part of, History.  
 
Traditionally history was considered to be impersonal, the story of public events ‘that have 
occurred outside the archive of personal experiences’,3 a belief that ‘constructs rather than 
reveals.’4 In considering History’s development, how it was recorded and understood, and its 
twentieth century reformulation, it becomes apparent that film was, in some way, party to this 
subjective review. This evident re-imagining of History, its representation on film, has been 
derided, seen, as Michael Chopra-Gant writes, ‘to present a simplified and hyperbolic version of 
the past’,5 but can film actually aid our understanding of the past, offering another film oriented 
history?  
 
Film’s facility for verisimilitude affords it seemingly historical validity, in its fictional and non-
fictional forms, which makes even dramas appear to be laden with documentary substance: as 
Michael Witt observes, all films ‘serve to haphazardly document human attitudes, cultures, 
customs, behaviour, clothing, and so on, thereby providing the historian with an incomparably 
rich audiovisual archive of the world.’6 As time passes a film’s history, and the history of its time, 
influence its reading. Memories of other times are often given credence by moving image 
documentation and/or dramatization, as they communicate an idea of what has been with 
believable authority.  
 
 
New concepts of history and memory 
 
The nineteenth century’s memory crisis had partly occurred due to a mismatch between 
technological developments, societal changes and a historical narrative, which was perceived as 
being independent from such matters - Benjamin characterised this situation thus: history 
‘displays its Scotland Yard badge’, a procedural tendency ‘that showed things “as they really 
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were” was the strongest narcotic of the century.’7 Carolyn Steedman suggests that that by the 
nineteenth century History had ‘usurped the functions of memory’, and that it ‘might be 
understood as just one more technology of memory, one of a set of techniques developed [by the 
academy] in order that societies might remember.’8 This debilitating acceptance of history's 
inevitability often leads to the seeking of solace in the past, but as E. H. Carr cautions this is ‘a 
symptom of loss of faith and interest in the present or future.’9 This foregrounds memory’s 
subjective nature, the inference that it influences any reading, that history’s record is the product 
of interpretation.10  
 
Marx’s work is ingrained with a historical understanding that is founded in economic 
interpretation, an analysis of society (and class struggle) that suggests the possibility of a different, 
radiant future. Benjamin, in ‘On the Concept of History’, writes that, ‘Thinking involves not only 
the movement of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a 
constellation saturated with tensions, it gives that constellation a shock, by which thinking is 
crystallized as a monad.’11 He believed history must be challenged, there was an implicit desire to 
forsake that which has passed for History, the march of victors, and to establish a new causal 
agency that declares ‘knowledge within the historical moment is always knowledge of the 
moment. In drawing itself together in that moment – in the dialectical image – the past becomes 
part of humanity’s involuntary memory.’12 This has a redeeming purpose that is bound up in an 
emancipatory progress, and the arbiter of this, the historical materialist, must uncover that history 
which is mostly hidden. It also suggests that memory is changeable, that it can be shaped by 
contextual parameters that service external imperatives. As the twentieth century progressed a 
new understanding – in which history was seen as a ‘social process’ formed of individuals13 - 
became accepted.  
 
History, Foucault offers, is the ‘most erudite, the most aware, the most conscious, and possibly 
the most cluttered area of our memory; but it is equally the depths from which all beings emerge 
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into their precarious, glittering existence.’14 Steedman writes that this interpretation suggests that 
History ‘has provided a way of thinking about what is in that particular place’ - memory.15 And to 
interrogate it we should not be ‘concerned with History as stuff’ its content, but focus on its 
‘process, as ideation, imaging and remembering.’16 This is a place populated by people and their 
ideas and thoughts. For Benjamin there can be no homogeneous universality, no cultural 
embrace with history’s officiators, because the ‘historical materialist keeps his distance from all of 
this. He has to brush against the grain.’17 Through his multifarious understanding he developed a 
critical shift in cultural interest, as he sought ‘historical significance in “the rags, the trash” of 
commodity culture’, and emphasised the ‘transitory and shifting meanings of historical 
phenomena.’18 He was fascinated with contemporary being, the ephemera of life, its mercantile 
interactions, its patterns and resonances, the places flâneurs haunt and Baudelaire once dwelt: 
‘what intoxication it is in the city of opportunity, in this network of good fortune, to multiply 
oneself, to make oneself ubiquitous and be on the lookout for the approach of lady luck at any 
one of ten different street corners.’19 This place, a truly modern manifestation, enabled the 
locating and reflective pursuit of his social and cultural preoccupations.  
 
Benjamin’s desire was to see revolutionary change and for the arts to contribute to this, as he 
writes, ‘history decays into images, not into stories’;20 the dialectical image was to be a 
provocation, an incendiary means of deliverance and delivery of history. Film, for Benjamin, 
writes Allen, ‘represents the “real” as the synthetic traces of fragmented and fragmentary 
perceptions of modern urban perception.’21 Benjamin, in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’, compares the cameraman to a surgeon, suggesting ‘Magician and 
surgeon compare to painter and cameraman. The painter maintains in his work a natural distance 
from reality, the cameraman penetrates deeply into its web.’22 This movement affords a gathering 
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of knowledge à la Vertov’s man with a movie camera, in which the camera becomes a scientific-
like instrument for revealing truth. This social conception would see film as a revolutionary 
means to undo cultural bounds and emancipate the image, writing that ‘for the first time in world 
history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on 
ritual.’23 This faculty stripped away a work’s ‘cult value’,24 and made it present, permitting the 
audience to take a more critical stance. Adorno observes how ‘Benjamin did not elaborate on 
how deeply some of the categories he postulated for film - exhibition, test - are imbricated with 
the commodity character which his theory opposes.’25In this regard Adorno emphasised that 
‘There can be no aesthetics of cinema, not even a purely technological one, which would not 
include the sociology of the cinema’;26 and how this social inscription needs to be considered and 
understood otherwise film will always fail to deliver on its ‘promise’27 – that it tantalises but this 
is only ever a distraction, an illusion. For Adorno ‘all truly modern art assumes the function of 
dialectical theory’28 and his critique of film, first published in 1966, iterated one of the main 
concerns for critically engaged filmmakers, how should they situate the ‘spectator as subject’?29 
 
 
 Depicting the impossible  
 
After the profound tragedy of Auschwitz Adorno asserted that it was no longer possible 
to write poems.30 Radstone suggests that his dictum was not intended to be an embargo but work 
must counter its ‘impossibility’, that ‘If the entire field of representation was contaminated by this 
event whose incommensurability precluded adequate representation, then art was the only – 
albeit the apparently impossible – hope.’31 History needs to be remembered, but how to 
represent that which is not representable?  
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This time was a time of ‘bruised’ memory, as Carol Mavor observes, its frequency being a 
blackened blue.32 Hiroshima Mon amour (1959) is one of her key references. Resnais’s first feature 
would ponder this (seemingly impossible) need to comprehend, tell history; it begins with a 
startling set of images - intimate, dark, ash covered, entwined male and female forms - and an 
exchange between its protagonists, which sets the film’s tone. 
  
 
 
 Il: You saw nothing in Hiroshima. Nothing. 
 Elle: I saw everything. Everything.  
 Fig. 6 Hiroshima Mon amour (1959) 
 
 
In these words the imponderable inexplicability of being is voiced; what does it mean to see 
Hiroshima? The film’s protagonist, the woman from Nevers, who is in Hiroshima to make a film 
about peace, visits the rebuilt city’s Peace Memorial Museum, which is dedicated to the memory 
of 6 August 1945, but how can the horror ever be really known or shown? This is the film’s 
paradox, but it also indicates that some have seen, and cannot forget, their burden is to bear 
witness to all that which cannot really be known by others - questions are asked knowing there 
cannot be an answer; it is the posing of the question which is of paramount importance. The 
conscious depiction of temporal space may be an immemorial preserve, but the compulsion to 
do so is induced by a need to show what is now and what has been.  
 
‘Do you know nothing? Do you see nothing? Do you remember nothing?’ wrote T. S. Eliot in 
The Wasteland (1922). This last century sentiment expresses the desire to know, but the 
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acknowledgement that real history (and its memory) is incomprehensible: Landsberg suggests 
there is a need to remember impossible occurrence because, ‘it is about finding ways to “burn in” 
memories so that they might become meaningful locally, so that they can become the grounds 
for political engagement in the present and the future.’33 Film would offer a form of hitherto 
unknown memorial, consideration, with its distinct facility for depiction being a uniquely 
communicable, and emotive, semblance of experience. To return to Adorno: how can all that 
needs to be remembered be made known, what is its appropriate form and how is this vision 
communicated? 
 
To write of memory and its filmic formulation and resonance it is necessary to establish a sense 
of context, an indication of some of the events, experiences that occurred and have a bearing, 
one way or another, on the films that occupy this study. The post-World War II, Cold War era 
was a time of opposing grand narratives, unresolved trauma, pressing fear and uncertainty. It was 
also a time when the old order saw its precessions diminish, power fade, and the political and 
cultural tide turn and ideas that once resided in the surety of empire and certified dominions were 
challenged; internal and external tensions were exacerbated as claims for independence and new 
freedoms were pressed with a resolute determination. This season of upheaval was also the 
occasion to try and quantify all that had been, find the means to represent it, consider what 
should constitute society and how its citizens could contribute to its social cohesion and 
economic stability. If poetry could not be written in this climate, if memory is impossible, how 
could this place be truly recognised, exposed? The need to know and process, in some way, 
present memories - so filled with guilt and pain - actually saw a cultural blossoming, with 
experiments in narrative, documentary and experimental filmmaking, that saw filmmakers 
endeavour to express thought, to use practice as a means to contemplate, analyse and agitate.  
 
In the post-war films of Italian Neorealism and other works European society was seen to be in 
flux, between pre and post war generations. Rossellini’s war trilogy Roma Città Aperta (Rome Open 
City, 1945), Paisà (1946), Germany, Year Zero (1948) moved from the actuality of war to its effect, 
and indicated that something had fundamentally changed, that Europe needed to be rebuilt and 
also re-thought. This was a time of near and present memory, in which the horror and hardship 
of war, and its aftermath, had been replaced by the binary pull of geo-politics, and personal place 
and affect was being questioned as never before.  In Antonioni’s L'Avventura (1960) a young 
woman disappears from an island in the Mediterranean. The film is a mystery without 
conclusion. Her lover and best friends search but their investigation does not offer any 
conclusive evidence and is but a temporary distraction from unfulfilled and isolated lives. In  
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Bergman’s The Silence (1963) two sisters are on a night train journeying home. They stop in a 
fictitious central European state, which is mobilizing for war, in the town of Timoka, where an 
incomprehensible language is spoken. The sisters try to make sense of their claustrophobic 
situation, but they seem unable to communicate, and the ties of family and nationality are 
seemingly destructive. The film’s characterisation invokes all that has been and that which may 
happen, the memory of Europe’s self-destruction, subsequent ideological partition and possible 
future conflict. At this time Europe appeared to be enjoying an economic recovery, but as the 
panicked run on the Rome stock exchange in Antonioni’s L'Eclisse (The Eclipse, 1962) illustrates, 
the future is far from being assured and the memories of recession and political repression are 
never far away. The prevailing sensibility of these films is of a rootless searching, a profound 
uncertainty about the future, but they also show the active advancement of film’s thinking form.  
 
Many of the characters in these films enjoyed a new affluence but they lacked direction; they 
pursue sensual pleasure, but the depicted cold-war world is without sustaining spiritual belief and 
that which preoccupies the characters’ lives does not satisfy them, they want something more, 
before they also disappear. The final scene of Rossellini’s Viaggio in Italia (Journey to Italy, 1954) 
emphasises this listlessness. The film’s protagonists, Katherine and Alex Joyce (Ingrid Bergman 
and George Sanders), a disconnected couple considering divorce, only rediscover their love when 
they become caught up in a religious procession. Its ritualistic veneration, an echo of the past, 
shocks the couple out of their stupor allowing instinct and memory to override self-regard, as if 
they are trying to recover some forgotten promise, a sense of belief, which is now absent. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Journey to Italy (1954) 
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There is a widely held belief that ‘the sense of personal identity that each of us has is a sense of 
continuity through time’,34 suggests Mary Warnock, and that a ‘person and “his” [or ‘her’] past 
are one and the same’35 - how is this past made known and what is its purpose? Steedman writes, 
that ‘the modern way of being in the modern world’ is ‘expressive of a fever to know’ the past36 
in which it ‘has become a place of succour and strength, a kind of home.’37This is largely a means 
of defining identity, but this ‘search for what is lost (in an individual past or a public historical 
past) alters it, as it goes along, so that every search becomes impossible.’38 This may be 
understood, but there is still a desire to seek that, which might authenticate, in some way, our 
existence and confirm our place and belonging. This sense can be formed through personal 
memories and more expansive histories; it can also be sought through other sources. This 
narrative investigation is developed further in chapter IV, ‘Muriel, or the Time of a Return: 
About Film, Memory and Imagination.’ 
 
The post-war era may have been traumatized, numbed - again and again new inhumanity was 
perpetrated - but this did galvanize new thinking, forms of resistance, which found political, 
social and cultural form. This sensibility is evident in Resnais’ Muriel, or The Time of Return (1963), 
which eschews the usual filmic tells, that indicate changes in temporal location, and shows all 
time as a whole, without structural differentiation, as imagined by Bergson. His film would 
dissect time and topography, foregrounding the temporal effect on the personal and physical 
environment. 
 
 
 
 Fig. 8 Muriel, or the Time of a Return (1963) 
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The formal experimentation and philosophical resonance that Resnais's first films advanced are 
sedimented in time, shards to be perused, indicating something of the past’s relation to other 
pasts, for as Bergson observes, ‘What I call “my present” has one foot in my past and another in 
my future.’39 Resnais is not generally considered to be a political director, but Muriel advances a 
form of film imagination, which offers a myriad of resonances, which challenges the spectator to 
think about time, form and narrative experience. He was interested in personal histories, the 
depiction of the intricacy and mystery of relationships, place and history, what Marguerite Duras, 
who wrote Hiroshima mon amour, referred to as ‘false documentary.’40 In the mid-century to 
consider history was to perceive the effect of war. France may have found some peace, but the 
marks of conflict were inescapable and all works that sought to depict the contemporary realm 
had an implicit or explicit political sensibility as they were scarred by contact and memory.  
 
 
 Documentary and the need to remember (all that has Just past)  
 
The relevance of memory directly relates to the age of its inception, and times and places 
of discernible trauma necessitate a more pressing need to remember, to better understand what 
has occurred, but this is a perilous preoccupation, for the reason and means are always 
contestable. Carr observes that ‘before he [the historian] begins to write history, he is the product 
of history’,41 a sentiment that can be applied to other adjudicators of the past; Night and Fog 
(Resnais, 1959) and Shoah (Lanzmann, 1985), both reflexive documentaries that are direct 
reflections and representations of the Nazi programme of racial extermination, are products of 
different ages and this perspective, affected by historical proximity to the subject, societal and 
cultural discernment and methodological developments indicate that the need to remember may 
have some constancy but all else changes with time. Regarding Night and Fog McQuire writes that 
it ‘it respects history’s demand to show “what really happened” while acknowledging the 
impossibility of ever really showing what happened.’42 Concerning the Holocaust, Jean 
Baudrillard writes ‘forgetting extermination is part of extermination, because it is also the 
extermination of memory, of history’, 43 and the production of this ‘artificial memory’ does not 
provoke real regret, only its simulacrum.  
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Both Resnais and Lanzmann’s films, in distinct ways, seek to make the past memorable, still 
relevant and contemporaneous once again, for as Ward states: ‘Auschwitz did not end in 1945: it 
exists in all we are.’44 David Rodowick states, ‘the aesthetics and the ethics of film are closely 
linked to historical powers of documenting’,45 in that when a subject is filmed the process aids 
and abets the forming of History. Allen writes, regarding the importance of historical 
conceptuality, that ‘the task of a historically informed film theory is to formulate the way in 
which individual subjectivity is articulated with “trans-individual” subjectivity over time.’46 These 
films do more than invoke the past; they make History present through reflective film practice 
and act as agents for active preservation, real encounters. ‘History does not exist until it is 
created’,47 writes Rosenstone, and it is continually being rewritten in this act of coming into 
being, and films can recreate the past in a way that is not possible in any other medium.  
 
 
 
‘A frontal look at horror.’ Claude Lanzmann48  
Fig. 9 Shoah (1985) 
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History’s remembrance correlates with society, as Tom Conley, with reference to Marc Augé and 
his memories of War World II, writes, there is an implied ‘duty to remember’,49 not just for Augé 
but his generation, that the occupation of France cannot be forgotten and it should be actively 
remembered, lest we forget its compromises and entanglements. But, when the past is 
encountered, it is never what it once was and memories fall ‘into partially historical, partially 
personal forms of memory.’50 Marcel Ophuls’ The Sorrow and the Pity  (1968) centres on the 
wartime inhabitants of Vichy-controlled Clermont-Ferrand - it shows fascist and opportunistic 
collaborators, resistance fighters of various allegiances, and all manner of other citizens - 
emphasising that history resists simple narratives and that memory is partial, rarely unaffected by 
the passage of time and is re-cast to suit the prevailing ethos. Its scope challenged the established 
Free French legend, a complex, often conflicting, and involved account that exposed self-serving 
revisionism, but this reality was problematic for those invested in the myth and as a result the 
film was subject to state censorship.  
 
Bill Nichols, in Representing Reality, writes ‘Documentary offers access to a shared, historical 
construct. Instead of a world, we are offered access to the world.’51 But which world and how is it 
offered? In the introduction to Imagining Reality Kevin Macdonald and Mark Cousins write that 
John Grierson ‘has a lot to answer for’ in defining the only documentary films worth making as 
‘utilitarian, pedagogic and impersonal.’52 But as Stella Bruzzi points out, Grierson’s understanding 
was not inflexible, describing documentary with reference to Robert Flaherty’s films as ‘the 
creative treatment of actuality.’53 This telling phrase, which was also iterated by Maya Deren to 
different ends,54 indicates the inherent contradictions within the form - reality is manipulated 
through technical imposition, and the results are made manifest through critical and ideological 
exposition. In this context actuality is bound up with notions of authenticity. In Grierson’s 
model, as invoked by Macdonald and Cousins, the documentary film poses and responds to 
questions, for instance ‘what was Vichy controlled Clermont-Ferrand like?’ and the resulting 
investigations form the film.  
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Documentaries are not ‘a direct reflection of the past’,55 and as Nichols emphasises, ‘the notion 
of any privileged access to reality that exists “out there”, beyond us, is an ideological effect.’56 
Material is structured in a manner that creates its own meanings and history is appraised from 
this assemblage, arranged with linear adherence, and the form’s own precedents. The value 
assigned to authenticity is founded in the interrogation of History and the history of film (which 
every film contributes to) and in the way that the viewer is provoked to reflect on what has been 
seen, heard, Rosenstone suggests the best historical films will: 
1.   Show not just what happened in the past but how what happens means to us. 
2.   Interrogate the past for the sake of the present. Remember that historians are 
working for the living, not the dead. 
3.   Create a historical world complex enough so that it overflows with meaning; so that its 
meanings cannot be contained or easily expressed in words.57 
 
Films may represent, consider historical experiences, but their treatment is always more than a 
factual presentation. Baudrillard contends ‘cinema contributed to the disappearance of history’ 
and was responsible for its ‘secularization’58 and it can only can reanimate, be a semblance of, all 
that it has hastened the demise of.  However, Rosenstone believes, ‘film has been part of a search 
for new ways to express a relationship to the past’,59 that in a time when History’s course can be 
individuated the reflexive film’s attention offers new ways of considering what has been, an 
‘intransitive middle voice’, one that can operate between scholarship and poetry, be an expression of 
experience.60 This potentiality can facilitate a varied, textured register, a place of thought, beyond 
any omnipotent presence. In the latter part of the twentieth century a new form of documentary, 
the cinematic essay, developed, a self-reflexive work, which could consider all that had been 
through personal relation and reflection, Jay Ruby observes, ‘To be reflexive is to be not only 
self-aware, but sufficiently self-aware to know what aspects of self are necessary to reveal.’61 Its 
categorisation alluded to its literary forebear, in its expression of authorial ideas, and showed 
them through images and accompanying spoken and framed text, Marker’s Lettre de Sibérie (Letter 
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from Siberia, 1958) is thought to be one of the first examples. Nichols, who has proposed ‘the 
most influential genealogy’ according to Bruzzi,62 writes,  
‘Realism provides unproblematic access to the world through traditional physical 
representation and untroubled transference of psychological states from character to 
viewer (by means of acting style, narrative structure, and cinematic techniques such 
as point-of-view shots). Reflexive documentaries will employ such techniques only 
to interrupt and expose them.’63  
 
This coming together of essayistic investigation and audio/visual montage suggested a subjective 
voice, subject awareness and historical position, and uses tense and tone to convey ideas; a 
formulation that would seem to be explicitly imbued with memories and is further explored in 
chapter VI, ‘Level Five: Technology, History and the Melancholic Turn.’ This practice’s 
evolution saw it emphasise experiences and social developments, often perceived injustices, 
which occurred beyond the mainstream’s remit. Films that offer reflexive knowledge, that 
indicate film’s scope, form, reason, also reinforce the idea that history can be pluralistic and this 
mode’s questioning of form and content, Nichols writes, can heighten consciousness in the 
viewer;64 this challenge is like Benjamin’s desire to undo the perception of History’s stately 
progress.   
 
 
A radical challenge to film’s narrative inclination  
 
The European critical theories from the 1960s onwards developed a confrontational 
critique of narrative cinema, as Mulvey, observes, that a ‘politically and aesthetically avant-garde 
cinema is now possible, but it can only exist as a counterpoint [to mainstream film].’65 In this 
understanding narrative cinema was perceived as a ‘cinema of consumption’66 that offered 
seamless continuity, identification, ‘the hold of the image’67 and psychological disclosure, in 
which, ‘it tells the truth against which we can measure the [film’s] discourses.’68 This approach 
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directly attacked classic narrative cinema’s unifying gaze, its closed discourse, defining 
experimental film in oppositional terms; it was to be everything classic cinema was not, a 
challenge to the dominant ideological position, politicising issues and articulating its critique at 
the level of form and content, exposing illusionist practice and its embedded methodology. 
Indicative of this approach, Jean-Louis Baudry asks, ‘does consumption of the product bring 
about a “knowledge effect”, or is the work concealed?’69 Michele Aaron summarises this position 
as,  ‘The film apparatus produces the subject and positions the spectator as false author of the 
image.’70 Benjamin had suggested that the audience’s identification with the film camera allowed 
them to achieve a mobile vision, that ‘the audience takes the position of the camera; its approach 
is that of testing.’71In most instances the technical means of presentation remains hidden, and, as 
Baudry observed, if the cinematic apparatus breaks down ‘the spectator is bought abruptly back 
to discontinuity’, and the audience’s state of suspended disbelief is broken as the illusion is 
revealed.72 The influence of technology mediates our relationship to the illusion. For Baudry the 
technical passage that excited Benjamin had become a means of suppression, a cultural 
commodity within an ideological system.  
 
In the ‘The Two Avant-gardes’ (1975) Peter Wollen defined the radical cinema in binary terms, 
‘in Europe today there are two distinct avant-gardes. The first can be identified loosely with the 
Co-op movement [and by affiliation non-European films like (nostalgia)]. The second would 
include film-makers such as Godard, Straub and Huillet [and by association the radical 
documentaries of Marker].’73 Despite there being ‘points of contact’ the fundamental contention 
was to be one of politicality and how this was to be made manifest. He writes,  
‘[The supporters of Godard] are constantly forced to assert that being “political” is 
not in itself enough, that there must be a break with bourgeois norms of diegesis, 
subversion and deconstruction of codes – a line of argument which, unless it is 
thought through carefully or stopped arbitrary at some safe point, leads inevitably 
straight into the positions of the other avant-garde.’74  
 
His formulation privileges an avant-garde who would work with some form of critically aware 
narrative. Later, Wollen was to say ‘for me the problem is to find a way of working with 
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narrative.’75 This politicized position would trace its lineage from the Avant-gardism of early 
Soviet cinema and Brechtian theatre, whose aphorisms - ‘for art to be “unpolitical” means only 
to ally itself with the ruling group’,76 and ‘it is a dangerous illusion to think that any sort of 
revolutionary statement can be made in an essentially reactionary style’77 – came to define the 
approach of the political avant-garde. Writing in the early 1980s Heath commented, 
‘Alternative practices are alternative in so far as they transform the relations of 
representation against representing, against the universalising conditions of exchange; 
representation held to use (a definition of Brechtian distanciation), that is, to division, 
disunity, disturbance of the (social) contact (of film).’78 
 
Brecht considered his work to be a prelude to action. His radicalism, exposing the illusion of 
naturalism through the representation of reality, through his theories of distanciation 
(Verfremdungseffekt), Epic theatre (Episches theatre) and later the teaching play (Lehrstücke) 
sought to engage his audience in a form of critique, one that would de-naturalize society, show 
that its structures are a construct, not pre-ordained, and, therefore, it can be changed and the 
intention of a truly revolutionary practice is to make this occur. His work posed primary radical 
questions: how should populist forms be used to enliven and mobilise an audience, and how 
oppositional can the political vanguard be before alienating the very audience it wishes to reach? 
 
Straub and Huillet’s History Lessons (1972), based on Brecht’s ‘fragment novel’,79 The Business 
Affairs of Mr. Julius Caesar (1939), exemplifies film’s interpretation of his techniques. The texts that 
Straub and Huillet base their films on are not reverentially realised; it is never forgotten that they 
have a pre-history, another context, as Walsh writes, ‘just as Brecht liberates us from the 
normative image of Caesar, so Straub/Huillet free us from visual/aural chains of cinematic 
illusion.’80 But, as Anja Kirschner, talking more recently, has commented, in a reversal of radical 
cinema’s critique, the critical avant-garde’s ‘attack on narrative filmmaking have largely been 
worn out or co-opted. If anything, “criticality” itself has become an empty or aestheticised 
posture in contemporary art – shorn of any actual political position or engagement.’81 Her 
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sentiment suggests a divide, critical and artistic, between current practice and earlier radical film; 
Straub and Huillet’s films consider a situation - its social, historical, cultural conditions - and 
indicate that a critique is not possible whilst operating within a classic realist form.  
 
In 1968 Godard and Jean-Pierre Gorin formed the Dziga Vertov Group with the expressed 
intention of making political cinema. The last feature film that they produced was Tout va bien 
(1972). The film embodied a political subject (industrial unrest, its media coverage and personal 
responsibility), form (the adaptation of Brechtian ideas within a narrative structure) and 
commercial strategy (the self-reflexive casting of stars Jane Fonda and Yves Montand),82 as 
Godard and Gorin sought an engaged but broad audience, whilst being aware of their potential 
indifference to the film’s politics. The film’s form suggested that the audience for politics and 
cinema are not necessarily one and the same, and that working with dominant codes, however 
subverted, is justified by the intention of bring them together, but Adorno warns, ‘The demand 
for a meaningful relationship between technique, material and content does not mix well with the 
fetishism of means.’83 After the dissolution of the Dzigia Vertov Group, Gorin commented that, 
‘the very idea of trying to think through the lens of a guy [Brecht84] who was thinking through 
the ’30s seems to me, now, extraordinarily backward; what kind of madness tries to delay the 
time and space of history?’85A statement that suggests context is essential, that method has 
distinct application and even though history may provide precedents, they do not inevitably 
transfer across time and situation.  
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Victor Burgin, in the coda to The Remembered Film, writes that he is not content with the 
classifications which resulted from film’s academic ascendancy in the 1960s and 70s86, and 
contests that ‘the question of ideology is at least as much one of unconscious processes as it is of 
consciousness. Consciousnesses may be synchronized in a shared moment of viewing, but the 
film we saw is never the film I remember.’87 This process, of informed critical discernment, 
requires a viewer who can perceive a work’s totality, mustering interpretive knowledge to decode 
the given work. The sociologist Bourdieu suggests that ‘art perception involves a conscious or 
unconscious deciphering operation’, and any ‘deciphering operation requires a more or less 
complex code which has been more or less completely mastered.’88 If a work is to be understood 
Bourdieu’s method would indicate that all cultural encounters are filtered through the audience’s 
relative and prior knowledge.  
 
 
The end of the century and history’s realignment 
 
As the 20th century waned the political certainty that had largely shaped it was being 
recalibrated, the fall of modern history, the collapse of the Soviet Empire, economics seemingly 
replaced politics and by the century’s end neo-liberal capitalism had apparently swept all before it. 
Francois Hartog, in Regimes of Historicity, contends that the Berlin Wall’s fall changed the way that 
history is perceived, that prior to this event the Western regime of ‘historicity’ was future-
oriented, but post-1989 it became present-oriented and in doing so Modernity’s linear projection 
was forsaken and the distance between present and past with diminished.89 The past, in this 
conjecture, finds its meaning from the present, as this is formed through memory, the 
remembrance and assessment of history, a realignment that duly indicates the post-modern-
anxiety, as after 1989’s fall certainty was rent asunder, as ‘Everywhere the order of time ceased to 
be self-evident.’90 Marker, in a rare interview, conducted by email and published in Libération 
(2003), writes that ‘What interests me is history, and politics interests me only to the degree that 
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it represents the mark history makes on the present.’91 Marker’s last film was to be Level Five 
(1996) and represents the end of an era - the socially aware global observer of political action 
would now find sanctuary in techno-archival examination, the ordering of history – the film is 
concerned with future memories, investigating the damage of the battle of Okinawa. The film’s 
protagonist, Laura, tries to comprehend the last battle of World War II through a computer 
game. The bringing together of these elements questions the balance between personal and 
archival evidence, how it is appraised, and the technological cast of history.  
Level Five, produced at the dawning of the digital age, considers the use of computers as a 
research tool, and how material is accessed and assessed; how will the programmatic storage of 
information, with its often fragmented display, affect engagement, and will this influence actual 
memory?  In this new universal archive images are like echoes, which Marker expresses through 
form, the contemplation of technology, the connotations for personal and collective past, 
present, future. Level Five also indicates Marker’s interest in new media, as a site of resistance and 
investigative tool, but what now of the promise he saw?  
 
 
 
Fig. 10 Level Five (1996) 
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Memory is entwined in developing and enveloping technologies, and cinema itself, as Kilbourn 
claims, can also be defined, ‘as memory, or “meta-archive”; “prosthetic memory” writ large.’92 
This memory, which he associates with cinema, is the antithesis of the natural variant, and 
formed through its aesthetic and technical properties, its totality. In Histoire(s) du cinéma’s (Godard, 
1998) mixed multiple video channels, one image superimposed upon another, we see a subjective 
meta-history; Lev Manovich writes that ‘this technique can be interpreted as the representation of 
ideas or mental images floating around in our minds, coming in and out of mental focus.’93 
Godard’s project was cinema’s history(s), therefore the twentieth century history(s), as expressed 
through the referencing, and bringing together, of films; Agamben contends ‘There’s no need to 
shoot film anymore, just to repeat and stop. That’s an epoch-making innovation in cinema.’94 He 
writes that there are ‘two transcendental conditions of montage: repetition and stoppage.’95 These 
actions renew and herein ‘lies the proximity of repetition and memory. Memory can give us back 
what was, as such […] memory restores possibility to the past.’96 In this configuration, revisiting 
the past is not an act of nostalgia, but a reassertion of history’s potentiality. This formulation in 
the service of practice, but this is no longer a matter of political preparedness and is more like a 
philosophical proposition, which, like Marker’s latter work, Level Five for instance, is concerned 
with History.  
 
In our present era Radstone contends that our understanding of memory is weighted ‘towards a 
“memory” aligned with subjectivity, invention, the present, representation, and fabrication’,97 
which emphasises the individual and local perspective over that of grand narratives, which is one 
of the concerns of chapter V, ‘(nostalgia): These Times are Personal.’ Frampton’s (nostalgia) 
(1970) is rooted in conceptual practice (his films are now very much part of the experimental and 
art canon),98 and the individuals who populate it – once just friends and now icons - locate it in 
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the fabled artistic milieu of 1960s New York. It is composed of a series of photographs and 
autobiographical episodes, a form of audio/visual diary distilled for public scrutiny. Steadman 
writes, that in ‘the practices of history and of modern autobiographical narration, there is the 
assumption that nothing goes away; that the past has deposited all of its traces, somewhere, 
somehow.’ 99 Frampton’s film is emblematic, a means to discern time: a time for Frampton when 
photographs were no longer pertinent and images needed to become temporally active and have 
eternally connected and audible memories. The film proposes a personal (ironic) puzzle (a 
contextual exercise that requires knowledge beyond the text to truly begin to comprehend its 
different layers) that would test narrative expectations and show the power, and limits, of image 
and text – the past may still seem discernible, but its remnants are smoke. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 (nostalgia) (1971) 
 
 
In the twenty-first century, memory, Kilbourn argues, is by definition collective, and this could 
be recognised as ‘artificial or prosthetic’, and furthermore ‘no memory is impersonal or 
objective;’100 this understanding is an aspect of the analysis in chapter VII, ‘Memento: Fettered 
and Systematic Recollection.’ The forgetful protagonist of Nolan’s Memento (2000) operates 
beyond Los Angeles city’s limits, a liminal place in which other American memories dwell. He 
                                                                                                                                      
comprise Hapax Legmena. (nostalgia). It is now available as a Criterion Collection DVD (A Hollis 
Frampton Odyssey, 2012).   
99 Steedman, C. (2001) Dust, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p.76 
100 Kilbourn, R. J. A. (2012) Cinema, Memory, Modernity: The Representation of Memory from Art Film to 
Transnational Cinema, London: Routledge, p.228  
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claims that he cannot form ‘new memories’, which is an emblematic statement - in America, at 
this juncture, an embattled Bill Clinton was serving out his second presidential term and by the 
end of the year George Bush would be waiting to replace him after a widely contested victory 
over Al Gore; a simple national agenda, one hewn from a mythologised past, a time of moral 
righteousness and unfettered action, had been accepted.  
 
Radstone apprises that ‘the scales may swing between, say, invention/tradition and 
reflection/representation, the “fragile value” of memory resides in its continued capacity to hold, 
rather than to collapse these equivocations.’101 This malleable definition adheres to contemporary 
notions of culture and its continual reformulation, in which its meaning evolves with time and 
place. Stuart Hall argued that culture ‘is not so much a set a things’, but ‘a process, a set of 
practices’,102 that 'representation connects meaning and language to culture'103 and as 'meanings 
shift and slide, so inevitably the codes of culture imperceptibly change.'104 This proposes that 
culture is subject to societal change and is not a set entity but evolves as society does.  
 
 
 
Fig. 12 Memento (2000) 
 
 
Memento was originally released in the year of Gladiator (Scott), another film about male vengeance 
and adventure, and viewing it now it is clearly a mark in cinematic and personal time, a clever 
                                                
101 Ibid 
102 Hall, S. (1997) ‘Introduction’ in: Hall, S. (ed.), Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying 
Practices, London: Sage, p.2 
103 Ibid, p.13 
104 Ibid, p.62 
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contrivance that ushered in a new century and indicated its cultural spectrum and orientation, a 
contemporary vision found in a referential mining of past cinematic moments. Nolan’s film 
shows a form of collective film memory, has a post-classical structure, which would work with 
narrative and avant-garde strategies, and in this we see something of the database film’s 
promiscuous formulation;105 its generic, aesthetic and critical influences are reconstituted in an 
assimilated work in a recognisable mode. Aaron contends that ‘contemporary or postmodern 
filmmakers increasingly exploit the contractual nature of spectatorship’, and this in part is due to 
“films” fiction-status and moral judgements – [which] have diminished both in effect and 
frequency’,106 is the this critique applicable to Memento or does it actually create something 
arresting, new out of its past?  
 
To review film, the development of a form, the flow of ideas, patterns of acquiescence and 
critique, is to identify its historic periodization; to see any film is to be appraised of a genre’s 
invention, reference and method. Viewing Memento, for example, is to be reminded of a particular 
canonical variant, the influences that propelled Nolan and the external matrix that the film 
operates in. The accrued knowledge, which is brought to any film, interprets and reads, situating 
the film in a practical and critical, conscious and unconscious, schema - it is a meta-text pointing 
the way to film’s past (and confirming its present). ‘Prosthetic Memory’, Landsberg’s conception, 
would open ‘up a world of images outside a person’s lived experience, creating a portable, fluid, 
and non-essentialist form of memory.’107  She suggests that this form functions’, ‘between a 
person and a historical narrative about the past, at an experiential site such as a movie theater or 
museum. In this moment of contact, an experience occurs through which the person sutures 
himself or herself into a larger history.’108 This collective memory is derived from a 
representation of what has been and as the events of the past are retold, such as in Schindler's List 
(Spielberg, 1993), for all manner of sometimes contradictory purposes, a new history is offered to 
those who feel they should remember, but are actually after the fact. Memories may become 
commodified, co-opted to suit different forms and narratives, for they reside in history and are 
always subject to reinterpretation - new technologies can offer a more inclusive reckoning, but 
this can also make even obviously mediated memories appear authentic. Chopra-Gant suggests 
that between the ‘historical film and criticism lies the prospect of a valuable syncretic mode of 
historical knowledge’,109 and that film can in fact offer a means of realisation that is beyond 
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traditional means and used conscientiously can contribute to historically changed dialogues; 
memory acquisition can also be reflective, empathetic, but aware of difference, and active, for it 
can be the precursor to action and this facility will be explored in more detail through the various 
case studies that constitute Part 2, ‘In Time: Films, Associations and Other Memories.’ 
 
When these various films become known they take on their own memorious form - Agamben 
contends that ‘images can have such a historical and messianic importance, because they are a 
way of projecting power and possibility toward that which is impossible by definition, towards 
the past.’110 They suggest ideas, bring forth memories, associations, evoke all manner of other 
influences and suggest numerous other related and seemingly instructive and timely films, as 
Augé comments that ‘to remember one film also means remembering film itself, that is, 
remembering images […] as if in some way it had accomplished the labor of memory.’111 These 
films suggest memory’s purpose, uncertainty, importance and potentiality and within their 
application something materialises as thinking is substantiated through practice.  
 
                                                
110 Agamben, G. (2002) ‘Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord’s Films’, in: Guy Debord and 
the Situationist International, McDonough, T. (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
p.316 
111 Augé, M. (2007) Casablanca: Movies and Memory, Conley, T. (trans.), Minneapolis/London: 
University of Minnesota Press, p.10 
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III. RECOLLECTABLE IMPORTANCE:  
FILM’S APPRAISAL AND OTHER ASSOCIATED MEMORIES 
 
 
 
‘A memory of a first time.’ Marc Augé 1 
Fig. 13 Casablanca (1942) 
 
 
 Film’s mnemonic facility, has for many, brought it and memory together, one invoking the 
other. This sense of something being created, added to the screen-bound images, is emphasised 
by Monaco2, who comments, ‘there is the image that exists for itself, the picture, and the image 
“made in seeing”, the conception, which does not imitate so much as analyses or comments 
upon. The image is perceived reality.’3 This chapter will consider the relationship between viewer 
and film (a productive producer of memories), how this encounter has been theorised, the 
critical, textual, analysis of film (the mediation from one form to another), and the importance of 
place (a tethering context for the memory). 
                                                
1 Augé, M. (2007) Casablanca: Movies and Memory, Conley, T. (trans.), Minneapolis/London: 
University of Minnesota Press, p.11 
2 Monaco is indebted to Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) whom he quotes: ‘… after the object 
is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than 
when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing… 
IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other 
living Creatures, as well sleeping, as waking… when we would express decay, and signify that the 
sense is fading, old, and the past, it is called memory. So that Imagination and Memory, are but one 
thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.’ Monaco, J. (1978) Alain Resnais: The 
Role of Imagination, London: Secker & Warburg, p.11-2 
3 Ibid, p.12 
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Since the end of the twentieth century there has been a ‘growing preoccupation with memory 
and nostalgia’, observes Pam Cook, and ‘this has resulted in a startling proliferation of discursive 
intertexts and textual commentaries, whose origins and validity are not always clear, which have 
the potential to transform the way history is traditionally written and perceived’4 Emphasising 
this perspective Mullarkey writes that film should be seen ‘as a series of relational processes and 
hybrid contexts comprising the artists’ and audience’s psychologies, the cinematic “raw data”, the 
physical media of the film, the varied forms of its exhibition, as well as all the theories relating 
themselves to these dimensions.’5 These inclusive and variable understandings echo, in a number of 
ways, contemporary contemplation of memory and its workings. A work’s reputation is formed 
through public engagement and this may be occurring, more and more, through virtual and viral 
means, but in terms of film and video, this activity is still largely a supplement to some form of 
public screening, and its critical reception, which adds to a work’s provenance and traceable 
progress.  
 
 
Public screening, private encounter 
 
 Film, more or less since its inception, has been a projected medium, and in this cinematic 
encounter memory is formed, and as Annette Kuhn observes, ‘a place can trigger or produce 
memories […] Every place has its own inherent features, its own character; and these are 
independently instrumental in forming acts of memory.’6 Augé, in Casablanca: Movies and Memory, 
emphasises this association. He first saw Casablanca (Curtiz, 1942) sometime around the Allied 
liberation of Paris aged eleven or twelve as he recalls:  
‘Casablanca was not my first film, but it was my first experience of time being 
induced by a work of fiction. Not only did the film begin to exist as a memory (a 
memory of a first time, of a ordinary, inaugural emotion sustained by a few mythic 
scenes), but in itself it dealt with memory and remembrance, with fidelity and 
oblivion.’7  
 
In the book’s afterward Conley writes that ‘Casablanca becomes a memory machine’,8 a catalyst 
that ushers in impressions from the past that the author then ‘works with.’9 Augé’s first 
encounter happened somewhere in the Latin Quarter, and his memory of the experience still 
                                                
4 Cook, P. (2005) Screening the Past: Memory and Nostalgia in Cinema, New York: Routledge, p.1 
5 Mullarkey, J. (2009) Philosophy and the Moving image: Refractions of Reality, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, p.10 
6 Kuhn, A. (2002) An Everyday Magic: Cinema and Cultural Memory, London and New York: I.B. 
Tauris Publishers, p.16-7 
7 Augé, M. (2007) Casablanca: Movies and Memory, Conley, T. (trans.), Minneapolis/London: 
University of Minnesota Press, p.11-2 
8 Ibid, p.80 
9 Ibid, p.87 
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makes itself felt, as memory ‘is a place we revisit, or to which we are transported.’10 His 
recollection is expressly nostalgic, linked to another time, but the involved cinema procedure 
produces a complex experience that adds to all the similar, but different, memory sites, which 
represent, for Augé, what it means to experience a movie and being moved in time.  	  
The cinematic formulation has fundamentally stayed the same since its invention; its technical 
presentation may have evolved, in terms of image resolution and audio dynamics, directed 
towards heightened verisimilitude, but the basic rudiments - image gathering, assemblage, 
projection - remain unchanged. This configuration, a means to affect attentive viewing, is in 
many ways an ideal, a unifying solution to the projection of film and video. The cinema audience 
is a collection of ordered individuals within in the confines of the projection space, and, as 
engaging as this form can be, each recalled film, despite being derived from the same source, will 
be partial and individualised; Robert Stam suggests, the cinema spectator ‘both is constructed and 
him or herself constructs, within a kind of constrained or situated freedom.’11 When films are 
offered in cinema or cinema-like conditions, there is an acceptance by the viewer that 
irredeemable time is given, and it emphasises that other forms of media encounter maybe afford 
ease of access but do not facilitate the same degree of situational resolution.  
 
The Invisible Cinema (Anthology Film Archives, New York, 1970-74) tried to define the 
cinematic experience to the nth degree. Designed by Peter Kubelka, constructed by Giorgio 
Cavaglieri, it was conceived to provide the perfect viewing conditions for experimental film,12 as 
Kubelka elucidates, ‘Architecture has to provide a structure in which one is in a community that 
is not disturbing to others.’13 This configuration would allow unfettered concentration, but did 
this focus memory differently from standard cinema practice? Kubelka and Cavaglieri’s 
innovation may have heightened the viewer's experience, but it did not fundamentally re-work it, 
because even in less perfected conditions something memorable can still occur. Moving images 
have the power to override even the most adverse conditions and become internalised with 
lasting effect.   
 
Laura U. Marks suggests that ‘Most people agree that viewing single-channel work in a theatrical 
setting, or “cinema”, is an immersive experience, partly as a result of the viewer's slight 
                                                
10 Kuhn, A. (2002) An Everyday Magic: Cinema and Cultural Memory, London and New York: I.B. 
Tauris Publishers, p.16-7 
11 Stam, R. (2000) Film Theory: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell publishing, p.244 
12 Connolly, M. (2013) ‘Shared Viewing: Moving Images in the Cinema and Museum’, Millennium 
Film Journal, no. 58, Fall, p.24 
13 Cited in: Sitney, S, (2005) ‘The Search for the Invisible Cinema’, Grey Room, no. 19, p.111 
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disembodiment.’14 Describing what she defines as the ‘Bergsonian [by way of Deleuze] 
experience of the movies’, she suggests that the ‘viewer's perception actualizes only certain 
elements of the film, which remains dense with virtuality. The richness of the single-channel 
experience lies in the surplus of image, sound, meaning, and experience.’15 A film’s audience will 
always have different memories of a viewing experience – Stan Brakhage comments that ‘The 
capacity to remember any imagery from the flowing-river experience of motion pictures is exactly 
dependent upon one’s capacity to name what one has seen.’16 In remembering, we privilege one 
reflection over another - the residue of cultural habit, social being, personal awareness and 
situation - and this set of preferences consciously and unconsciously forms a flow of memories, 
attendant sensations, a privileging of certain moments, which found our own films.  
 
 
 
Fig. 14 Invisible Cinema (1970-74) 
 
 
When considering a film it becomes apparent that moments, certain resonances, rather than its 
actual narrative per se, have come to constitute what we think of as the film. Christian Keathley 
describes these ‘discarded’ details as being ‘cinephilic moments’,17 and suggests that the ‘links 
                                                
14 Marks, L. U. (2012) ‘In the Single Channel: Experimental Media from Theater to Gallery’, 
Millennium Film Journal, no.55, Spring, [online] available at 
http://www.readperiodicals.com/201204/2759925591.html [accessed 24 July 2014] 
15 Ibid 
16 Brakhage, S. (2002) ‘The Lost Films’, in: Chicago Review, Vol.47 / 48, winter, 2001 – Spring, 
2002, p.68 
17 Keathley, C. (2006) Cinephilia and history, or The Wind in the Trees, Bloomington, IN: Iary, ndiana 
University Press, p.7 
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between the cinema, personal memory, the anecdote (metonymy), and the uncanny are strong’,18 
that these cinephilic moments ‘seeks to illuminate the ways in which movies – especially 
moments from movies – displace themselves out of their original contexts and step into our 
lives.’19 In this a singular, personal, composite of the original is assembled, and if a film is 
revisited it often reveals forgotten nuances which correspond, in some way, to the viewer’s 
evolving memories and on-going preoccupations. Cavell, in The World Viewed, a book that relied 
on the author’s unreliable memory of the films that he had seen, writes that in ‘viewing a movie 
my hopelessness is mechanically assured; I am present not at something happening, which I must 
confirm, but at something that has happened, which I absorb (like a memory).’20 For Cavell 
cinema makes us conscious of time passing, and film memory is a form of montage, of (personal) 
films past made present (once again) through appreciation, alignment and assimilation.  
 
 
 Techniques of film memory and the need to categorize   
   
How is film remembered and why? Edward Branigan, considering the influence of a film, 
wonders, ‘is narrative comprehension affected by the particular way we imagine we are seeing 
events?’21 He suggests the answer concerns, ‘how an event is presented, how it happens, rather 
than what is presented or what happens’ is of importance, what is readable and the deduced 
‘procedural knowledge and declarative (or postulated knowledge).’ 22And this inference is affected 
by the ‘dynamics of a character’, ‘representation of the historical conditions’,23 and how they 
determine the film itself. These considerations operate within certain historical protocols and 
pertain to the classic realist model, which is still seen to define narrative film structure.  
 
Film, like other mediums, films have a tendency to fall into categories, if they are not deliberately 
made for them, but many films challenge genre-exclusive definitions, as Stam writes, ‘Are genres 
really “out there” in the world, or are they merely the constructions of analysts? Is there a finite 
taxonomy of genres or are they in principle infinite?’24 Genre formulation can only be an 
approximation and often, more than anything, indicates a work’s periodization; Stam writes that 
the major issues in genre identification are, extension (confines of definition), normativism (given 
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genre criteria), monolithic (claims of singularity) and biologism (common-sense rationale).25 But, 
despite these telling issues work does adhere, forms textual alliances, and an inclusive, hybrid, 
approach is required, one that searches for connections in an equivocal manner, formed from an 
individuated perspective. Todorov’s influential critique of literary taxonomy suggests ‘genre as 
such has not disappeared; the genres-of-the-past have simply been replaced by others’, and works 
form new rules, genres, through example.26 David Duff concurs with this view, writing that its 
not possible to ‘move beyond genre’ but it is ‘not a prescription and exclusion but opportunity.’27 
He may be considering literature but the same notion could be applied to film.  
 
The juxtaposition of the selected films throws genres, categorisations, into relief and brings them 
into new constellations as all manner of memories flows between the different films. Frampton 
proposed that the historian of cinema ‘is obliged to make himself responsible for every frame of 
film in existence. For the history of cinema consists precisely of every film that has been made, 
for any purpose whatever.’28 This totalising position may be beyond reason, but it does 
emphasise the idea that all work is in reference, one way or another, to pre-existing forms. 
Mullarkey contends that ‘Film is hybridity itself, or, in Bergsonian terms, creativity in the raw: 
which is only to say that the very messiness of film – which is fast approaching even further 
levels of divergent mess through new forms of media and spectatorship – merges with the same 
messiness of reality.’29Film may have the appearance of a language (something cognitivists 
dismiss30) but it is more than a set of codes to be mastered; it is always a complex collection of 
effects, which are produced through particular aesthetics, techniques, histories and resonances, 
that generate relative meanings, memories, personal films, as Wollen writes: ‘any reading of a film 
has to be justified by an explanation of how the film itself works to make this reading possible. 
Nor is it the single reading, the one which gives us the true meaning of the film; it is simply a 
reading which produces more meaning.’31 Histories form evolving hierarchies, Wollen writes, so 
that ‘changes in the canon32 are often linked to changes in production, and the emergence of new 
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forms of practice’33 - assessments which are invariably rationalised through critical and academic 
adjudication.  
 
There can also, as Keathley attests, other criteria, ones based in instinct, antidote, personal 
association and subjective evaluation.34 This is exemplified by the development of experimental 
film, which ‘is broken and diverse’ and it has advanced, as Wollen writes, ‘by knight’s moves, 
going forward much of the time but always obliquely, sometimes aggressive, sometimes defensive 
according to a strategy that was always difficult to define and second-guess.’35 This telling image 
of off-kilter movement is by way of Viktor Shklovsky. Frampton also uses this simile to imagine 
a developing history of cinema that encompasses all traditions.36 Brakhage, thinking about 
lineage, commented, ‘no one has recognized that I (and all my contemporaries) are working in a 
lineal tradition of Méliès, Griffith, Dreyer, Eisenstein, and all the other classically accepted 
filmmakers.’37 A film is always historical, and history is always present. Frampton would see the 
filmmaker as an agent of change, someone who attempts ‘to practice an art that feeds upon 
illusions and references despised or rejected by other arts.’38 There is an acknowledgement of 
tradition but nothing is excluded and that which might be deemed productive is intuitively 
reconciled. His notion invokes something other than the expected order of things and suggests 
an operation of decoding, interpretation, of deconstruction, but no work is enough in itself as it 
always operates within critical limits. 
 
Film’s referencing of memory is made known through a lexicon of tropes, which can be 
understood as being aesthetic, technical and content driven; aesthetic techniques, such as voice-
over (present and past tense, first and third person), flashbacks, inter-titles, durational shots, 
repetition, audio/visual disjunction, still image(s), archival material, complex montage, jump-cuts 
(all manner of intercontextualities); and contents, such as history (memory and material), themes 
of memory (recollection and forgetting), physiological (emotional memory), autobiographical 
                                                                                                                                      
programmes decide what can be publicly seen, academics and critics, who influence and form 
opinion, filmmakers and artists, who have their own relationship to historical and contemporary 
peers, and the engaged viewers’ advocacy. 
33 Wollen, P. (2002), ‘The Canon’, in: Paris Hollywood: Writings on Film, London/ New York: 
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(memoir), genre (mystery), trauma (communal and personal). The types of tropes and their forms 
may vary, with occurrence and resonance altering, but they have transformative temporal value: 
as Turim suggests, ‘flashbacks in film often merge the two levels of remembering the past, giving 
large-scale social and political history the subjective mode of a single, fictional individual’s 
remembered experience.’39 This ‘subjective memory’ places dramatic exposition, the explanation 
of history within the personal experience of individual characters, their projected social position. 
These techniques can be found in all manner of films, but in combination they elucidate and 
indicate that plays of memory are being authored, which allow for the crossing and merging of 
temporal planes, the bringing together of different perspectives.  
 
Memorious structures, in one form or another, exercise minds across all forms of filmic 
expression. When examining what might constitute a memory’s relation to film, and to discern its 
process and affect, there is a need to investigate different modes of production and creative 
approaches from different periods. Some films that have narrative assurance may refer to 
memory, but they do not risk memory’s true exposure, because these films, such as The 
Manchurian Candidate (Frankenheimer, 1962) and Schindler's List (Spielberg, 1993) wish to define 
experience and delineate history. In these works history is illustrated, temporality services 
narrative explanation, and memory becomes a matter of certifiable contextual reassurance. Other 
films, however risk narrative flow and coherence in order to prioritise structures that emulate the 
fragmentary character of memory.  
 
In Sculpting In Time Tarkovsky expressed the belief that the artist has a responsibility to represent 
something of necessary worth that contemplates life’s very meaning40 and ‘by collecting together 
the films of different directors do we arrive at a picture of the modern world which is more or 
less realist and has some claim to be called a full account of what concerns, excites and puzzles 
our contemporaries’41 For Tarkovsky this notion of artistic truth, which was identified in 
cinema’s ability to record and show reality42, is only really to be found amongst the purveyors of 
cinematic mastery, the men that he would consider his artistic peers.43 This vision corresponds to 
Deleuze’s conception of the medium; ‘great directors of the cinema may be compared, in our 
view, not merely with painters, architects and musician, but also with thinkers’,44 this notion is 
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borne out in the actual cinematic process and its cultural bearing, a sense that art can make sense 
of existence, a belief that Bergson also shared.45 These films, that ‘think’, are but one stratum, all 
be it rarefied, of film’s totality. Mullarkey suggests that any critical approach should be ‘a messy 
mix of methodologies and eclectic, random examples, rather than exemplars that illustrate one’s 
point perfectly.’46 Considering the substance of this research it would seem imperative to follow 
memory’s model and allow the juxtaposition and association of films and ideas, instinctive and 
instructive acts, which make manifest preference, experience and add (unexpected) streams of 
thought and resonances. This accumulative association is akin to the Kuleshov Effect,47 as one 
image influences the next and so on. This analogy also could suggest memory’s affect and film’s 
complimentary invocation.  
 
 
The critical and intuitive reading of film      
   
When encountering a film there is a distinction between what we see and how we 
remember it, that the passing between film and memory draws on reflective and contextual 
necessity: how to make known, verbally and textually, that which is recollected but not directly 
quotable. Writing about film is, in some ways, analogous to communicating a memory: both are 
present in the telling yet both reside in this past experience. In this, Garrett Stewart draws a 
distinction between ‘reading’ and ‘interpretation’, stating that ‘interpretation settles for the 
rhetoric of effect rather than probing its structural logic’,48 suggesting that the ability to ‘read’ 
film is an analytical tool that allows critical awareness. Rodowick cautions that ‘we tend to view 
films under the assumption that we are also “reading” them, while we may in fact be mis-reading 
them.’49 Also, he contends that,  ‘Writing may capture succession. Yet it fails to reproduce film’s 
peculiar quality of an automated, ineluctable movement.’50 Robert. A. Rosenstone reflects that 
attempting to communicate all that has been encountered, cannot ever be ‘more than the palest 
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reflection of the experience and meaning of film’,51 but despite this it is still worthwhile because 
it can indicate, connect, reference. 
 
When describing a film, in text, a conversion occurs, that according to Raymond Bellour, asserts 
the ‘absolute privilege of written expression.’52 In ‘The Unattainable Text’ Bellour writes that film 
and literature are not incompatible, but film is not directly ‘quotable’, and as a result, a process of 
mediation occurs, an undertaking that he characterises as ‘a kind of principled despair’ that 
‘constantly mimics, evokes, describes.’53 Affirming this observation Cavell suggests that when 
‘speaking of a moment or sequence from a film we, as we might put it, cannot quote the thing we 
are speaking of.’ He describes his memory of films being ‘like dreams’, and contends that the 
disparity between what is seen and written, experienced and remembered, suggests that ‘movies 
have achieved the condition of music.’54 For him film, like music, exerts an imaginative hold 
beyond the work’s physical bounds, in which seemingly forgotten moments can return 
unexpectedly as strongly as our own experiential memory. Adorno, in ‘Essay as Form’,55 writes, 
‘thought does not advance in a single direction, rather the aspects of the argument interweave as 
in a carpet’,56 a notion that chimes with Benjamin’s advice in ‘One-way Street’, ‘Work on a good 
piece of writing proceeds on three levels: a musical one, where it is composed, architectural one, 
where it is constructed, and finally a textile one, where it is woven.’57 Benjamin brings a 
multifarious past into the present, a time denoted by the author, his work, and those who may 
encounter it.  
 
The cultural position of film, as a contemporary art, was initially fermented in the particular post-
war environment of Paris, in cine-clubs and publications, first Revue du Cinéma and then Cahiers du 
Cinéma.58 The latter was initiated by André Bazin in 1951, edited by Rohmer and then Rivette, 
and included writing from Godard, Chabrol and Truffaut amongst others. It came to define 
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modern criticism and enriched la nouvelle vague, modern films made by many of its writers with 
reference to cinema. It proposed, in one way or another, Bazin’s now eternal question, ‘what is 
cinema?’ and its contributors, cinephiles all, offered aesthetic and formal answers. Serge Daney 
described cinephilla as ‘a sickness that brought immense pleasure’, which Wollen believes 
changes your life forever.59 Keathley contends that there is a need to reconnect with this 
cinephiliac spirit. That through it the pleasure of viewing and the passion that film, which was 
lost when it crossed the ‘threshold into scholarly legitimacy’,60 could be recovered. This 
sensibility does not forgo theory, and distinctly formulates, collate films and histories, but 
suggests that as Mullarkey observes that there is not a ‘secret of film’, that ‘everybody knows 
something, but nobody knows everything’,61 and that ‘the crisis for cinema, then, is also one for 
our culture and philosophy, for our ability, fundamentally, to think anew.’62 This activity would 
re-cast films, bringing them together in new configurations that can suggest new thoughts and 
insights. In considering the rudiments of film analysis Rodowick contends that, ‘the form and 
vocabulary in which these questions are posed has changed continuously in the history of film 
theory as a series of conflictual debates [however] the basic set of concepts has remained 
remarkably consistent.’63 When considering ‘film aesthetics’ the enquiry has concerned itself 
primarily with the analysis of space’64, and this is intrinsically bound up with duration, a space 
that resides in time.  
 
The technical proficiency of cinema suggested for Bazin the possibility of ‘objectivity in time.’65 
In ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’ Bazin proposed that photography and cinema are 
‘discoveries that satisfy, once and for all and in its very essence, our obsession with realism.’66 His 
cinematic appreciation championed aesthetic and social resemblance, a formulation that would 
see cinema as a revelatory medium. Bazin’s intrinsic and influential understanding linked 
photographic representation to reality. As Tom Gunning writes, Bazin believed ‘that a 
photograph puts us in presence of something, that it possesses an ontology rather than a 
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semiotics.’67 Subsequent critics, particularly the post ‘68 generation68, were to take Bazin’s 
perceived idealism to task, however as Wollen, in Signs and Meanings, asserts, ‘A great deal of 
influence which Bazin has exerted has been due to his ability to see the indexical aspect of 
cinema as its essence.’69 Doane, writing about the inception of cinema, comments that 
‘knowledge of the indexicality of the cinematic image sustains a belief that something of time, 
something of the movement or its imprint, or, at the very least, its adequate representation, is 
there.’70 This understanding is emphasised by Mulvey who contends that when still images are 
placed in a multiple and movable context the ‘indexical “this was now” fuses with time passing, 
with the “now” of cinematic sequence that continually turns back into “then” within a single 
shot.’71 A position that is further iterated by Wollen, the ‘index has a privileged relation to time, 
to the moment and duration of its inscription.’72 This posits the image as a transcription of time 
that is as rooted in the now of the viewer, as well as the then of the image, an occurrence that 
could be described as being both historical and present, and when we see a progression of images 
and simultaneously remember what we have just seen, the past, present and anticipated future 
fuse and separate in turns. 
 
Bergson’s enquiries initiated film’s philosophical exchange, he describes its effect rather than its 
content and affect, but, as Münsterberg realised, for most viewers what was seen is defined, at 
least in part, by the work’s content and form. After viewing a film audiences habitually discuss 
their experience, for what is a film without an audience? Films are remembered because they 
create an impression, and become part of the personal, and critical, consciousness. Stewart 
asserts that the ‘philosophic mind may teach us how to think cinema, but cinema reminds us how 
we think.’ Cinema, for him, is a means to divine thought and this is made apparent by the 
‘staging’ of consciousness through the ‘historic’ flicker of images that allows an audience ‘to 
retain the film as a mobile image (a textual model) of its own deepest cognitive negotiations with 
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the real.’73 However, Mullarkey cautions that film, ‘doesn’t reflect (illustrate, illuminate or 
represent) our philosophy – it refracts it, it distorts it with its own thinking [and] forces us to 
change our theory of what Philosophy and the Moving Image (thinking, philosophy) is.’74 This 
reiterates that film, the form and event, is of primary concern, that it must provide the impetus 
and thinking should be understood through practice - film as an expression of thought (and 
memory). 
 
The visualization of perception, for Bergson, was similar to viewing a stream of images, as they 
‘can never be anything but things, and thought is movement.’75 However, he perceived that the 
cinematic viewer’s experience was largely passive, as the rapidity of images negates proper 
reflection. Deleuze, in Cinema 1, inverts this understanding, relating movement to the viewer 
rather than the apparatus. He sought to address Bergson’s ‘over hasty critique of the cinema’76, 
and to use this methodology to comprehend the cinematographic image. He writes that Bergson 
‘makes possible another way of looking at cinema, a way in which it would no longer be just the 
perfected apparatus of the oldest illusion, but, on the contrary, the organ for perfecting a new 
reality.’77 Mullarkey suggests that Deleuze’s ‘sleight of hand […] shifts the reader’s attention from 
actual celluloid, projection rates and their effects on perception, to directorial cuts, viewed images 
and their effects on the brain.’78 For Deleuze’s cinema is not to be understood as a series of still 
frames but as continuous movement, ‘cinema does not give us an image to which movement is 
added, it immediately gives us movement-image.’79 He suggests that Bergson understood this 
connection but he ‘forgot’ his own discovery.80 Stewart, in Between Film and Screen, found fault 
with this reasoning and suggested that ‘Deleuze wants only a new kind of thinking built upon a 
base of normative seeing’, believing that the ‘intervallic constitution’ of the image is all important, 
and this makes ‘possible an imaged temporality within screen motion.’81 His reckoning may be 
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technically correct,82 however, Deleuze’s assertion regards how film’s images are encountered, 
and remembered, which is invariably as an extended sequence, a perceptual composite, in which 
film is seen to be comprehensibly continuous.  
 
Deleuze desired to reassert the image and experience over signs and their meanings. Conley 
writes that, ‘[for Deleuze] Cinema is a surface on which viewers reflect their thinking, and in itself 
it is a medium or a machine that thinks with autonomy with respect to its viewers and creators.’83 
This conception, cinema as articulated thought, is reiterated by William Brown, who suggests 
through Deleuze’s insight it is possible to perceive cinema as a ‘virtual machine […] that allows 
us viewers to become, and does so because it helps us to think the previously unthought, to 
experience the new.’84 In this the viewer is presented with new knowledge, and depending on the 
nature of the film, has to work, one way or another, to extract that which was previously 
unknown; and this is part of what cinema does, it shows us other worlds, and allows us to reflect 
on cinema’s time-image (its thinking, as it were). 
 
Deleuze’s hypothesis divines a shift in filmic preoccupation, moving from ‘movement-image’ to 
‘time-image’, a development that he traces largely through post-World War II canonical 
European cinema. He suggests that there are two possible ‘time-images’, ‘one grounded in the 
past, the other in the present. Each is complex and is vital for time as a whole.’85 As an 
adaptation of Bergsonian temporality, these images denote a shift in, and an evoking of, another 
time; ‘a camera-consciousness which would no longer be defined by the movements it is able to 
make, but by the mental connections it is able to enter into.’86 For Deleuze this potentiality finds 
manifestation in the films of Resnais, amongst others, and he uses these examples to realise the 
primacy of thought and temporal continuity, observing, in this respect, that ‘there is a present of the 
future, a present of the present and a present of the past.’87 If this understanding of time is accepted it is 
clear that films like Memento and Traffic (Soderbergh, 2000) which differentiate time into separate 
                                                
82 The frame is the singular filmic unit and film’s motion, which is designed to have equivalence 
to, and create the illusion of, actual movement when passing through a projector at the 
appropriate speed, 24 frames per second is film’s mechanised convention; around 14fps is the 
‘Critical Flicker Threshold’ where stills cohere as movement; 25fps constitutes 50 fields per 
second for video (in the UK). Flicker fusion, the persistence of vision and beta movement each 
contribute to the subsequent illusion of apparent movement, achieved through optical and 
neuro-psychological means. 
83 Conley, T. (2005) ‘Movement-Image’, Parr, A. (ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, p.174 
84 Brown, W. (2012) Deleuze and The Lizard’ in: Deleuze and Film, Martin-Jones, D. and Brown, 
W. (ed.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p.100 
85 Deleuze, G. (1989) Cinema 2, Tomlinson, H. and Galeta, R. (trans.), London: Continuum, p.95 
86 Ibid, p.22 
87 Ibid, p.97 
  80 
colour-coded realms, does not represent time as Bergson and Deleuze understand it, because for 
them it is a continuous cycle and, for Deleuze, this reckoning is expressed in the elliptical form of 
Last Year at Marienbad (Resnais, 1961).  
 
 
 
An exercise in ‘mental realism.’ Alain Robbe Grillet88 
Fig. 15 Last Year at Marienbad (1961)  
 
 
Deleuze’s conjectures, which emerged from a semiotic, structural, political stance, were 
countered by the self-proclaimed Cognitive and Analytic theorists, who sought to return to the 
text and eschew more contextual considerations; David Bordwell clearly marks the parameters of 
his enquiry, ‘we can, in short, study [film] narrative as process, the activity of selecting, arranging 
and rendering story material in order to achieve specific time-bound effects of the perceiver.’89 
Bordwell and Noel Carroll claim that their stance is not a theory but a position in which film is 
interrogated in ‘accord to with the norms of human perception.’90  They would reduce the field 
of enquiry and find a type of scientific explanation and avoid the ideological and sociological 
questions which so preoccupied Deleuze.  This would disavow difference, subject and location 
positioning – the intricacies of subjective interiority, cultural differentiation, social distinction and 
response – an acceptance that reception (and memory) is determined by contradictions, a myriad 
of factors and histories and not rational formulation.  
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 Other media and its relation to cinema 
 
 In Toute la mémoire du monde (All the memory of the world, 1956) Resnias and Marker depict the 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France91 as a supreme ‘giant memory.’ The film concludes in the 
expansive reading room, readers, ‘pseudo-insects’, pour over the proffered manuscripts,  
 ‘Here we glimpse a future in which all mysteries are solved when this and other 
universes offer up their keys to us. And this will come about because these readers, each 
working on his slice of universal memory, will have laid the fragments of a single secret 
end to end, perhaps a secret bearing the beautiful name of “happiness”.’  
 
The film’s narration implies that within this national institution that which can, and should, be 
known, can be found and will be remembered. Resnais and Marker conceived the library as an 
expansive and accessible repository of knowledge, a singular vision that describes a benign 
totality of information - this is an echo of the medieval library, such as the Biblioteca 
Malatestiana (Cesena, Italy) - where all extant knowledge could be acquired by reading a sequence 
of books - a qualification that is now no longer imaginable.  
 
 
 
Fig. 16 All the Memory of the World (1956) 
 
 
The universal memory that Resnais and Marker perceived was a unifying and positive entity that 
might facilitate ‘happiness’. The narrator in Borges’ short story, The Library of Babel (1941), is a 
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librarian, his domain is the ‘universe (which others call the Library)’92 Here all discernible 
knowledge can be found, most of the books are ‘formless and chaotic’, but there are some ‘books 
of apology and prophecy which vindicated for all time the acts of every man’,93 however this self-
discovery is followed by disillusionment, because the ‘certitude that everything has been written 
negates us.’94 The story alludes to the mystery of divinity, and the Librarian writes of the 
superstition that ‘there must exist a book which is the formula and perfect compendium of all the 
rest.’95 And its sentiment iterates the earthly illusion of omnipotence. 
 
In another Borges’ short story Funes the Memorious the narrator relates the tale, as he knows it, of 
Ireneo Funes, a man who cannot forget anything he encounters. He comments, ‘I suspect, 
however, that he was not capable of thought. To think is to forget differences, generalize, make 
abstractions.’96 Libraries and other repositories of data, physical and virtual, act as cultural filters, 
as do books, which denote an author’s preferences. Libraries and other storage sites provide a 
predetermined framework for archiving and accessing recorded knowledge. Borges’s library is a 
world of seemingly limitless textual permutation, but this vastness meant that little was ever 
discovered. Much of Borges’ library would now seem to be a physical imagining of all that the 
Internet would promise; the librarian asserts that ‘man’ will always find an order and this will 
become the order, which suggests that this is actually the library’s purpose, to be systematically 
arranged, and the pursuit of knowledge is but an accompanying requirement. 
 
Godard contends, that ‘there are no more simple images… The whole world is too much for an 
image. You need several of them, a chain of images…’97 The contemporary proliferation of 
images may make them harder to account for, possibly altering context, but does this 
fundamentally change their individual complexity, and surely any image proffered as the world 
only illuminates the author’s directorial synthesis. Godard explained that Histoire(s) du cinéma’s 
technique was a way to visualise the ‘vague and complicated system that the whole world is 
continually entering and watching.’98 A speculative sentiment, that is in contrast to earlier self-
conscious political dictates, which refers to a now familiar and abundant visual universe, and 
suggests that this overwhelming imagistic multiplicity can invoke a reactive time of remembrance, 
one that is unique to film - Witt describes Godard’s project as ‘a time capsule filled with traces of 
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films’, which is designed for the future.99 Increasingly images, or sequences, are categorised and 
organised on our behalf, for instance on Youtube, Tumblr and other websites, where opening an 
image simultaneously pulls up a whole list of related images or sequences. Thus the relationship 
between images is emphasised at the expense of the individual image, which no longer stands 
alone, and viewing one image becomes a mere pretext for pursuing an endless chain of more 
such images. 
 
Digital technology and the online environment have irrevocably changed the processing and 
presentation of the audio/visual vista, with the how and where of media engagement becoming a 
variable encounter, with films, which were once considered difficult to see now regularly appear 
(and disappear) in all forms and conditions online. Mulvey has suggested that the development of 
new media means ‘that old films can be seen with new eyes and digital technology, rather than 
killing the cinema, brings it new life and new dimensions.’100 She contends that this promotes a 
dialogue between histories and the present, in which viewers, through utilising new technology, 
can interrogate cinema’s hidden detail, that new technologies ‘reveal the beauty of the cinema but 
through a displacement that breaks the bond of specificity so important to my generation of 
filmmakers and theorists.’101 Is there a contradiction in these two positions or does the former 
one just express present reality and that this bond is now fundamentally broken, and this new 
realm moves considerations beyond the often fractious invocation of specificity?  
 
In the last few decades there has been a change in film exhibition and reception, with works now 
being encountered on all manner of platforms and in non-cinema spaces, such as museums and 
galleries, which places it in a different cultural and spatial regime; for instance Sans Soleil (Marker, 
1982) was shot on film and originally a cinematic release, before being made available on portable 
media, initially in the form of a VHS cassette, and later was installed in the gallery, and can now 
be seen in various unofficial forms online. Once, specialist playback facilities were required to 
access moving images, but, as Manovich writes, the arrival of the computer screen, and the 
potential to access a seemingly infinite flow of images, has challenged the stability of the cinema 
screen.102 Vinzenz Hediger suggests that new media have facilitated ‘the industrialisation of film 
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cultural memory’;103 he perceives that film’s platform migration has diminished its portent as it 
becomes untethered and domesticated.  
 
Screens are now to be found, in various scales, in all private and public locations, with familiar 
effect. Francesco Casetti contends that cinema ‘no longer has its own place, because it is 
everywhere, or at least everywhere that we are dealing with aesthetics and communication.’104 Do 
all screens, one way or another, reference cinema or are these screens more akin to television’s, 
and now the computer’s, infomercial flow and therefore suggestive of an enlarged and exposed 
domestic sphere? Fredric Jameson, in an echo of Guy Debord’s critique of the commodification 
of society where ‘All that once was directly lived has become mere representation’,105 perceives 
that post-modernity is suffused with all manner of invasive images. He writes that ‘the very 
sphere of culture itself has expanded’, and is ‘no longer limited to its earlier, traditional or 
experimental forms, but is consumed throughout daily life itself.’106 The proliferation of viewing 
platforms, coupled with a growing platform agnosticism, would seemingly differentiate viewing 
experiences, but as Manovich, suggests, ‘A hundred years after cinema’s birth, cinematic ways of 
seeing the world, structuring time, of narrating a story, of linking one experience to the next, 
have become the basic means by which computer users access and interact with all cultural 
data.’107 Film’s cultural primacy may be challenged by new media’s omnipotence, but the material 
offered still largely respects cinematic models, its forms, protocols, techniques; content and 
configurations always indicate some form of previous incarnation, for nothing is without lineage 
(and linkage), a written (and yet to be written) history.  
 
Agamben contends that cinema is now to be made from its own remnants, a conception that is 
founded in the practices of Godard and Debord and their liberal ‘re-use’ of film.108 In this 
process cinema’s own history is being accessed and asserted and in doing so its heterogeneity is 
confirmed, a disparate, sometimes seemingly chaotic, assemblage. Colin MacCabe, in his 
biography of Godard, writes that ‘in a world where we are entertained from cradle to grave 
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whether we like it or not, the ability to rework image and dialogue, light and sound, may be the 
key to both psychic and political health.’109 His observations were written in support of Godard’s 
Histoire(s) du cinéma, which was cleared for screening on Channel 4 ‘under the protection of the 
“fair dealing” provision of the British copyright act, which allows a limited amount of quotation 
for the purposes of criticism.’110 A memory of cinema was Godard’s resource, and his project, 
whose eight ‘chapters’ took ten years to create, indicated a working method that is now regularly 
encountered under less exacting and more familiar circumstances, as the partial remembering of 
other films now routinely occurs online, where the copyright restrictions that are placed on 
public broadcasters are not adhered to, with the same rigor. 
 
Film may have undergone a digital evolution with multi-platform possibility, but this 
development re-emphasises its distinct and singular form, as Manovich reflects, ‘So far a 
computer, despite its persistent association with a human mind, has served as an even worse 
artistic mirror for our mind than cinema.’111 His observation connects the lack of nuanced 
complexity in ‘multimedia’ software and the need to represent ‘uniquely human, embodied 
thinking’ of the type personified by the ‘mind modeling’ of Proust, Nabokov, Joyce and Histoire(s) 
du cinéma.112 An age, in computing terms, has passed since Manovich recorded his frustration and 
the advent of new technology has afforded audio/visual work transformative powers and 
increased malleability, even the potential to be unconstrained by the frame, but, it would seem 
that alternative thinking, imaging, has yet to truly emerge.  
 
Both film and digital video share a capacity to carry the same, or very similar, audio/visual 
information and practitioners who once only used film, like Marker or David Lynch, migrated to 
video and their practice engaged with the change in production, but largely the same 
preoccupations remained. For some digital means have provided a new way of imagining, such as 
in  Alexander Sokurov’s continuous history lesson from the Hermitage, in Russian Ark (2002), or 
Nolan’s curved Paris dream streets, in Inception (2010). These innovations are a matter of 
technical realisation, with attendant aesthetic considerations, rather than fundamental changes in 
visualisation or reception. Sean Cubitt observes, that the material, emotional and intellectual 
effects that cinema produce, ‘all share a quizzical and oblique relation to reality.’113 Film’s 
component elements sometimes combine to make strange, even unintended affect, but they are 
still recognisable within its form. Until a new visual aesthetic, which eschews cinematically 
                                                
109 MacCabe, C. (2003) Godard: A Portrait of the Artist at 70, London: Bloomsbury, p. 301-2 
110 Ibid 
111 Manovich, L. (2000) Jump Over Proust: Toward Multimedia Writing, [online] available at: 
http://www.manovich.net/TEXT/proust.html [accessed 15 March 2014] 
112 Ibid 
113 Cubitt, S. (2004) The Cinema Effect, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT press, p.1 
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derived viewing emerges, all developments, in this regard, are of technical rather than 
evolutionary interest; in visual culture, anything that requires images to be moving, always 
references, in some way, the film form (and our memory of it).  
 
Even in the platform-agnostic realm cinema’s affect and heterogeneity has discernible affect, its 
lexicon and protocol still has audio/visual dominance, which justifies continuing need to examine 
its instructive purchase. The tropes that have come to represent memory are utilised in all 
manner of films to indicate that more than one temporal plain is being invoked. This suggests the 
past can readily be conjured and a form of time travel can occur, and through discerning the 
manner in which this temporal switch is made manifest a film’s conceptual position becomes 
known, for instance the contrast in the methodologies deployed by Resnais and Nolan is telling. 
There may be something in every film that strives for autonomy, and for the differentiated 
moment that is outside of the given order of things, when images, and sounds transcend their 
screen-bound presence, but some filmmakers strive to register difference and their images, 
sounds and ideas puncture indifference and posit a form of resistance to unthinking 
consumption. These films adhere to and associate with other salient works and memories, which, 
in turn, prompt further consideration. Film’s theorization may produce multiple interpretations, 
but its evocative potency is evident, its practice illustrating thought in progress, and its study can 
offer an understanding of memory, its constitution and representation. This conceptualising of 
memory, the endeavour to give it form, finds a unique and instructive mode of expression 
through film and in Part 2. ‘In Time: Films, Associations and Other Memories’, the four case 
studies will be analyzed in conceptual and contextual detail and the ideas outlined in Part 1 will 
be cross-examined through practice.   
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 PART 2.  
 
 
 IN TIME:  
 FILMS AND OTHER MEMORIES 
 
 
Time present and time past   
Are both perhaps present in time future,   
And time future contained in time past.   
If all time is eternally present   
All time is unredeemable. 
‘Burnt Norton’, Four Quartets, T.S. Eliot, 1943 
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IV.  MURIEL, OR THE TIME OF A RETURN:  
THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME (AND IMAGINATION) 
 
 
 
Fig. 17 Muriel, or the Time of a Return  (1963) 
 
 
Muriel, or The Time of Return (1963), directed by Alain Resnais’ (1922-2014), deftly suggests 
shifts in time, and its understanding and offers a partisan vision of post war and colonial France, 
a state struggling to find contemporary constitution. This brought the political into the private 
realm, the relationship between individual and nation, self-determination and communal 
responsibility, a reckoning that saw cultural equivalence, with these concerns finding film form. 
Through focusing on a familial drama in provincial Boulogne Muriel considers the scars of 
conflict and whether their marks can ever be excised; in this regard it questions the surety of 
memory - how it is internalised, expressed, changes - and how it can be made manifest. Muriel 
brings into focus a number of still timely concerns and through its analysis, and contextual 
augmentation, these questions and positions will be considered.   
 
Resnais was part of a generation of filmmakers who were ‘brought up in the shadow of the 
Cinémathèque Française, the first generation for whom film history has meaning and has been 
important in the development of their own work.’1 These filmmakers would reflect on the 
meaning of cinema and its place within the cultural vista; asking what could, should cinema be: a 
story-telling machine derived from theatre or something closer to modernist literary prose, 
poetry, or even music, a means to think and let thoughts be known.  
                                                
1 Richard Roud quoted in: (1969) ‘Retrospective Trace Career of Alain Resnais’, The Museum of 
Modern Art, New York, March 31, [online] Available at: http://www.moma.org/docs/ 
press_archives/4231/releases/ MOMA_1969_Jan-June_0064_44.pdf?2010 [accessed 16 
September 2013] 
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In considered how both the Cahiers du Cinéma and Left Bank groups responded to the 50s 
‘information explosion’,2 Ray Durgnat saw a coming together, and confounding, of ideas, and 
desired to interrogate film practice; he observed that the Left Bank Group’s mood of ‘inter-
disciplinary’ investigation and experimentation ‘marked a qualitative change in movie language 
and agenda.’3 Durgnat suggested that this ‘project’ could still reward analysis, and lists the 
elements that he identifies as being exemplary: ‘a “critical poetry” mainstream; a solid materialism 
(non-naïve realism); a Wittgensteinian emphasis on the limits of discourse; virtuoso movie 
craftsmanship; and a non-academic avant-garde drive’;4 qualities that can be applied to both 
Resnais’ documentaries and dramas.  
 
For Resnais narrative was to be the means for him to explore his interests, he states, ‘I can’t 
imagine a film in which the contact with the audience is not achieved by some form of dramatic 
construction.’5 The film critic Jonathan Rosenbaum contends that Resnais is the 
‘unacknowledged inspiration for most of the significant narrative experiments in movies since the 
60s.’6 Resnais first three feature films, Hiroshima mon amour (1959), L’année dernière à Marienbad 
(Last Year at Marienbad, 1961) and Muriel ou le Temps d'un retour (Muriel, or the Time of a Return, 1963), 
indicated that the invocation of the past, was a timely and instructive preoccupation; Monaco, in 
his study of Resnais, writes that, ‘Without memory we should have no past, only a series of 
presents which changed before we were even aware of them.’7 These films, the framed memory 
of Hiroshima’s destruction, a baroque dreamlike puzzle, the affect of history and the trace of 
personal memory, make manifest a distinct and pluralistic temporality and topography that 
supersedes usual expository movement, a narrative complexity that subsequent visions have 
struggled to truly encompass. 
 
The form of Resnais’ first two feature films emanated from the subjectivity of their lead 
characters, but Muriel’s narrative is shared, with no one character responsible for its intonation. 
Monaco comments, ‘For the first time in Muriel Resnais makes the oppression of imagined pasts 
human.’8 The film’s aesthetics and techniques aid the personification of encounter, the 
expression of memory and history and it offers some contextual understanding for the personal 
                                                
2 Durgnat, R. (1987) ‘Resnais & Co: Back to the Avant-garde’, Monthly Film Bulletin (London), 
54/640, p.132 
3 Ibid, p.132-3 
4 Ibid, p.132 
5 Roud, R. (1969) ‘Memories of Resnais’, Sight and Sound, 38 / 3, Summer, p.128 
6 Rosenbaum, J.  (2004) ‘A Stylist Hits His Stride (Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind)’, 
Chicago Reader, March 19, [online] Available at: http://www.jonathanrosenbaum.com/?p=6070 
[accessed 20 May 2014] 
7 Monaco, J. (1978) Alain Resnais: The Role of Imagination, London: Secker & Warburg, p.10 
8 Ibid, p. 95 
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(even national) state of disillusion; does Resnais’ method achieve a representation of time 
(everyday personal experience and the machinations that constitute a nation’s history) in its 
elaboration or just render it as effect, and does his elevation of the personified narrative objectify, 
or diminish, any attendant political commentary? His film is not overtly political, like the work of 
Godard and Debord, but does Muriel actually show, communicate something as equally radical, 
and perhaps with even more lasting affect?  
  
 
 Appearances and Disappearances in a pre and post war provincial town  
  
 
Open on:  A partially open internal door. A woman’s brown leather glove grips the door 
handle. The cuff of her brown fur coat is visible. 
Woman:  What I really need is a chest of draws. 
Cut to:  A stove. On it a kettle is boiling, beside it is a glass and part of a coffee maker.   
Cut to:  The brown fur coat. The right gloved hand is holding a square shaped brown 
leather handbag.  
Cut to:  Another woman’s hand is holding a low burning cigarette. She is wearing a 
beige cardigan. She lifts the cigarette to her mouth – the camera follows - she is 
attractive and middle-aged with grey streaked hair. She is Hélène.  
Woman:  Four feet, no more. 
 The hand holding the cigarette returns to its original position – the camera 
follows.  
Cut to:  The brown leather glove gripping the door handle.  
Woman:  It’s to go between the windows.  
Cut to: Water from the kettle is poured into the coffee maker.  
Cut to:  An ornate brass chandelier.  
Woman:  But if you can’t find one... 
Cut to:  The back of a carved dark chair. A polished dresser stands behind it. 
Cut to:  The brown leather glove gripping the door handle.  
Cut to: A dull metal dish full of glass objects on a tabletop.  
Cut to:  An ornate black clock, with a gold face and details, a small ‘price’ tag is visible.  
Cut to:  The brown leather glove gripping the door handle.  
Woman:  I’ll buy a Swedish teak table. 
Cut to:  A dull wall hanging that depicts a ruined classical temple. 
Cut to:  A small glass chandelier.  
Cut to:  The brown leather glove gripping the door handle.  
Cut to:  A man’s hand removes the coffee maker from the stove. The blue cuff of his 
sweater is visible. 
Cut to:  The back of the Woman’s head. The coat has a matching hat. Beyond her 
Hélène, is standing, arms crossed, smiling politely.  
Cut to:  The Woman’s face. She is younger than Hélène.  
Woman:  I don’t want my apartment to look old. 
Cut to:  The Woman’s profile.  
Cut to:  The Woman’s head turned.  
Cut to:  Detail of the Woman’s fur coat.  
Cut to:  Hélène has a metal tape measure in her hands, which she retracts. 
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Cut to:  The edge of Hélène’s checked wool skirt, stocking covered legs and black slip on 
shoes with a low heel. She twists a foot on the parquet floor. 
Cut to:  Woman’s head and shoulder. 
 Woman:  You’ll need to satisfy both my taste and my husband’s.  
 (Pause) 
 You know what I want. I’m counting on you. 
 She turns to leave.   
Cut to:  The apartment’s exterior. The Woman opens a green door. Hélène follows her 
to the door.   
Woman:  I need the frame to be in good condition. Good night. 
Hélène: Good night.  
 The Woman leaves and Hélène shuts the door.  
 
 
Resnais’ film begins with no establishing shots, little by the way of introduction, just a rapid 
and intricate montage, a form of temporal and spatial ordering, as all manner of different relations 
and histories are shown and alluded to - Jacques Rivette commented that ‘From the moment of 
the opening shots what you are given is clues, every shot is a clue – in other words, it’s both the 
imprint left by an action and what the action entails, its mystery.’ 9 Time is recorded across the 
apartment’s artefacts and furnishings. Each carefully framed object embodies a displaced history 
and its provenance confers aspirational (and mercantile) value. This sequence is indicative of the 
film’s flowing and complex montages, overlapping memories and historical vistas. In Poetics of 
Space Bachelard presented the house as the place to find the trace of time, where ‘a great many of 
our memories are housed.’10 This scene, in which Hélène Aughain appears to be selling the 
contents of her home, implies reduced circumstances and a present that indicates past upheaval 
(for her, others, the nation), as the furnishings seem to belong somewhere else; and they, in turn 
are imbued with the passage of existence.  
 
After Hélène’s customer, has departed, she and her stepson, Bernard, the apartment’s other 
inhabitant, are left alone; she became part of Bernard’s life when his father remarried, after 
Bernard’s mother had died in World War II. He is another European orphan, lost and symbolic. 
Their familial situation locates the film’s relational drama; Hélène is going to meet Alphonse, an 
old lover who she has invited to stay at Boulogne’s railway station; Bernard acts disinterested, he 
is going to meet his girlfriend.  
 
                                                
9 From a 1963 Cahiers du Cinéma roundtable discussion of Muriel quoted in: Kite, B. (2009) 
‘Everything is just like you’, Muriel DVD booklet, Eukeka! The Masters of Cinema Series, p.14 
10 Balchelard, G. (2014) The Poetics of Space, Jolas, M. (trans.), London: Penguin Books, p.30 
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Bernard Aughain (Jean-Baptiste Thierrée) and Hélène Aughain (Delphine Seyrig)  
Fig. 18 Muriel, or the Time of a Return  (1963) 
 
 
The film’s drama occurs between Saturday, 29 September, and Sunday, 14 October, 1962, the 
dates of Alphonse’s arrival and departure. He arrives with a woman he claims to be his niece, 
Françoise, an aspiring actress, in tow; it is quickly established that she is in fact his lover, however 
their relationship is evidently waning and Hélène seems unconcerned by her appearance.  
 
 
 
Françoise (Nita Klein) and Alphonse Noyard (Jean-Pierre Kérien)  
Fig. 19 Muriel, or the Time of a Return  (1963) 
 
 
Alphonse’s return indicates something of Hélène’s present unhappiness and her wish to re-visit 
the past. Their previous relationship was troubled, and ended with him abandoning her, but 
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despite all that she knows she still entertains the possibility of a shared life. Like Hiroshima mon 
Amour’s woman from Nevers, Hélène is trapped in time. Her affair may not carry the same 
traumatic weight, but she is still paralyzed by its effect.  
 
Muriel is located in the coastal town of Boulogne - the only visual divergence is through Bernard’s 
8 mm film of Algeria, which he shot whilst doing his military service; Resnais reported that it,  
‘Began with an idea: one day on the stairs, [Jean] Cayrol [who was to write the film] 
said, “I’ve got an idea you might like, a film about provincial life. Wouldn’t you like 
the idea of a movie about a kind of double city – pre-war and post-war with people 
who can’t find their way anymore because the new streets don’t follow the lines of 
the old ones?” Of course, I was interested.’11  
 
The film’s sensibility relates to the nouveau roman, and is to be understood as such, a formulation 
founded in structural interplay with often seemingly opaque psychological motivations. Deleuze 
writes that ‘Resnais has often declared that it is not characters that interest him but the feelings 
that he could extract from them like their shadows, depending on which regions of past they are 
placed in.’12 Resnais considered that ‘modern life is fragmented’13 - Muriel’s temporal progression 
is never clearly demarcated, suggesting the mental time of consciousness and the compulsion to 
remember (and forget). Its narrative is a matter of association, which conjures multiple temporal 
streams and its drive resides in the interplay between place, time and its inhabitants; the film 
forgoes physical flashbacks, but introduces all manner of emotional and cerebral ones, moments, 
realizations, that transport the characters to other places and times. It is the depiction of space (in 
time) that orientates the film and it is the observable accumulation of evidence that offers some 
explanation in a way that the film’s protagonists cannot.  
 
Resnais does not make direct reference to Henri Bergson, but his desire to encapsulate 
heterogonous movement within his films places him within the philosopher’s cast; in Alain 
Resnais, or the Theme of Time Ward observes that ‘The framework within which the act of synthesis 
[Resnais’s filmmaking] is made possible is the philosophy of Henri Bergson, augmented by an 
almost Proustian obsession with associationism.’14 Resnais said, ‘I’ve always refused the word 
“memory” a propos my work, I’d use the word “imagination”’,15 which would seem to emphasise 
a Bergsonian understanding of film, in that the present, and the promise of the future, are 
founded in imagination, whilst everything that follows the moment of registration quickly passes 
into memory.  The film’s narrative is always present; the past is inferred through recollection, the 
                                                
11 Roud, R. (1969) ‘Memories of Resnais’, Sight and Sound, 38/3, Summer, p.125 
12 Deleuze, D. (1989) Cinema 2, Tomlinson, H. and Galeta, R. (trans.), London: Continuum, p.129 
13 Armes, R. (1968) The Cinema of Alain Resnais, London: A. Zwemmer, p. 120 
14 Ward, J. (1968) Alain Resnais, or the Theme of Time, London: Secker & Warburg, p.7 
15 Cited in: Monaco, J. (1978) Alain Resnais: The Role of Imagination, London: Secker & Warburg, 
p.11 
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mark of time, as Bergson thought, ‘we pluck out of duration those moments that interest us, and 
that we have gathered along its course.’16 Kilbourn writes that for Resnais, 
‘Memory is always an effect of the combination of the “objective” and “subjective”, 
voluntary and involuntary, conscious and unconscious, etc. Memory in this sense is  
a kind of representation system or mode of narrating or mediating experience:  
a structure over which individual agency only ever has partial control.’17  
 
How can memory and imagination be differentiated? Sartre suggested that ‘what distinguishes 
memory from imagination is not some particular feature of the image but the fact that memory 
is, while imagination is not, concerned with the real.’18 Furthermore he stated that ‘if I recall an 
event of my past life, I do not imagine it, I remember it’,19 asserting that this is a real action. This 
matter is further complicated if considered within the context of a work of art. Even within the 
imaginative realm we are constrained by that which we know. This suggests that memory is 
within both past and future (‘the living future and the imagined future’),20 that the past is ‘one 
mode of real existence among others’21 and that it is embedded within reality. If a memory is 
altered, for whatever reason, it becomes, by degrees, a work of imagination, because memory is 
built upon that which is known. 
 
 
 
Fig. 21 Muriel, or the Time of a Return (1963) 
                                                
16 Bergson, H. (1911) Creative Evolution, Mitchell, A. (trans.) London: Macmillan, p.288 
17 Kilbourn, R. J. A. (2012) Cinema, Memory, Modernity: The Representation of Memory from Art Film to 
Transnational Cinema, London: Routledge, p.57 
18 Warnock, M. (1987) Memory, London: Faber & Faber, p.34 
19 Sartre, J. P. (2004) The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination, Webber, J. 
(trans.), London/New York: Routledge, p.181 
20 Warnock, M. (1987) Memory, London: Faber & Faber, p.34 
21 Sartre, J. P. (2004) The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination, Webber, J. 
(trans.), London/ New York: Routledge, p.181 
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France’s colonial complications, seeming intransience, informs the film’s context. Bernard served 
in Algeria, for twenty-two months, and even though he is now demobbed he is still beholden to 
his memory of that time - he is particularly haunted by his part in the killing of a local woman, 
who may be called Muriel. Alphonse states he was also there for fifteen years – he ran a self-
styled ‘influential’ café. He returned to France, two years ago, but he has struggled to settle down. 
However, Ernest, Alphonse’s brother-in-law, tells another story. Ernest has followed Alphonse 
to Boulogne. He traces him to Hélène’s apartment where he reveals that Alphonse was never in 
Algiers, his war record is an invention, that he is in fact fleeing a bankrupt restaurant and his 
wife, Simone, and his memories of his relationship with Hélène are in fact another fabrication; 
Ernest claims that some of Alphonse’s memories are actually appropriated from his own time 
with Hélène – she does not comment on this situation, it’s as if her memory of what may have 
happened, and what she wanted to happen, are at odds. After Ernest’s denunciation, Alphonse, 
in palpable desperation, grabs him by the collar. Bernard, delighted, starts filming; he tells 
Françoise to get his tape recorder. But, rather than documenting the fight, she turns it on, and it 
emits laughter. This jarring emission causes Bernard to tearfully breakdown. He then rushes from 
the apartment. It is only after this shock that Hélène becomes presently aware - Alphonse’s 
duplicity, her compulsive gambling and faltering business have been pressing distractions – and 
she follows Bernard out onto the street. 
 
 
 
Marie-Dominique (Martine Vatel) 
Fig. 20 Muriel, or the Time of a Return  (1963) 
 
 
Earlier, one Sunday morning, Bernard rides a white horse along Boulogne’s cliffs, a symbolic 
image of freedom that is at odds with his repressed and conflicted characterization, and in this 
regard his relationships with women are particularly revealing. He may claim his girlfriend is 
called Muriel, however, in the time of the film, she is a young French woman, Marie-Do; their 
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relationship appears largely sexual, he does not show commitment - when she tells him that she 
is going to Montevideo, for three years, he reacts with a lack of concern. Françoise is also 
interested in Bernard, but he is unresponsive, being preoccupied with Muriel. When Françoise 
reacts against the oppression of the Aughain’s collective past, she tells Bernard ‘I’m sick of this 
dump that’s fuelled by memories’, and decides to return to Paris. Of all the primary characters, 
only Marie-do and Françoise appear to be unfettered by stifling memories and are able to pull 
free of the past.  
 
In the film’s finale Bernard shoots, dead a former military comrade, Robert, whom he blames for 
Muriel’s death. Also, Alphonse departs - Ernest intends to escort him back to Simone - but he 
manages to give him the slip and jumps onto the first bus that he sees. Hélène, unaware of 
Alphonse’s escape, goes to the railway station to see him off, but on arrival a porter tells her that 
the Paris train no longer stops at this station, for ‘It’s all changed’; this is endemic of her 
relationship with time’s progression and her idealized memory of her affair with Alphonse. For 
him the present will always be too real, troubling, so he rejects his life’s presumed course once 
again and flees from it. After the fatal shooting Bernard tells Hélène, who is blissfully unaware of 
his action, that he is leaving, perhaps now he can move on.  
 
In the very final scene Simone locates Hélène’s apartment. The front door is open, so she lets 
herself in. The remnants of lunch are still on the table. She looks through the rooms – the 
apartment is deserted. Her movements are tracked by the camera, which is in motion for the first 
time, and accompanied by the score’s rising lament - Hans Werner Henze’s score for voice and 
orchestra plays with, and against, the narrative, a non-digetic overview of all that occurs, 
emphasizing, through its modernist accents, all that is, or is not, being said. She leaves but the 
camera remains, fixed, once more, in its gaze, waiting, as it were, for someone to return to the 
frame, for something to happen.  
 
 
Wartime, trauma, recall 
 
This period of production was a time of profound uncertainty, in which history’s lessons 
and questions seemed particularly troubling and unresolved, but also a time of change, France’s 
waning power had been brutally exposed in Indo-China and Algeria, the aftermath of its 
Independence had produced an undeclared civil war, also the scars of World War II were yet to 
heal with many still struggling to admit complicity, lulling in fatalistic complacency. Muriel 
resonates with this prevailing mood and its narrative continually struggles with the consequences 
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of the past and the challenge, and possibility, of change, domestic and public visions, the wear 
and evidence of time.  
 
Muriel’s writer, Cayrol, had previously worked with Resnais on Night and Fog (1955). He had been 
a member of the French resistance; in 1943 he was betrayed and sent to the Gusen concentration 
camp. Following his imprisonment he suffered from bouts of amnesia - he says, ‘I write and 
make films to “return”: it’s always the problem of memory regained’22 - an experience that 
affected his understanding of memory, perceiving it to be an ‘alternate reality, equal in value to 
present experience.’23 He was to be Resnais’ third feature film literary collaborator, after 
Marguerite Duras and Alain Robbe-Grillet - Resnais observed, ‘I think it’s because I was not 
choosing these screenwriters because they were writers but because they had a hidden desire to 
make films’24 – and his text shows traces of Duras’ direct eye and ear and Robbe-Grillet’s 
conceptual structure. That which is encountered in Muriel is invariably in some form of repetition 
or reflection; Cayrol commented that ‘the film’s characters are always between two memories, 
between two times, between two passions, unstable, badly put, not knowing the limits of their 
existence.’25 Cayrol’s scrip suggests that behaviour follows certain unavoidable patterns and that 
the pull of the past is hard to resist.  
 
This sense of fatalism is perhaps understandable in a post-war and cold war context, but 
Existentialism, the philosophy that seemed to have a relevance, and subsequent notoriety after 
1945, would promote individualism, ‘an attitude of self-consciousness’26 against this sense of 
determinism. Within existential understanding, human essence, or what it was to be alive, is seen 
as being contingent and absurd;27 knowledge can only be found outside the general 
meaninglessness of communal existence and within oneself.  Albert Camus’s first novel, 
L’Étranger (The Outsider, 1942), portrayed ‘man’s “absurd” lot’28, and he came to be seen a 
‘spokesperson’ for the philosophy (and the French Resistance, due to his articles for the 
clandestine newspaper Combat).29 However, in time he disavowed this political association, not 
wanting to be creatively and intellectually constricted by prescriptive definitions.30  
                                                
22 Cited in: Armes, R. (1968) The Cinema of Alain Resnais, London: A. Zwemmer, 
p. 120 
23 Monaco, J. (1978) Alain Resnais: The Role of Imagination, London: Secker & Warburg, p.75 
24 Ibid, p.29 
25 Cited in: Bounoure, G. (1962) Alain Resnais, Paris: Editions Seghers, p.56, cited in: Ibid, p.87 
26 Solomon, R. C. (2005) Existentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.xiii 
27 Ibid 
28 Zaretsky, R. (2010) Albert Camus – Elements of a Life, New York: Cornell University Press, p.52 
29 Ibid, p.7 
30 Ibid, p. 97 
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In the The Outsider’s afterword Camus wrote that his protagonist, Meursault, a man who has killed 
an Arab, is ‘driven by a tenacious and therefore profound passion, the passion for an absolute 
and for truth.’31 Camus was a pied-noir, a Frenchman born in North Africa. He supported 
French Algeria but objected to the repressive colonial form that it took. In his novel he invoked 
the impartiality of those who sat in judgment of Meursault, but this description of social equality 
ran counter to the racist reality of the time; it was a fiction that he desired to be fact. A majority 
of the pied-noir strongly rejected the prospect of an independent Algeria; it had been considered 
an integral part of France since 1830. Camus refused to accept that violence was justified in the 
pursuit, or defense, of freedom and foresaw that violent revolution would only beget more 
tragedy, a belief that had been formed in the recriminations that followed France’s World War II 
liberation as he came ‘to doubt the logic of uncompromising justice.’32  
 
De Gaulle had become president again in May 1958, and it was generally thought, due to his 
military background and political record, that he would maintain the status quo, therefore when 
he granted Algeria its independence in 1962 the pied-noir felt bitterly betrayed. This political 
decision, the displacement of the Algerian-born French nationals, raised the question of what did 
it mean to be French, and did it include Europeans and Arabs alike? This vexed issue afflicts all 
nation states that have a colonial past. When Alphonse imagined his café its customers were to 
be pied-noir. Alphonse’s stories, believable in their mundane detail, are constructed to suggest 
the life he desired, but they also illustrated a conservative mistrust of France’s changing 
composition. 
 
Bernard enlisted before his call-up, but his sense of patriotic duty was defused by the actuality of 
conflict. On his return to Boulogne he inadvertently encounters Robert, a man who may have 
killed Muriel. Robert advises Bernard to forget Muriel, and remember the plans they made when 
they were demobilized, reminding him of De Gaulle’s betrayal. The President’s diplomatic 
pragmatism may have left France nominally at peace for the first time since the beginning of 
World War II, but it resulted in the very real possibility of civil war. Robert’s plans are never 
made explicit, but it is implied that they relate to the OAS (Organisation armée secrete), a 
terrorist conspiracy that consisted primarily of disaffected soldiers who sought to avenge 
France’s defeat by destabilising the French state and assassinating De Gaulle. The OAS 
campaign, which was part of a violent anti-Semitic and nationalist tradition that had embraced 
the Vichy regime, invoked uncomfortable memories of earlier conflicts and internal divisions. 
France’s post-war attempt to project strength and maintain colonial claims, in North Africa and 
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Indochina, had proved to be forlorn delusions and consequently exacerbated societal fears, as 
Robert observes, ‘The main thing is that French people feel alone. They’re scared stiff.’   
 
Godard was to be the first filmmaker to directly reference the Algerian conflict.  Le Petit Soldat 
(The Little Soldier, 1960) was initially banned, and was not shown for three years, because it 
explicitly referenced France’s use of torture as a counter-terrorist tool against the FLN (National 
Liberation Front); Colin MacCabe writes, ‘Any film about France’s quasi civil war, whatever the 
opacity of its politics, or perhaps particularly because of the opacity of its politics, was political 
dynamite.’33 In considering the representation of the Algerian struggle Gillo Pontecorvo’s The 
Battle of Algiers (1966), through its documentary like dramatization of the strategies of insurgency 
and counter insurgency, created a detailed and celebrated analysis of a violent conflict in which 
both sides utilised targeted terror; it was not screened in France till 1971 due to official 
censorship and pro-OAS threats.34 The film focuses on 1954-57, the years when the Algerian 
guerillas formulated new terrorist strategies, urban rather than rural, choosing to operate from 
within the Casbah. The French forces, through state sanctioned repression, torture and 
assassination, neutralized the FLN leadership, but in winning the battle, by any means necessary, 
the populace were radicalized and ultimately the war was lost. 
 
Night and Fog also ran afoul of the French authorities. It begins with images of prisoners being 
corralled by uniformed figures, accompanied by a voice-over that informs that this scene 
occurred right across Nazi occupied Europe. One of the featured photographs was taken at the 
French concentration camp, Pithiviers, and in the corner of the frame a gendarme, his insignia 
indicates his nationality, can be seen watching the scene. Resnais managed to reach a compromise 
with the censors and superimposed a beam over this offending French guard.35 The Sorrow and the 
Pity (Ophuls, 1969) was also considered problematic in its exposure of France’s often inglorious 
Second World War, and the convenient Gaullist myth that every man and woman had in some 
way supported and worked towards France’s liberation, it had been originally commissioned for 
television broadcast but was rejected for being unpatriotic; it had a cinematic release in 1971 but 
it was not shown in its intended form until 1981. French narrative film also reflected this cultural 
turn, moving from the resourceful heroics of Un condamné à mort s'est échappé ou Le vent souffle où il 
veut (A Man Escaped or: The Wind Bloweth Where It Listeth, Bresson, 1956), to the valiant but bleak 
L'armée des ombres (Army of Shadows, Melville, 1969), to the explicit collaboration and capitulation 
of Lacombe Lucien (Malle, 1974).  
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Night and Fog was produced a decade after the Allied victory in Europe, and even though the 
spectre of the concentration camps was still present, their actuality was beginning to fade, in 
Louis Marcorelles’s telling phrase ‘the inexorable forgetfulness of the present.’36 The film sought 
to show that which is beyond representation, yet requires remembrance, for ‘as Resnais never 
tires of affirming, memory does more than preserve, it also creates.’37 Emphasising this 
conjecture, Carr contends that ‘The past is intelligible to us only in the light of the present; and 
we can fully understand the present only in the light of the past.’38 Emma Wilson outlines 
Resnais’s conceptual dilemma:  
‘As in his experimentation with still and moving images, so more broadly Resnais 
is concerned to unsettle his viewer (to irritate our senses in Bersani’s terms) and, 
in particular, to bring us close to the matter, substance, and affect of the images 
he manipulates. He seeks indeed to make the image distressingly manipulable, 
tangible, sentient, graspable.’39  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 22 Night and Fog (1955) 
 
 
Night and Fog, with its affirmation of death and survival, its deadened, informed voice, slow and 
detailed inspection of the vacated architectural mausoleum, a scarred and tell-tale relic, directly 
locates what has been, McQuire writes that, its ‘images of atrocity [are redeemed] not only from 
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the forgetfulness of historical absence, but also from the forgetfulness of banality.’40 However, 
Claude Lanzmann criticized Resnais and Cayrol’s failure to directly name what they depict as a 
predominately Jewish experience, and their decision to show the bodies of the dead.41 But, their 
film considers concentration camps, not the Holocaust, the emaciated detainees are referred to as 
‘prisoners’ (their racial or religious identity is not offered) and images of their fate, footage that 
had previously been seen in the newsreels shot after the camps’ liberation, marked the 
consciousness of all that came into their presence; Wilson writes the Resnais’ conception bids ‘to 
unsettle how and what we see, to make the visceral shudder of the indeterminacy of living and 
dead matter.’42  
 
Lanzmann’s epic documentary Shoah (1985) may not feature archival footage, relying as it does 
on contemporary interviews, but every piece of testimony suggests all that Lanzmann excludes, 
therefore to watch Shoah is also to remember Night and Fog, and all the other films which make 
use of archival material. Griselda Pollock and Max Silverman suggest that Resnais’s film is ‘not 
about absence and absenting’, which is the subject of Shoah, but is about the ‘terror and 
systematic operations’ of concentration camps.43 They indicate that it would be wrong to see 
these two films in opposition; Lanzmann envisaged his film as a ‘resistance to representation’, in 
which historical events are located in the present, but his film, as with Resnais’, should be seen in 
the context of its production; by the 1980s the representation of the Holocaust had passed into 
knowing and commodified horror, however, when Night and Fog was produced this archival 
material had yet to be desensitised.44 They classify Night and Fog as being part of ‘concentrationary 
cinema’, a form that utilises ‘radical techniques of montage and disorientation’, and ‘connects the 
living to the dead, past to present, here to there in order to shock us out of comforting 
dichotomies that keep the past ‘over there’, and as a form it also embraces Hiroshima mon amour, 
Muriel and Marker’s La Jetée (1962).45 Through Resnais’s method, the manifestation of memory 
becomes a testament, not a definitive statement for nothing can take on that mantle, but it 
contains seemingly off-hand and elemental disjuncture that still unsettles and provokes. 
 
After Night and Fog Resnais was commissioned to make a documentary about the atomic bomb, 
but he felt unable to do so; he did not wish to revisit his previous film and document 
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monumental suffering and perceptual incomprehension again.46 So he turned to Duras and the 
result, Hiroshima mon amour, combined documentary observation, a metaphorical love story and 
reflective history, she commented, ‘All one can do is talk about the impossibility of talking about 
Hiroshima. The knowledge of Hiroshima being stated a priori by an exemplary delusion of the 
mind.’47 Her staged dialogue and scenarios, never naturalistic ventriloquism, deploy a rhetorical 
form to question the validity of what is known and how it can be communicated. Duras termed 
this approach as being one of ‘false documentary’,48 a position that implies through dramatic 
contrivance true fiction can occur, as fiction can also allow a truth, as it were, to be realised. 
Muriel’s dramatic relating of the effect and trauma of conflict evolved from Night and Fog’s self-
awareness, from its intention to show, without illustration, and invoke what has been, without 
settled contemplation, as it explored the creative freedom of ‘false documentary’ to portray an 
understanding of France’s post-war situation.  
 
 
All that home movies show 
 
  
Fig. 23 Muriel, or the Time of a Return (1963) 
 
 
 After Alphonse’s arrival Bernard chose to sleep at his studio. One day Hélène decides to 
visit him, but he is absent. She looks around and then turns on his 8mm projector. The image of 
a busy souq is illuminated before it catches fire and burns in the projector’s gate. When we see 
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the heat radiate across the frame more than just an image is being destroyed, time itself is being 
effaced, but our ability to view what has been reiterates time’s continuing affect.  
 
It is rare, particularly in feature films, to see the mechanised nature of film, its material inscription 
and fragility, so exposed. The insertion of the 8mm film provides another textual and temporal 
surface, as do Bernard’s photographs and hand-written notebook. The contrast between the 
resplendent lustre of the feature film’s 35 mm and the worn and grainy texture of Bernard’s 8 
mm is marked, but this lowly gauge, with its amateur, home-movie connotations, offers an 
incidental authenticity.  
 
Throughout Muriel Bernard films Boulogne and its inhabitants, his appearance with a camera is 
never thought to be particularly noteworthy and the footage is never seen; he is ‘collecting 
evidence’ documenting the conditions that allowed torture to happen; he wishes to see and indict 
a sensibility, a people, a country. In Michael Powell’s Peeping Tom (1960) we see another young 
man, Mark Lewis (Karlheinz Böhm), who also has an interest in filming all that he encounters 
with a 16 mm camera. However, the films he shoots invariably culminate in the death of a 
woman; he has attached a mirror to his camera, so his victims are forced to view their own 
deaths. Lewis’s films may be black and white, but they do not show the requisite characteristics 
of 16 mm: the on screen resolution is no different from the parent 35 mm film, whereas 
Bernard’s is clearly what it purports to be. Peeping Tom concludes with Lewis killing himself. He 
dies in the same fashion as his victims, by stabbing himself with a sharpened tripod leg, and in 
doing so finishes, as it were, his film. Powell’s film emphasises the predatory aspect of the 
camera, and at times we are offered Lewis’s point-of-view as he tracks his victims, as Susan 
Sontag writes, the film ‘assumes connections between impotence and aggression, 
professionalized looking and cruelty, which point to the central fantasy connected with the 
camera.’49 Lewis’s scopophilia, a sexualised pleasure in watching those engaged in some form of 
sexual activity, is mirrored by the film audience’s own voyeurism, the pleasure they derive from 
being ‘safely’ thrilled and horrified. Bernard’s film does not contain such dramatic evidence, but 
his Algerian memories add meaning to his footage and change its connotations, a retroactive 
composite of the conditions of action.   
 
In one of Muriel’s key scenes, Bernard, projects a ‘tin of rushes’ in his studio, which he views with 
the local odd job man. We see, a scratchy 8 mm color film, Bernard provides a commentary as it 
plays:  
‘No one knew this woman before.’ Images of a barren landscape, a young soldier 
comes into view. ‘The warehouse was at the back of the courtyard.’ Target practice. 
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‘I didn’t see her at first… I bumped into her as I approached the table.’ Soldiers in 
country. ‘She seemed to be asleep but she was trembling all over.’ Eating rations. 
‘They told me she was called Muriel… I don’t know how but I knew it wasn’t her 
real name.’ Dishes of food – an Arab eats. ‘There must have been five of us standing 
chatting around her.’ A field-gun in action. ‘We had to get rid of her before 
nightfall.’ A howitzer fires. ‘Robert bent down and turned her over…’ Two relaxed 
soldiers walk down a slope. ‘She covered her eyes with her arm… He dropped her… 
She fell like a bundle.’ The soldiers acknowledge the cameraman. ‘Robert kicked her 
in the hips.’ A city. ‘He took a torch and shone it on her… She was foaming at the 
mouth… They tore off her clothes… They tried to sit her in a chair.’ The soldiers 
play fight. ‘One of her arms was all twisted… They had to finish what they started… 
She couldn’t have talked if she’d wanted to… I joined in.’ Digging a hole. ‘Muriel 
groaned as I slapped her… My palms were burning… Muriel’s hair was all wet…’ 
An army truck on a country road. ‘She stared straight at me…’ The city again. ‘She 
shut her eyes... Then she started vomiting.’ Children and soldiers fraternize. Plucking 
dead birds. ‘I left them all there.’ Washing socks. ‘That night I went back to see her.’ 
Children by an army tent. ‘I lifted the cover.’ A soldier shakes the hand of a child. ‘ 
It was as if she’d been in the water for a long time.’ Soldiers in a café. Soldiers swim. 
‘She was like a sack of potatoes that had been ripped open.’ Arabs. ‘Her body was 
covered in blood. So was her hair. She had burns on her chest.’ A soldier strolls by. 
‘Muriel’s eyes were open… I hardly felt anything.’ Soldiers try and enter a house.  
‘I went to bed.’ They throw rocks at the door. ‘I slept well…’  
 
The film cuts back to Bernard, his head is resting upon his hands, he continues, ‘…Robert had 
got rid of her.’ The odd job man speaks for the first time, ‘And where is that guy now?’ Bernard 
replies, ‘Traipsing round Boulogne like everyone else.’ The man considers and then offers, 
‘Once you start digging you can never get out of the hole.’ White leader spins out.  
 
 
 
Fig. 24 Muriel, or the Time of a Return (1963) 
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Bernard films as any sightseer might and his images appear unedited, as the picturesque mingles 
with the mundane. Bernard and his comrades are at war, but the fighting is not directly evident, a 
howitzer recoils after firing but it is just another image of army life. However, the juxtaposition 
of film and commentary produces a different reading. He never directly implicates those who we 
see but the documented troop must contain Bernard’s fellow torturers. The nostalgia of the film 
still remains but what it depicts alters and the location becomes a crime scene. Bernard tells 
Hélène that ‘the story of Muriel cannot be told’; to tell her story would be to admit personal 
involvement in her death and the torturous nature of France’s suppression of a racially divided 
Algeria. The images that represent her show another time and place, which Hélène can never 
know, but for Bernard these images have become a means to locate her, and they indicate the 
image’s power to pass through temporal and spatial realms. Her memory oppresses Bernard, and 
he desires this now unknowable woman, her death was painful and unjust but she is symbolically 
victorious, for it is the French who are forced to leave Algeria. 
 
Bernard’s film is made of diary-like observational recordings; its true significance only becomes 
apparent through his narration. Other personal films feel the direct call of history. Abraham 
Zapruder, an amateur 8 mm enthusiast, shot 22 seconds of film, in Dallas, Texas, on 22 
November 1963. On that fateful day he was the only cameraman to be positioned on the now 
infamous grassy knoll, and his silent, real-time, somewhat jerky recording of Kennedy’s 
assassination is still the most complete visual record of this much- contested event.50 Every other 
detail of that day appeared to be captured, everything but that which Zapruder saw. The Warren 
commission stated, ‘of all the witnesses to the tragedy, the only unimpeachable one is the camera 
of Abraham Zapruder.’51 The Warren Commission’s belief in the camera’s natural observational 
powers is a widespread, but flawed, belief; a fallacy that Report (Conner, 1967) ably illustrates. 
Brue Conner’s film ‘utilises the emotional matrix of the Kennedy assassination’,52 the now 
familiar documentation, but through deconstruction, repetition and de-synchronisation these 
known images become estranged from their original intention and meanings, their exposition 
now a series of enacted gestures.  
 
The Zapruder film is now part of the repository of images that represent Kennedy’s 
assassination, but despite being unique it does not show who shot the president. Film reveals a 
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framed, partial vision - Bernard’s 8 mm footage shows Algeria and its inhabitants, but it fails to 
show why he is actually stationed there and what he experienced.  
 
 
 
 Frame 313: the head shot   
Fig. 25 Zapruder’s film (1963) 
 
 
Bernard’s accomplice reassured him that once he had left the army he could return to normal life, 
but differentiating experience is problematic, and Bernard’s film and commentary expresses his 
inability to reconcile this divide. Resnais’ next film La Guerre est Finie (The War is Over, 1966), 
written by Jorge Semprún, an expatriate Spanish socialist, considers how an individual attempts 
to stay true to their beliefs, in this case Spanish Republicanism; what happens when the struggle 
becomes illusionary (Franco will not be overthrown) and an activist breaks with this, false, but 
necessary, ideal: what remains; self-deception, disillusionment, comradeship, duty? The War is 
Over suggests that humanity, real communal experience, rather than theory, is what ultimately 
matters, as Ward observes, ‘this “plunge into ourselves”, our memories and our pasts, will teach 
us that we are free and enable us to rediscover our capacity for action and the community 
between ourselves and others.’53 After his Algerian experience Bernard is disconnected, he does 
not have the benefit of genuine companionship, the ideological sympathy of his comrades-in-
arms, and is unable to relate with people or place.  
 
Films, which are concerned with military veterans reconnecting with society invariably focus on 
the relationship between military and civil life, public and private domains, the peacetime struggle 
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to assimilate - the disparity between duty and personal feelings. This is augmented by conflictual 
context and this affects popular understanding and its representation, for instance The Best Years 
of Our Lives (Wyler, 1946), which focuses on three servicemen returning to America after World 
War II, imbues their re-integration with dignity and determination, a sense that they, and 
America, will prevail. World War II is still considered to be just and unavoidable, unlike the cold-
war conflicts that followed. Samuel Hynes writes that, ‘Americans had to wait until Vietnam for 
our national disillusionment.’54 The returning servicemen, from this earlier ‘Good War’,55 may 
have found that the world they left had changed, but their sacrifice was commonly respected; 
John David Slocum observes, ‘Hollywood cinema functioned as a source of mutual identification 
and shared standards of social behaviour and values for a variety of viewers.’56 Coming Home 
(Ashby, 1978) regards the emotional cost of the Vietnam War and shows that its veterans existed 
in a conflicted environment, where their presence abroad was viewed, in some quarters, to be 
fundamentally flawed. Despite being from a different culture these films, like Muriel, suggest that 
the discarding of a uniform is but the start of any reintegration, however society struggles to 
comprehend this and expects servicemen to forget what they have seen and done once they 
return home. 
 
Resnais’ sympathy is with the victims of war; this understanding also includes young men who 
become involved with violence. Bernard holds Robert responsible for Muriel’s death and he was 
shot to appease her memory; Bernard acts without vitriol or flourish, only a small hole in the 
pocket of his vinyl overcoat shows where the gun was concealed. After the fatal shooting there is 
an explosion at Bernard’s studio. Responsibility is not attributed but the most likely explanation 
would seem to be retaliation for Robert’s death. The 8 mm film that Bernard shot whilst they 
served together does not reveal anything directly incriminating, but its importance is in what it 
invokes and for Bernard it confirms Robert’s guilt. Bernard’s violent act lessened his sense of 
complicity; he no longer feels the need to gather evidence and throws his camera into the sea. 
His archive, the images that he scrutinised, was destroyed in the explosion, but rather than 
mourn their passing he seems relieved. Bergson considered memory to be heightened when 
being of an action, because the memory is experienced within the body,57 and when the past 
comes back to us, it is to enable us to comprehend the present, and move with understanding 
towards the future.58 It is as if Bernard’s action has freed him from the past, its image, he is no 
longer looking at the world around him through film’s mechanism, for memories do fade, time 
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effaces. He is now able, ready, to reengage with the world, an understanding that commences 
with his mother. He now remembers when they first met, ‘the broken roof? The linen turned to 
ashes… the melted silverware. The snow fell on my bed.’ She corrects him, ‘No, it was rain.’ 
They share a memory, tenderness, and then he readies to go.  
 
 
 Urban traces and other sedimented refrains 
 
Cayrol proposed a reflective and knowing relationship between word and memory. His 
writing has a marked ambivalence towards resolution and the characters’ motivations are largely 
to be inferred by the viewer, for they only speak of experience, and their sensibilities are expressed 
through external trappings, their attire, actions, habitation. Sontag, in her review of Muriel, 
contended, ‘when Resnais decided to take as his subject, not “a memory”, but “remembering”, 
and to situate memories in characters within the film, a muted collusion between the aims of 
formalism and the ethic of engagement occurred.’59 She characterised Resnais’s films as lacking 
‘vigour’ and being ‘overburdened and synthetic’ and posited Bresson’s Les Dames du Bois de 
Boulogne (The ladies of the Bois de Boulogne, 1964) and Godard’s Vivre Sa Vie (My Life to Live (1962) as 
examples of the formalist tradition that are successful and ‘emotionally exalting.’60 She wished to 
find a formalism that acknowledged the narrative film tradition and was not ‘cluttered’, 
contending that  ‘Godard is the first director fully to grasp the fact that, in order to deal seriously 
with ideas, one must create a new film language for expressing them.’61 An appraisal that forgets 
Vertov’s revolutionary cinema, Brecht’s experimentation and the work of Godard’s 
contemporary, Debord, three figures who had a distinct influence on Godard’s practice.  
 
Debord, in ‘Cinema After Alain Resnais’ (1959), praises Hiroshima mon amour as ‘the most original, 
most innovative film since the invention of talkies.’ 62 Debord’s appreciation is but a prelude to 
his real critique, ‘the appearance in “commercial” cinema of the self-destruction that dominates 
all modern art.’63 The modern directors that Resnais epitomised brought a self-awareness and 
critical understanding to their craft. They were part of cinema’s new project, as outlined by 
Durgnat in ‘Resnais & Co’, which sought to promote its societal importance and artistic worth;64 
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a position that Debord acknowledged in his earlier essay, ‘With and Against Cinema’,65 which 
begins, ‘The cinema is the central art of our society.’66 Monaco, in his study of the French ‘New 
Wave’, observes that the Cinémathèque Française generation ‘were imbued with the history of 
art’ unlike those who had come before them.67 They saw film as more than a form to be 
consumed and emphasised its creative potential and process. However, Debord argues that the 
form of cinema, as experienced through Hiroshima mon amour, could no longer claim cultural 
autonomy, and that for all its promise it was to be just another art turn and only through 
fracturing the critical and commercial binary could cinema stave off its institutional 
commodification. In Debord’s last film for cinema, In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni (We Turn in 
the Night, and are Consumed by Fire, 1978), he differentiates cinema’s technological development 
from its societal application, suggesting that cinema did not have to become the preserve of the 
‘spectacle’, but it is now a sullied form, as he narrates, ‘I do not wish to preserve any of the 
language of this outdated art.’ Debord conceived of a cultural rebuttal that would use culture 
against itself, that a true analysis of society could only occur through dissecting popular culture’s 
traces. 
 
Resnais’s films of this period considered contemporary history, but they are not overtly 
politicised in their ideological analysis. He suggests in an interview with Richard Roud that he 
believes that ‘dramatic construction has to evolve, but you can’t dispense with it altogether. It’s 
just a question of finding a new form for it’, and he is sure that there is a structural logic to 
Godard’s first essayistic film 2 ou 3 choses que je sais d'elle (Two or Three Things I Know About Her, 
1967), ‘despite what others may say.’68 Resnais suggests ‘a really careful analysis of certain new 
techniques might not reveal that they are in essence still the same old rules which have applied 
for six thousand years.’69 Godard considered his film to be ‘a continuation of the movement 
begun by Resnais in Muriel: an attempt at a description of a phenomenon known in mathematics 
and sociology as a “complex” [the analysis of society through its social networks]’,70 that is was to 
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be his ‘first film which was not totally dominated by the previous history of the cinema.’71 
Monaco comments that Godard adopted a mix of documentary and ‘simple drama’, because 
‘fiction doesn’t leave enough room for the persona of the artist.’72 Godard’s presence is seen 
through his visual montage of documented drama, but also heard, for the first time, in his 
hushed, whispering narration. If Resnais’ film, in part, inspired Godard, how does it relate to Two 
or Three Things I Know About Her? Resnais is intent on representing that which is not known and 
the search for some understanding, whereas Godard’s title is a statement of subjective knowledge 
and suggests a sense of confidence, that at least two or three things are definitely known.  
 
 
 
Fig. 26 Two or Three Things I Know About Her (1967) 
 
 
Godard’s film was inspired by an ‘article about prostitution in the new suburbs of Paris by 
Catherine Vimenet’,73 and reflects on consumerist society, the war in Vietnam, and Paris’s 
redevelopment. The ‘her’ of the film’s title refers to Juliette (and Marina Vlady who plays her), 
who lives with her family in a new housing development, which is portrayed as a microcosm of 
capitalist alienation, and Paris the city; the gender specific affirmation could also regard their city. 
The film considers whether it is possible to be contented in a materialist society. Kilbourn writes 
that ‘the cinematic city is a repository of memory’,74 and Stephen Barber suggests that the ‘cities 
at the origins of European cinema are strange Edens, already contaminated in the first 
illumination of their urban matter.’75 In the post-war environment France’s cities are depicted as 
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a site of change, opportunity, but also excess and duplicity, populated by compromised 
individuals, places were the old and new worlds meet. The places depicted by Resnais, Godard 
and Debord are located and given authorial presence through film. Their modernist practices are 
situated in the urban theatre, and they sought to represent its complexity, in different and distinct 
ways, and their approaches contextualise France’s post-war regime and confirmed film’s political 
and conceptual potentiality. 
 
The tropes that Godard adopts were first explicitly outlined in Debord’s earlier film Critique de la 
séparation (Critique of Separation, 1961). T. Y. Levin emphasises Godard’s indebtedness to Debord:, 
‘[he] takes up the philosophical voice-over, the use of black sequences, paratactic, non-narrative 
constructions, refusal of sound image synchrony, extended use of text frames, the exposure of 
the “means of production”, intensive intertextuality, and so on.’76 The Situationists repeatedly 
derided Godard for being out of touch with revolutionary cinema,77 and his films for presenting 
society with ‘a false image in which they recognize themselves falsely.’78 Debord’s films, from 
Hurlements en faveur de Sade (Howls for Sade, 1952) onward, were to be an antagonistic critique of 
form and society.  
 
There may be no cinematic autonomy, but Critique of Separation engenders parody, 
societal/personal/political reflection, quotation, self-deprecation, irony, and contradiction to 
suggest and enact its challenge to cultural homogeneity, as Debord’s voice-over states, ‘The 
relation between the images, the spoken commentary and the subtitles is neither complementary 
nor indifferent, but is intended to itself be critical.’79 The film regards, as its title indicates, the 
separation between audience and film, history and the present, politics and life, images and 
words, representation and reality, but also as Tom McDonough has pointed out, separation is 
also a vital part of Debord’s revelatory strategy, which ‘requires an analysis that insisted on 
separation – of viewer from film, of film from pro-filmic reality.’80 This was a conscious exposure 
of film’s, and by extension society’s, apparatus, that film should forego its mastering inclinations 
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and imbue the viewer with active necessity; over images of Plateau Saint-Merri the opening lines 
of Dante’s Inferno appear, ‘Midway upon the journey of our life, I found myself within a forest 
dark, For the straightforward pathway had been lost’, McDonough posits that the quotation is, ‘a 
confession of authorial impotence and a refusal of any position of mastery and knowledge; and 
second, in the absence of any Virgilian guide, the subsequent film can lead its viewer only deeper 
into the obscurities of that dark forest.’81 The spatial presence in Resnais, Godard and Debord’s 
films emphasise different relational perspectives; Debord reconfigures Paris through his own 
politicised geography, Godard’s interest is within the contemporary socio-political realm and 
Resnais’ Boulogne is like a palimpsest.  
 
 
 
Fig. 27 Critique of Separation (1961) 
 
 
Debord’s film, like Godard’s, has a female protagonist, whom the author follows and in this 
action Paris is revealed, a personal environment with sedimented historic traces. Her derive, 
which traces a familiar neighbourhood, is described by Debord thus: ‘playful-constructive 
behavior and awareness of psychogeographical effects’,82 that ‘calls for a radical transformation 
of society’s comportment, its habits, behaviors, passions, and desires’;83 McDonough writes that 
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this action was ‘meant to contest the retreat of the directly lived into the realm of representation, 
and thereby to contest the organisation of the society of the spectacle itself.’84 Debord’s 
conception would re-engage life and its expression, and this informs a sociological critique and 
avant-garde autobiography; he intones that the film relates to ‘some particular memories’, the 
visualized dérive is formed of locations that invoke, for Debord, all that has been, as the images 
recall the Situationists’ ‘experimental inhabitation’,85 and potentially could be.  
 
Critique of Separation, and its predecessor Sur le passage de quelques personnes à travers une assez courte 
unité de temps (On the Passage of a Few Persons Through a Rather Brief Unity of Time, 1959), are records 
of Debord’s Paris, his life, other Situationists, the places they frequent, their discourses, the 
critical methods they would deploy (‘it is necessary to destroy memory in art. To undermine its 
communication.’) The films are a reflexive summation of time lived, images and reflections on all 
that has been, and an analysis of how a better (Marxist) future can be achieved. His monologue is 
always aware – at turns self-deprecating, serious, curious, irreverent, impassioned, personal, 
derisory - formed from an assemblage of memories, political entreaties, observations, all that he 
would offer to foment social and cultural change.          
 
In Muriel the physical impact of World War II is still visible in scarred buildings, punctured road 
signs, displaced inhabitants and almost twenty years after the town was liberated it is still being 
rebuilt, as Cayrol recalled, ‘I situated the story in Boulogne, despite Resnais’s doubts, because 
Boulogne is also a town after a drama. There are two towns, the old one spared by the war and 
the reconstructed town, the topography of which the old inhabitants cannot recognise.’86 Hélène 
regularly visits the town’s Casino. Her gambling companion is Roland De Smoke, who was in 
charge of the town’s demolition in 1945; he believes that the attic of his old house is exactly 
where Hélène’s apartment now stands. The modern architectural impositions do not have the 
confidence to orchestrate a real revival and awkward juxtapositions remain, revealing history; for 
Ward, Muriel shows ‘Time, as the great destroyer, the great reducer and the great repeater.’87 De 
Smoke recounts the story of an apartment block, which nearing completion slid, he concludes, 
‘we’re waiting for it to fall down… It won’t be a pretty ruin.’  
 
The present is obsolete before it has had a chance to age, and unlike that which originally 
occupied the space its ornamentation will not be re-claimed, re-constituted, as it has not accrued 
the value that time bestows. Muriel’s characters all seem to be dissembling their past and are 
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therefore evasive about their present. This is echoed in the town, which is falling down in the 
process of trying to improve its own past by unconvincingly reinventing its present. Ernest’s 
denunciation, that Alphonse is a fantasist, is inter-cut with close-ups of a new apartment block’s 
concrete and mass-produced planes, as if it is dislodging all that came before it with brutal 
disinterest. 
 
 
 
Fig. 28 Muriel, or the Time of a Return (1963) 
 
 
A building may disappear, but its footprint still offers a specific resonance - Hélène indicates to 
Alphonse the location of the now demolished Folkestone hotel, which they once visited for a 
three-day holiday, its absence reinforces its emblematic power for it allows the past to be 
remembered. Unseen at the station a young couple loiters. They cryptically discuss their future. 
The couple suggests a form of repetition; a cyclical variant on Hélène and Alphonse’s past 
relationship. Hélène may seem to be in an uncertain place, the memory she desired to rekindle is 
now, once again, in retreat, but things have happened and time is past. Before Ernst’s revelations 
he entertains Hélène, and her assembled friends, with a rendition of the popular song Déjà: 
‘Not only autos go a hundred 
How annoying 
Time too rushes on 
How insane 
Take it easy, Mr Time 
Slow down on the curve 
Yesterday a kid, today white hair…’ 
 
An aspect of Boulogne’s, and France’s, redevelopment was to be a conspicuously disaffected 
youth. In Muriel bikers congregate outside a sea front café, their youthful menace displayed 
through their mobility and style. In another scene Alphonse and Ernest meet, and in a different 
café, which coincidentally is also the location of Bernard and Robert’s initial encounter; this 
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double meeting indicates that the orbits of these individuals have come together and their futures 
are interlinked until their trajectories pull apart, once more, a contrivance that can only occur in 
the urban environment.  
 
The café, a social space that facilitates the passing of recreational and discursive time, was, from 
the 1950s onwards, witness to new emerging economic power, cultural rites and social 
configurations. Godard, after surveying a café that Juliette is seated in, frames a cup of coffee, he 
suggests, ‘perhaps an object like this will make it possible to link up, to move from one subject to 
another, from living in society, to being together;’ in a later scene, in another café, two men, 
Bouvard and Pécuchet, characters from Flaubert’s unfinished novel of the same name, who 
wished to know all, are surrounded by piles of books, from which they randomly choose phrases 
and connect them, linking one subject to another, whilst contemporary characters discuss the 
meaning of communism. Godard’s agitprop would position politics as an intrinsic component of 
life.  
 
Debord’s cinematic time is always one of historical materialism, an ideological progression in 
which different temporal allusions reinforce his polemic - History, through images, commentary, 
quotations, reiterates the context in which society exists - believing that action must follow 
analysis. For Debord film should not just represent existence as it is, but it should produce 
change, as Debord wrote that ‘Revolution is not “showing” life to people, but bringing them to 
life’;88 his film’s impossible, but necessary, task was to qualify his aphorism. Godard’s 
commentary oscillates between philosophical and theoretical lyricism and flights of revolutionary 
invocation - towards the end of the film he offers,  
‘I listen to the ads on my transistor… thanks to Esso I’m happily on my way,  
on the route of dreams, and I’m forgetting the rest. I’m forgetting Hiroshima…  
I’m forgetting Auschwitz… I’m forgetting Budapest… I’m forgetting Vietnam… 
I’m forgetting the housing crisis.’  
 
Critique of Separation, a marginal film apart from general discourse, ends with Debord declaring 
that he is unwilling to ‘play the game.’ Godard’s expansive cinematic palette, in contrast to 
Debord’s position, ‘didactic’ and ‘rigorously negative’,89 indicates that he is unwilling, at this time 
at least, to forego the game and his cultural position. Debord and Godard reflect on a society 
that they perceive to be corrupted, one in need of change, and their critical persuasiveness is 
assessed through the acceptance, or not, of their respective positions. In ‘Cinema After Alain 
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Resnais’ Debord’s critique drew on his memory of another, more innocent, time, one before 
Resnais, as it were. However, it could be countered that Resnais’ method actually enriched 
cinema and developed its form, that his ideas could only find fruition in film and these works 
were still very much subject to the public’s discriminatory gaze, they were not ensconced in the 
art world or archive, and were actively accounted for.  
 
Resnais does not seek to divine the ideological imperative of progress and his treatment of 
history is understood through narrativised encounters, the relationship between the general and 
the specific, the progress of temporal detectives; Algeria marks the film and is made primarily 
known through Bernard’s direct and Alphonse’s fantastical relationship to this conflict.  In this 
favouring of the individual, Resnais would personify some issues of war. He does not attempt to 
investigate the state’s motivations, policies are understood through their effect on personal 
relations, but focuses on the temporal differentials and anomalies of experience. Resnais desires 
to use the language found in cinema to divine meaning from the fabric of time: like Bergson 
before him, this may be a high-minded aspiration, but no more so than to make film politically. 
  
 
Divergent temporalities and their narrative orientation 
 
 Resnais’ form and approach, a coming together of complex ideas in a narrative form, as 
Rosenbaum  suggested,90 has been extremely influential.91 The form of Memento92, which 
Rosenbaum derided as being a ‘gimmicky and un-poetic counterfeit’ of Resnais,93 and other films 
such as Run Lola Run (Tykwer, 1998), 21 Grams (Iñárritu, 2003), Irreversible (Noé, 2003), have 
come to be seen by some critics as evidence of a new form of cinema, which Allan Cameron 
defines as modular and database narratives ‘terms [that are] applicable to narratives that 
foreground the relationship between the temporality of the story and the order of its telling.’94 
His assertion is predicated on the understanding that these various works encompass the lessons 
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of Modernist narrative radicalism within an accessible form, arguing that database films, ‘signal 
the point at which these aesthetics have been accepted by popular culture at large’,95 that the 
temporal and aesthetic experimentation of Resnais, Antonioni and other canonical directors has 
become part of cinema’s lexicon. This contemporary co-option would suggest that all such 
methods could potentially be transposed, de-coupled from their original form, but intent and 
context is integral to their deployment.  
 
Database films may seem to reflect many of Resnais’s concerns, by implication reference 
memory, and through their structures suggest that it is an uncertain and variable tool, but the 
protagonists of these dramas never seem to enact inconsequential thoughts as their actions 
always have momentous effect that can be traced through clear narrative drives, which is 
essentially different from Resnais’s idea of fragmented life and its representation.96 Resnais’s 
choice of subject matter indicated a desire to inspect the contemporary world and question its 
occurrence and potential consequences, rendering these concerns through a complex form of 
thinking through practice, which resists being reduced to a formula and needs to be truly 
comprehended in totality, not as segmented effects. Muriel’s intricate montage offers a network of 
meanings and memories.  
 
On Alphonse’s first night in Boulogne Hélène leaves him alone to go and play roulette. Whilst 
awaiting her return, Alphonse decides to search the apartment. In Bernard’s room he finds a gun 
and a Journal stuffed with loose papers and photographs. He opens the book and reads, and we, 
the viewer, are also offered the text,  ‘I lifted the cover and I don’t know why Muriel’s eyes 
weren’t closed… Petit Rouge finally says to me, when you’re a civilian you’ll be able to think 
whatever you want…’ Alphonse notes a black and white photograph of a young dark haired 
woman with a man standing beside her - his face blackened out - Alphonse reads on, ‘We were 
“engaged” – we went to Paris now and then (I still have that stupid photo of us)… but it’s with 
Muriel that everything really began.’ It is telling that Alphonse, the film’s acknowledged fantasist, 
discovers these personal, revealing artifacts.  The text, with its accompanying defaced 
photograph, even the gun, offer clues as to who Muriel might be and the nature of her 
relationship with Bernard. They all suggest his experience in Algeria lingers. The journal and 
photograph inform the narrative, the gun is a warning from history and a suggestion of things to 
come.  
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Fig. 29 Muriel, or the Time of a Return (1963) 
 
 
To consider Muriel’s totality is to see the depiction of time, and through its realization a reflexive 
vision is communicated, one that can only be known through film - its divergent temporalities 
are suggested in frame, all is seen on the same involved plane, a Bergsonian invocation, which 
Deleuze emphasises, ‘there is a present of the future, a present of the present and a present of the past.’97 Out 
of the need to represent memory, to recall that which cannot be forgotten, Resnais offers 
personified moments, imagined scenes that create ‘false documentaries’98, Dumas’ telling phrase 
suggests that this form can potentially offer a real fiction, work that transcends dramatic 
contrivance and produces an authenticated, exploratory, narrative experience. This may be 
antithetical to invocations of memory, which act as a means to discern all that is present, but this 
method offers reclaimed moments, fragments of life that require remembrance and the means to 
apprise and assemble them. To move through time, invoke space and show the trace of 
individual memory - all that resides in a particular place and is buffeted by temporal passage – 
and its relation to history and others is Muriel’s lasting effect.  
 
Frampton’s (nostalgia) is the subject of the next chapter. His film was made at the beginning of 
the next decade, on another continent and was formulated from a different, but related, 
rendering of memory. His passage through time was to be distinctly personal, national affairs 
exist beyond its frame. In (nostalgia) he recounts memories of his artistic life in New York and the 
method of his recollection endeavoured to make his film directly part of this memorious 
experience. 
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V. (NOSTALGIA):  
THESE MEMORIES ARE PERSONAL 
 
 
 
Fig. 30 Self-portrait (1959) from: (nostalgia) (1971) 
 
  
Hollis Frampton’s (1936-84) film (nostalgia) (1971) proposes an investigation of time 
through a form of film memoir that asks how can that which is past, but not gone, be given new 
presence? In (nostalgia) a series of chronological photographs are burnt on a hot plate, in real 
time, whilst a voice-over relates a number of displaced autobiographical tales related to the 
photographs. Frampton’s succession of pyres simultaneously immortalises and replays their 
destruction. The film structure obliges the viewer to consistently adjust their temporal 
perspective as the film moves between tenses, invoking time and calling on memory. In 
considering (nostalgia) film’s capacity for activating memory is tested, as it simultaneously requires 
the deployment of memory - recall - (for its comprehension) and invokes memory (through its 
form).     
 
P. Adams Sitney placed Frampton’s films in the structural canon; ‘a cinema… in which the shape 
of the whole film is predetermined and simplified, and it is that shape which is the primal 
impression of the film.’1 He goes on to define what he perceived to be its characteristics, fixed 
camera position, flicker effect, loop printing and re-photography (off the screen), though he 
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cautions that these elements are not usually to be found in a single film and they can be 
modified. He observed, in a key phrase that echoes Frampton’s own sentiments, that ‘it is cinema 
of the mind rather than the eye.’2 It is worth noting that this definition was not universally 
favoured; Frampton commented in a letter to Peter Gidal, ‘I said to Sitney at dinner in July: I 
have found your structuralists, P. Adams, and they are in England. Complete to the diacritical 
mark, influence of Warhol, the whole number.’3 Sitney positioned Warhol as structural film’s 
major precursor, and that ‘it is an attempt to answer Warhol’s attack [challenging ‘the viewer’s 
ability to endure emptiness or sameness’4] by converting his tactics into tropes of the response.’5 
His seeming indifference to industrial production values and aesthetics exemplified a stripped 
and essential way of seeing and engaging with film. These structural films were, in many ways, 
the antitheses of the earlier American avant-garde, and Sitney’s formulation directly challenges 
the order of commercial cinema, and in doing so, seeks to expose and examine film’s materiality 
and its reception.  
 
(nostalgia) was Frampton’s first film. Previously he had been a photographer, and in turning to 
film he sought what he felt was absent in his original discipline, namely a dialogue about method 
and purpose.6 His New York was a place of artistic flowering and diverse influences, and 
(nostalgia)’s photographic roll- call bears witness to the fact that he was not without notable 
friends: Michael Snow, Carl Andre, Frank Stella, James Rosenquist and Larry Poons. Their 
involvement underlined Frampton’s artistic associations and also helped to establish his 
credentials, but as A. L. Rees observed, ‘Frampton seemed to know all the painters and 
sculptors, but wasn’t in any of the “prescribed categories”.’7 (nostalgia)’s sentiment attests to 
Frampton’s creative development and a certain artistic confederacy, but it also indicates that over 
time this cohort became less of a regular presence. Frampton states that being ‘a committed 
illusionist’ in a community of ‘dogmatic anti-illusionists’, like Andre and Stella, had its problems; 
‘I mean they could marshal not only their own arguments, which were excellent, but those of the 
venerable Clement Greenberg and so forth. It left one very little room for being the devil’s 
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advocate.’8 To be the iconoclast in this circle indicates, despite Frampton’s suggestions to the 
contrary, his sense of purpose and intellectual confidence. 
 
Frampton notes that ‘In my film, there is a remastering of a certain number of lumps I took 
during those years.’9 This suggests that his film, its form and content, is a means to revisit and 
take some control of this past life; at this point his disciplinary composure and intentionality, as 
(nostalgia)’s execution and ambition bares out, is exact. Frampton’s method requires an audience 
to be constantly, after the first episode, recollecting and recalibrating all they have seen into 
matching pairs, so Frampton’s narration can accompany the relevant autobiographical image. In 
imposing this method is Frampton placing the emphasis on form, rendering the content less 
important; is the validity of Frampton’s autobiographical tales vital; does the substance of the 
film override these concerns? Could the experimental form of the work, which is explicitly 
memorable, be too convoluted and actually obscure memory’s willingness and procedure? 
 
 
 Images of a life lived 
 
Open on:  Black screen.  
Voice Over:  Is it all right? 
Off mike:   It’s all right. 
Cut to:  Title card – (nostalgia)  
VO:  These are recollections of a dozen still photographs I made several 
years ago. 
Cut to:  Black.   
VO:  Does it sound all right? 
Off mike:  Yes, yes, perfectly. It’s fine. 
Cut to:  4 x 6 photograph of a dark room. It rests on a scorched surface. The top and 
bottom of a circle is visible.      
VO:  This is the first photograph I ever made with direct intention of 
making art. I had brought myself a camera for Christmas in 1958. One 
day early in January of 1959. I photographed several drawings by Carl 
Andre, with whom I shared a cheap apartment on Mulberry Street.  
The central area of the photograph starts to slowly ripple and discolour.  
VO:  One frame of film was left over, and I suggested to Carl that he sit, or 
rather, squat, for a portrait.   
The top of the photograph starts to smoke.  
The smoke intensifies, now affecting the bottom as well. 
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VO:  He insisted that the photograph must incorporate a handsome small 
picture frame that had been given to him a year or so before by a girl 
named North.  
The photograph is now alight. A distinct ring beneath it starts to appear.  
VO:  How the metronome entered the scheme I don’t recall, but it must 
have been deliberate.  
The photograph is buckling. The bottom starts to curl and a flame becomes visible.  
VO:  The picture frame reappears in a photograph dated March 1963, but 
there isn’t time to show you that one now. I discarded the metronome 
eventually, after tolerating its syncopation for quite a while.  
The top of the photograph is now alight.  
The bottom is ablaze and a concentric pattern is forming on the photograph. Smoke 
curls round the sides. The flames, at the top and bottom, are moving closer together.  
The center is turning black. It is becoming cinder. Only a clock and some containers 
on the left hand side of the image remain visible. The darkness is now spreading 
rapidly from the center out. All is ablaze. 
VO:  Carl Andre is twelve years older and more active than he was then.  
I see less of him nowadays than I would like; but then there are other 
people of whom I see more than I care.  
The photograph is now a rumpled misshapen rectangle.  
VO:  I despised the photograph for several years. But I could never bring 
himself to destroy a negative so incriminating. 
The flames dissipate.  It becomes apparent that the photograph was resting on the 
ring of an electric hot plate. The black turns to ash. The ash appears to ‘bubble’ 
and flake.  
The photograph is now grey and flaked.  
 Cut to:  Black.  
 
 
Frampton’s film is imparted in first person, past tense, which locates the spoken words and 
their related photographs in a time that is now being recalled. Frampton writes that ‘One way or 
another, everything in a filmmaker’s life forces its way into his work, finally… everything, even, in 
that part of his life he spends in making films.’10 Through the sharing of memories the film 
encapsulates part of a life that refers to Frampton’s time before the film, his first creative 
flowering as a photographer in New York. As (nostalgia) proceeds, it becomes apparent that image 
and sound are desynchronised, with the films’ narrative episodes preceding the corresponding 
photographs, that there is disconnectedness between what is seen and heard, and a remaking of 
linear sense and what it may mean.  
 
                                                
10 Frampton, H. (2009) ’Mental Notes’, in: On the Camera Arts and Consecutive Matters: The Writings 
of Hollis Frampton, Jenkins, B. (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, p.256 
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Bergson perceived of a ‘past gnawing into the future’,11 a notion which finds elucidation in 
Frampton’s film. In each sequence, movement occurs through the photograph’s contact with the 
ignited electric ring. This encounter animates the photograph and exposes its material fragility. 
The images change from being recognisable representations to carbonised remains, and in this 
oscillation, between being and decrepitude, they transcend their original form and become an 
eternal memorial. The recording of the process ensures that these images will be known for as 
long as Frampton’s work is preserved. It is worth noting that he retained the photographic 
negatives, ‘against unpredictable future needs.’12 This releasing of inert items, and their temporal 
awakening, is the recorded testimony of what has been but also new beginnings. 
 
The film’s voice-over foretells what we are about to see, and what we see reminds us of what we 
have just heard. The discontinuity challenges and destabilises the images, because they can only be 
known through the voice-over, a technique that weakens the usual audio/visual hierarchy.  Sitney 
perceived that this technique ‘very obviously undermines the indexical unity of picture and 
sound’, and ‘unpacks the temporal category of the present in the film.’13 Once Frampton’s 
methodology is comprehended, the viewer instinctively attempts to re-sync image and text, 
endeavouring to remember these separate elements, in order to make more sense of what is being 
presented. The desynchronised relationship between image and audio is mirrored in the image’s 
spatial representation. The electric ring, on which the photographs burn, is seen vertically, a 
change in orientation that defies the natural perspective, but due to film’s horizontal viewing 
plane this positioning does not appear unduly disconcerting.  
 
Frampton proposed an experiment in descriptive drama, a narrative in which the meaning may 
be displaced, but the grammar is intact. In his essay on Eisenstein, ‘Film in the House of the 
Word’, Frampton considered the late modernist position that ‘language was suspect as the 
defender of illusion.’14 He decried this stance, writing that ‘Every artistic dialogue that concludes 
in a decision to ostracise the word is disingenuous to the degree that it succeeds in concealing 
from itself its fear of the word.’15 Frampton’s formal method, his willingness to use 
autobiographical material, the film’s chronological arrangement and structural process, indicate 
                                                
11 Bergson, H. (2004) Matter and Memory, Paul, N. M. and Scott Palmer, W. (trans.), New York: 
Dover Publications, p.194 
12 Frampton, H. (2009) ‘Notes on (nostalgia)’, in: On the Camera Arts and Consecutive Matters: The 
Writings of Hollis Frampton, Jenkins, B. (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, p.224 
13 Sitney, P, A. (1979) Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde, 2nd ed., Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press, p.408 
14 Frampton, H. (2009) ‘Film in the House of the Word’, in: On the Camera Arts and Consecutive 
Matters: The Writings of Hollis Frampton, Jenkins, B. (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 
p.167 
15 Ibid 
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his desire to address the power of words (and images). Whilst at Western Reserve University, 
Cleveland (1954-6), he primarily studied Latin and Greek, but also German, French, Russian, 
Sanskrit, Chinese and Mathematics.16 His interests lead him to correspond with Ezra Pound, 
which led to the conclusion that he was not to be a poet.  
 
These concerns are found in (nostalgia), a structurally organised film, with a deliberately 
misdirected text, that challenges narrative meaning and conclusive resolution. His practice would 
range beyond defined parameters, and to identify (nostalgia) as a structural film is to limit its 
ambition and reach. The works of experimental filmmakers are to be understood in context, all 
that it would challenge, as Tzvetan Todorov writes ‘a new genre is always the transformation of 
an earlier one, or of several: by inversion, be displacement, by combination’;17 he may have been 
considering literature but his thoughts can be applied to other mediums. The attempt to qualify 
work may be problematic, but all work does come from history and is formed within its cast and 
finds a place within established and ever emerging histories. Frampton wanted Film historians to 
account for all that cinema encompasses,18 and for work that could be defined as experimental to 
achieve inclusive equivalence.  
 
In ‘A Pentagram for Conjuring the Narrative’ Frampton expresses the need for narratives and 
storytelling.19 Frampton’s form of narrative is elusive, complex and ambiguous like the literature 
of the Modernist masters that he so admired. In this context film is just another artistic language, 
a means to communicate ideas, and the form that Frampton proposed seeks to find ‘a 
dramatically evolving organic code directly responsive and responsible, like every other code, to 
the supreme mediator: consciousness.’20 Sitney, in considering the ‘theoretical power’ of 
Frampton’s book, Circles of Confusion: Film, Photography, Video, Texts 1968-1980, writes, ‘The 
                                                
16 [Online] available at: http://hollisframpton.org.uk/bio.htm [accessed 20 June 2015] 
17 Todorov, T. ‘The Origin of Genres’, in: Duff, D. (1999) Modern Genre Theory, London; 
Routledge, p.197 
18 Frampton, H. (2009) ‘For a Metahistory of Film: Commonplace Notes and Hypotheses’, in: 
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20 Frampton, H. (2006) ‘The Invention Without a Future’, in: On the Camera Arts and Consecutive 
Matters: The Writings of Hollis Frampton, Jenkins, B. (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 
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initiator of this branch of theory was Maya Deren’;21 Frampton dates the emergence of a new 
form of film from Meshes of the Afternoon (1943).22 Deren writes that if cinema is to become an art, 
‘it must create a total experience so much out of the very nature of the instrument as to be 
inseparable from its means.’23 Meshes of the Afternoon, made with her then husband Alexander 
Hammid, depicts the interiority of its protagonist. As Deren writes, ‘it reproduces the way in 
which the sub-conscious of an individual will develop, interpret and elaborate an apparently 
simply and casual incident into a critical emotional experience.’24 She conceptualised the 
encounter with a photographic image as ‘reality filtered by the selectivity of individual interests 
and modified by prejudicial perception to become experience.’25 This understanding of the 
photograph reinforces the image’s indexical reading and its importance as a unit of time, 
something with history and presence. 
 
Through (nostalgia) Frampton tells of his desire to speak of, and emphasise, aspects of his past, 
and in telling what has been he is also imagining the future; Boym writes that ‘At first glance, 
nostalgia is a longing for a place, but actually it is yearning for a different time’, and that this is a 
desire ‘to obliterate history and turn it into private or collective mythology, to revisit time like 
space.’ 26 (nostalgia)  was to be the first instalment of Frampton’s seven part film cycle Hapax 
Legomena (1971-2),27 and it is the work of a young artist. Frampton writes, ‘The narrative art of 
most young men is autobiographical. Since I have had little narrative experience, it seemed 
reasonable to accept biography as a convention.’28 This is announced through the film’s content, 
as Frampton observes, ‘I understand the word autobiography to mean: writing one’s own life. 
                                                
21 Sitney, P. A. (2008) Eyes Upside Down: Visionary Filmmakers and the Heritage of Emerson, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p.102 
22 Frampton, H. (2006) ‘For a Metahistory of Film: Commonplace Notes and Hypotheses’, in: On 
the Camera Arts and Consecutive Matters: The Writings of Hollis Frampton, Jenkins, B. (ed.), Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, p.136 
23 Deren, M. (1985) ‘Cinematography: The Creative Use of Reality’, in: Film and Criticism: 
Introductory Readings, 3rd ed., Mast, G. Cohen, M. (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.65 
24 Deren, M. (1965) ‘Notes, Essays, Letters, Film Culture', 39, Winter, p.1, quoted in: Sitney, P. A. 
Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde 1943-1978 (2nd edition), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p.9 
25 Deren, M. (1985) ‘Cinematography: The Creative Use of Reality’, in: Film Theory and Criticism: 
Introductory Readings, 3rd ed., Mast, G. Cohen, M. (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.54 
26 Boym, S. (2001) The Future of Nostalgia, New York: Basic Books, p.xv 
27 ‘The title, a term from classical philology, refers to those words whose sense is ambiguous 
because they only occur once in surviving texts; their meaning can only be determined from 
context’, and it comprised of (nostalgia) (1971), Poetic Justice (1972), Critical Mass (1971), Travelling 
Matte (1971), Ordinary Matter (1972), Remote Control (1972), Special Effects (1972). Sitney, P. A. 
(1979) Visionary Film: The American Avant-garde, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 
p.411 
28 Frampton, H. (2006) ‘Notes on (nostalgia)’, in: On the Camera Arts and Consecutive Matters: The 
Writings of Hollis Frampton, Jenkins, B. (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, p.224 
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But perhaps, as with so much Greek, our text is corrupt. I would rather understand it to mean: 
life, writing itself.’29 Todorov suggests that autobiography can be identified in two ways, ‘the 
author’s identification with the narrator, and the narrator’s identification with the chief-
protagonist.’30 These elements distinguish autobiography from other forms, because ‘the reality 
of the referent is clearly indicated.’31 It may be surmised that Frampton’s tales are formulated to 
suit his purposes but they emanate from the life he lived.    
 
Frampton, in conversation with Peter Gidal, describes his intentions for (nostalgia), ‘I corrupt – 
well, I say “corrupt” – a series of, not descriptions, but reminiscences that turn old photographs 
of my own into a kind of a-temporality, a history of aesthetics and sculpture.’32 (nostalgia)’s lower 
case and parentheses suggest the film’s non-referential relationship to what has been, that for 
Frampton remembrance was a wistful, playful undertaking, corrupted by time and intention, and 
that memories are a useful means to examine other matters.  
 
In composing (nostalgia) he fixes various recollections, framing them according to his purpose, 
and as Warnock observes, ‘memory and imagination overlap and cannot be wholly 
distinguished.’33 Frampton’s wry observations, the trials and tribulations of this photographer in 
New York, allow for a degree of identification and empathy, as he guides us towards the end of 
his photographic journey. In this way it is a farewell, and departures are redolent with sentiment. 
The narrator, referring to Frampton’s self-portrait, comments, ‘I take some comfort in realizing 
that my entire physical body has been replaced more than once since it made this portrait of its 
face. However, I understand that my central nervous system is an exception’; he is no longer the 
person that arrived in New York and he is ready to move on.  
 
The film’s monologue is written as if it is occurring now, which of course when viewing the film 
it is, but as a recording it necessarily happened sometime previously. At the beginning of the 
film, two voices can be heard, briefly discussing the microphone level. These voices belong to 
Frampton and Michael Snow. Frampton originally recorded the text, but rejected the results and 
in his place he decided to use Snow, commenting, ‘The reason I finally settled on Mike – except 
for the possibility of generating a couple of internal jokes – was that Mike has that flat Ontario 
                                                
29 ‘Mental Notes’, in: Ibid, p.255 
30 Todorov, T. ‘The Origin of Genres’, in: Duff, D. (1999) Modern Genre Theory, London; 
Routledge, p206 
31 Ibid, p.207 
32 Gidal, P. (1985) ‘Interview with Hollis Frampton’, October, 32, p.108 
33 Warnock, M. (1987) Memory, London: Faber & Faber, p.12 
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Scottish delivery’, whereas my ‘tendency is to imitate Richard Burton in a bathtub.’34 It is now 
known that it is Snow’s voice that is heard, but this knowledge is external to the film as he is not 
introduced and the film is without credits. Identifying Snow as (nostalgia)’s voice has the affect of 
removing any personal intonation and distances Frampton from the experiences being described. 
Snow’s involvement also adds associative complexity, a self-reflexive play between reader and 
subject, author and object; towards the end of the segment Snow intones Frampton’s apology to 
him, for his creative failure in designing a poster, concluding, that the ‘whole business still 
troubles me. I wish I could apologise to him.’  
 
 
 
Fig. 31 Untitled (Michael Snow’s Studio) (1965) from: (nostalgia) (1971) 
 
 
(nostalgia) is an elegy to the man Frampton had been, ‘In the end, when I saw the film myself, I 
felt that I had made an effigy, at least, of his opaque young-man’s life, even if I had not wholly 
entrained its sadness.’35 The film is a fond farewell to all Frampton knew in New York, but its 
material and enquiring form is an indication as to where his practice would venture next. 
(nostalgia) was to be not just a departure from photography it was also a farewell to the city; 
Rachel Moore writes that ‘he was shifting his residence to New York’s countryside, where he 
had purchased thirty acres of land and spent the summer in 1970’, and by 1974 this had become 
his permanent residence. 36  
                                                
34 Cited in: MacDonald, S. (1998) ‘A Critical Cinema’, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
p.61-2, in: Moore. R, (2006) Hollis Frampton: (nostalgia), London: Afterall Books, p.38 
35 Ibid 
36 Moore. R, (2006) Hollis Frampton: (nostalgia), London: Afterall Books, p.17 
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The photograph’s historical pact 
 
Photographs speak intimately to us of ourselves, so contends Philippe Dubois, he 
writes, ‘autobiography sets in motion an essential reflection on the notion of mental image [and 
not real images].’37 This ‘cinema of the self’, which Dubois suggests (nostalgia) is an example of, 
has, in Philippe Lejeune’s phrase, an ‘autobiographical pact’,38 of understanding with those that 
encounter it, in which the identity of the author, maker, is to the fore. The use of the 
photographic begs two questions: ‘How can the photograph speak, or be made to speak, in and 
through film? And why is the photograph the privileged vehicle of autobiographic inscription in 
cinema?39 Dubois perceives that the answer to these questions lie in an awareness of form, ‘The 
apparatus itself is as significant as the photographs it conveys and is thus in a way always 
theoretical – a concept as much as a form, machination as much as a machine.’40 Also, 
autobiography is a suitable means to traverse more conceptual matters, a personal form of 
communication within an often-unknown world. 
 
The filmstrip and photographs, connection to what has been, the process, its history, seems to 
place it in a distinct and recognisable temporal relationship. To view Frampton’s black and white 
prints smoulder is to imagine his photographic procedure - the shooting and processing of the 
film, with its shutter speeds and exposures, and the dark room, full of technical apparatus and 
chemicals, the developing of the negative and printing of the image - this involved procedure, 
which was once relatively common, is inscribed with temporality.  
 
Frampton, in ‘The Withering Away of the State of the Art’ (1974), acknowledged video’s artistic 
and democratic potential, envisioning an image machine, now recognisable as the ubiquitous 
video-enabled home computer, suggesting it would become increasingly important.41  Its 
assimilation has seen an acceptance that technology works its magic remotely and that which 
makes it work is largely hidden. The filmmaker Guy Sherwin states, ‘whatever advantages digital 
technology might have over film, its ontological link to the objective image-source is weaker.’42 
This is not a question of image definition but an assertion of film’s (and photograph’s) material 
relationship to light and time, that an image is only formed when film makes contact with these 
                                                
37 Dubois, P. (1995) ‘Photography Mise-en-Film’, (Kirby, L. trans), in: Petro, P. (ed.), (1995) 
Fugitive Images From Photography to Video, Indiana: Indiana University Press, p.154 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
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42 Sherwin, G. (1998) ‘Chronology and Some Reasoning’, programme notes, Lux, London, 
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elements, as opposed to video, which electronically produces images from a flow of voltages. 
This manifest connection is what makes Frampton’s burning so redolent with Mulvey’s indexical 
locating of material decay, human consciousness and the irrepressible nature of time.43   
 
 
 
Fig. 32 Untitled (photographic darkroom) (n.d.) from: (nostalgia) (1971) 
 
 
‘All history is the history of thought’,44 so proposed Carr. Frampton, in considering the 
photograph, wrote: ‘It often seems to us, as we think about thinking, that we think in words, it 
seems as often, when we are not thinking about thinking, that we think not merely in “pictures” 
but in photographs.’45 An idea that Sontag iterates, ‘each memory from one's childhood, or from 
any period that's not in the immediate past, is like a still photograph rather than a strip of film. 
And photography has objectified this way of seeing and remembering.’46 Photographs’ may now 
be mainly in digital form, but the notion of memory being composed of a series of images still 
follows, an idea that resonates with Bergson’s notion that ‘pure memory’ is formed from only the 
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most pressing ‘snapshots.’47 The idea that this media, which has become an omnipresent part of 
contemporary existence, influences our way of thinking, indicates that when individuals inhabit 
this environment and think through it (consciously and unconsciously), it becomes part of their 
personal sensibility, a way in which the world is encountered, but an image is never just an image 
as it is always framed by technological application, historical bearing and personal interaction.  
 
In Freud’s ‘A Note upon the “Mystic Writing Pad”’, he writes that,  
‘Devices to aid our memory seem particularly imperfect, since our mental apparatus 
accomplishes precisely what they cannot: it has an unlimited receptive capacity for 
new perceptions and nevertheless lays down permanent – even though not 
unalterable – memory traces of them.’48  
 
He goes on to posit the Mystic Writing Pad as an analogy for the workings of memory. He 
begins his reflections, ‘If I distrust my memory […] I am able to supplement and guarantee its 
workings by making a note in writing.’49 The problem with mechanical devices is their fixity, the 
lack of mutability. In this Freud is concerned with what is erased, potentially forgotten, when a 
memory ceases to be relevant and/or valued. When Frampton destroyed his photographs he 
iterated the inflexibility of the medium making them a memory. Frampton’s images that burn 
also have the effect of a palimpsest, which is reinforced by their repetition. The images may 
literally disappear, decomposing, time after time, on the electric hotplate, but all that has been 
seen lingers in memory, and these memories are needed, recollected, reordered, because of 
Frampton’s intrinsic mismatched composition and film faculty to suggest memory.   
 
In the photographic we find this ‘permanent memory-trace’ is revered for its indexical resonance. 
Barbara Meter’s Appearances (2000) begins with the introductory text:  
‘Independently of each other my father and mother fled from Germany in 1934. 
They met the same year in Amsterdam. This film is made from photographs they 
left me, all of which were taken before I was born.’  
 
Meter was born in 1939. The film’s photographs were taken at the time of the Weimar Republic, 
they were revealed to Meter only after her mother’s death, and show a large bourgeois family; 
these images are contrasted with contemporary footage of German landscapes. The photographs 
form an authentic, if incomplete, record, which facilitated a project of reclamation. Barthes 
contends that photography has ‘something to do with resurrection’,50 Meter writes, ‘I wanted to 
recreate my own family […] I wanted to recreate them from the depths of death. Out of the 
                                                
47 Bergson, H. (1911) Creative Evolution, (Mitchell, A. trans) London: Macmillan, p.333 
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Simon & Schuster, p.208 
49 Ibid, p.207 
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darkness into the filmic light and then back into the darkness again.’51 To see Appearances’ images, 
framed as they are, is to imagine a familial history, one that intersected with national, 
international narratives, a time of disappearances and displacement, as Bachelard writes, ‘Great 
images have both a history and a pre-history; they are always a blend of memory and legend, with 
the result that we never experience an image directly.’52 The history that these archival images 
indicate struggles to find reason and representation, but Meter’s never completely still camera, 
which hovers over photographs of lost faces, the enlarged grain oscillating, as if breathing, before 
the camera’s inspection, desires to personalise, to see and know what is lost and make it reappear 
once again. 
 
 
 
Fig. 33 Appearances (2000) 
 
 
The film’s opening card offers a description of when and how Meter’s parents left Germany, but 
this simple text is suggestive enough; they departed a year after Hitler became Chancellor. The 
film does not offer any more external context, but the powerful implication means the images 
have a distinct poignancy - they are a possible record of mortality, a national tragedy in 
microcosm – which is arguably all the more telling because of what is not said. All that is gone is 
focused by Meter’s travelogue – it would seem she is visiting the places the family once inhabited; 
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Rosenstone comments that ‘experimental films help to re-vision what we mean by history.’53  
The very existence of the archive is trace evidence of unknowable family members, who now 
take on symbolic significance. The past, a place that can never be realised, becomes more 
present, real, through the memorial experience of it, and photographs can facilitate some access 
to this other realm.  
 
Frampton, in considering the affect of the photograph, writes: ‘[the] camera deals, in some way 
or other, with every particle of information present within its field of view; it is wholly 
indiscriminate. Photographs, to the joy or misery of all who make them, invariably tell us more 
than we want to know.’54 In (nostalgia) Frampton utilised his personal experience to examine the 
medium he would now inhabit. The individuals in many of his photographs are friends, 
acquaintances, colleagues, a number of which are now well known beyond these personal circles. 
The material transformation that we view in (nostalgia) refers us back to ourselves as witnesses of 
our own timeliness; Frampton remarked, ‘In Greek the word [nostalgia] means the “the wounds 
of returning.” Nostalgia is not an emotion that is entertained; it is sustained.’55 Boym identifies 
two forms of nostalgia, restorative and reflective; the former ‘is not a duration but a perfect 
snapshot’, a preserved moment without decay, the latter is not concerned with the ‘recovery of 
what is perceived to be an absolute truth but on the meditation on history and passage of time.’56 
She contends that reflective nostalgia ‘reveals that longing and critical thinking are not opposed 
to one another, as affective memories do not absolve one from compassion, judgement or critical 
reflection.’57 This nostalgia is not identified with the longing for home but is bound up with the 
search for identity, and this notion has found particular expression in the twentieth century, a 
time when the potency and nature of home became less certain.  
 
Benjamin believed that relations between past and present could be indicated in a dialectical 
image: ‘an image that emerges suddenly, in a flash.’58 It is a synthesis of opposed elements, 
blinding and illuminating in equal measure, articulating the past in a manner that splinters 
classical historiography, with its belief in a reasoned progression of events, a juxtaposition that 
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produces progressive insight.59 He describes the dialectical image’s conditions, purpose and its 
almost divine countenance, but at no point does he exemplify this phenomenon or offer an 
empirical instance, for it is a matter of Marxist good faith. Moore suggests that Benjamin’s 
‘definition [of the dialectical image] articulates an apt description of Frampton’s burning, then 
quivering, images’, and that the relationship between burning image and text, is “balanced in a 
constellation of new meaning”.’60 Benjamin’s formulation appeals to film and Moore suggests 
Frampton has produced a form of celluloid alchemy, through which he ‘restores cinema’s 
magical power to curse and cure.’61 Frampton’s practice may be ‘political’ in its avant-gardism, 
but it forsakes direct political intent.  
 
There can be no conclusive definition of what is a progressive and politically informed film but 
it would seem that Benjamin’s historical materialism is essentially closer to Brecht’s activism or 
Vertov’s dynamism, and that he might find the dialectical image in the work of Sergei Eisenstein. 
Eisenstein’s dialectical theory of montage denoted a ‘collision rather than linkage.’62 Monaco 
writes, ‘For Eisenstein, montage has as its aim the creation of ideas, of a new reality, rather than 
the support of narrative, the old reality of experience.’63  
 
 
 
Fig. 34 Battleship Potemkin (1925) 
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Eisenstein’s configuration was part of his formulation of a total film language that eschewed 
emotional identification and naturalism and sought to exemplify dialectical process.  He 
developed his understanding of the dialectic to also apply to the shot: 
‘Every aggressive moment… every element… that brings to light in the spectator 
those senses or that psychology that influenced his experience – every element that 
can be verified and mathematically calculated to produce certain emotional shocks in  
a proper order within the totality [of film].’64  
 
Adorno was also to acknowledge the importance of montage but unlike Eisenstein he envisaged 
it arranging shots in a ‘constellation akin to that of writing.’65 Miriam Hansen comments that he 
believed, ‘Only through montage which negates the affirmative appeal of the image and 
interrupts the chains of associative automatism can film become a medium of cognition.’66 He 
desires to move the idea of montage beyond the principle of shock and make it readable and 
‘aspire to the level of a self-conscious construct’, because ‘only then would film cease to be 
script’ and move into the realm of critical reflection.67 Films such as (nostalgia) and Man With a 
Movie Camera (Vertov, 1929) have something of this quality. For Frampton ‘film builds upon the 
straight cut, and the direct collision of images, of “shots”, extending a perceptual domain whose 
most noticeable trait we might call successiveness’,68 and this conception of form is utilised for 
critical reflection, a formulation that is directly discernible.  
 
Janet Harbord also invokes’s dialectical movement for La Jetée (Marker, 1962), she writes, ‘In the 
film, as in Marxist reading, we ignore the past at our peril; in Marker’s version how we “know” 
the past is in itself a question.’69 This film is perceived by Dubois to be another example of the 
‘cinema of the self’, describing it as a ‘work of memory and distance, it allows us to see thought 
in images: It allows time travel.’70 The film is ‘The Story of a man marked by a childhood image.’ 
This man is propelled into time in search of his memories, an action that is necessitated by the 
violent destruction of the present and the war’s victors hope that the man’s ‘obsession with an 
image from the past’ would help re-orientate, save, the present. Traveling in time, in search of a 
memory of a man’s death watched by a woman at Orly airport, he encounters the future; and its 
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emissaries offer the man a chance to rebuild the present. But time spirals, and rather than 
choosing to join ‘the people of the world to come’ he requests to return to the site of that 
memory, his initial point of departure, but the death that he had witnessed as a child was in fact 
his own. The film concludes where it began, time has returned the man to this fateful, 
inescapable, memory; Bergsonian duration incarnate as past, present and future on the same 
temporal plane.   
 
 
 
Fig. 35 La Jetée (1962) 
 
 
Marker’s use of a dramatic genre, as a means to examine history and memory, places the 
attendant narrative in an enclosed universe, which operates through its own dynamic drives. He 
creates an alternative reality, which is recognisable in many respects and is occupied by characters 
from the near past, for instance the victor’s lead experimenter can be heard to speak German – 
invoking the fears of the Nazi camps and their adherent experimentation, all that still haunted 
Marker’s generation. In rendering his film in stills, taken by the American photographer William 
Klein, Marker fashioned an imagined world that emphasised the tone of reflective 
circumspection. His post-apocalyptic vision may be oriented towards the future, but like all 
science fiction it tells us more about present preoccupations, and their context, which in this case 
was the aftermath of World War II and mutually assured nuclear destruction, rather than things 
to come. The prosperity offered by the future beings does not appeal to Marker, for he is drawn 
to corporeal memory, and the real image of a man’s death and a woman’s face overpower 
unknown possibilities and a ‘pacified’ future. 
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In La Jetée the narrator likens the protagonist’s memory to that of a museum, and this is one of 
the places that he and the object of his memories meet. The inference being that memory is the 
museum of self, something Marker was to return to in other films, and later realise with the 
virtual Le Musée de Marker (2003). Frampton’s film may not have the historic gravity of 
Marker’s twentieth century fable, but Frampton’s consideration of his past does have actual 
material temporality; Marker’s narrated images illustrate an idea of time and the substance of 
memory, whereas Frampton’s assembly is imbued with real time (and memory). These films both 
assess what it is to remember, on and off screen, they both are redolent, in different ways, with 
the question of memory, why certain memories are powerful anchors; Freud may have mistrusted 
his memory, but its unconscious depths allowed time to be transcended. In ‘Notes on (nostalgia)’ 
Frampton writes (about himself), ‘I was forced into examining his leavings and middens, like an 
archaeologist shifting for ostracized pot shards.’71 Frampton’s use of analogy reminds one of a 
passage from Benjamin’s notebooks,  
‘Language has unmistakeably made plain that memory is not an instrument for 
exploring the past, but rather a medium. It is the medium of that which is 
experienced, just as the earth is the medium in which ancient cities lie buried. He 
who seeks his own buried past must conduct himself like a man digging. Above all, 
he must not be afraid to return again and again to the same matter; to scatter it as 
one scatters earth, to turn it over as one turns over soil.’72  
 
Both men (as does Marker) envisaged excavation, a process of sifting and documenting, as the 
way to better understand origins; this analogy also indicates the partialness of any discovery. The 
archaeologist attempts to reconstruct, through discovery, research and intuition, a plausible 
(academic and aesthetic) version of what has been found and what it may mean. The unearthing 
of fragmented pieces, also suggests the attempt to recreate, through collected evidence, the past. 
Mental exertion allows for retracing and recreating, in which the various fragments are given 
form through the act of informed imagination.  
 
   
 Thinking through practice 
 
Frampton equated frame bound images with thought, ‘the visible limit of the projected 
image itself – the frame – which has taken on, through the accumulation of illusions that have 
transpired within its rectangular boundary, the force of a metaphor for consciousness.’73 This 
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ambition found favour with fellow artists Snow, who deemed Wavelength (1967) to be a 
summation of his ‘nervous system, religious inklings, and aesthetic ideas'74, and Brakhage who 
contended that ‘In film, the closest metaphor is the thought process.’75 For these individuals film 
was an extension of art practice, a form that stretches back millennia, and expresses the thoughts 
and desires of humanity. Frampton writes,  
‘We propose another, radically different morphology… one that views film not from 
the outside, as a product to be consumed, but from the inside, as a dynamically 
evolving organic code directly responsive and responsible, like every other code, to the 
supreme mediator: consciousness.’76  
 
This notion is taken up by Moore, who writes that viewing (nostalgia) ‘is a direct engagement with 
consciousness itself as the viewer gets caught in the grip of past, present and future time.’77 The 
alignment of film and consciousness recalls Bergson’s interest, and these filmmakers’ shared his 
mistrust of film’s illusionism and sought to make manifest an alternative perception. This 
inclination was promoted by Annette Michelson who lauding Wavelength achievement in 
‘Towards Snow.’78 Snow conceived his film thus: ‘The space starts at the camera’s (spectator’s) 
eye, is in air, then is on the screen, then is within the screen (the mind).’79 His film begins with 
the framed expanse of his studio and zooms slowly, in a continuous sequence of shots, towards 
an unknown point on the far wall.80 The zoom is a unique filmic mannerism that moves from 
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The film is a continuous zoom which takes 45 minutes to go from its widest field to its smallest 
and final field. It was shot with a fixed camera from one end of an 80 foot loft, shooting the 
other end, a row of windows and the street. This, the setting, and the action which takes place 
there, are cosmically equivalent. The room (and the zoom) are interrupted by four human events 
including a death. The sound on these occasions is sync sound, a sine wave, which goes from its 
lowest (50 cycles per second) note to its highest (12000 c.p.s.) in 40 minutes. It is a total glissando 
while the film is a crescendo and a dispersed spectrum which attempts to utilize the gifts of both 
  141 
totality to exactitude, as Michelson describes ‘from uncertainty to certainty.’81 As the zoom 
progresses across the studio it is punctuated four times by narrative elements, which culminate in 
an death; Frampton plays the dying man. The film’s drama is a counterpoint to its optical 
intensity, however, the film’s progression does not pause to acknowledge the staged death, but 
instead the zoom moves on, indifferent to the weight this cinematic occurrence conventionally 
carries. Stephen Heath states that there is no ‘production of any simple memory: the film plays 
with and on the past or a future to the present moment of the zoom.’82 It is the frame that holds 
all that is memorable but its complexity defies exact recollection. It is not a fixed monument; it is 
resolutely present, and yet also something emerging out of the past.  
 
Snow, originally a painter, was born in Canada in 1931,83 and like Frampton sought the 
community of New York for the1960s, but despite its apparent vibrancy, Rees writes that,  
‘Snow lamented the lack of interest in contemporary arts among the devotees of 
Underground film, much of which was still, as it were, culturally in the beat era; 
there was at that time and still is a separation of communities between those 
involved in the painting and sculpture world in whatever capacity – artist, dealer, 
critic, collector – and those involved in experimental film.’84  
 
In Wavelength, and other works, Snow endeavours to break down the distinction between object 
and action. He forsakes formalism, intruding into the disputed realm of narrativity. The film’s 
moments of theatrical exposition emphasise the material interplay between contrived actions and 
found occurrence. Wavelength is a filmic experience that cannot be replicated by any other means. 
The film has a playfulness that ‘challenge[s] and deflate[s] its own purist modernism, and to open 
its range of associative meaning.’85 Its form engenders an immersive filmic environment that 
resides in immediate and after thought, one that resists classification and resides at the limit of 
perceptual recollection, due to relentless movement across space and questing structure. In the 
final sequence the zoom’s destination is evident, a point of stillness, a photograph of grey waves 
on the far wall between the studio’s windows.  
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At Wavelength’s conclusion, the viewer is no longer located in the room, but in stilled waters, 
Snow contends the ‘the waves are visible registries of invisible forces.’86 The image is held before 
it loses focus and ends in a glare of white light. Snow commented that the ‘photograph of the 
waves is an implication of total continuity for everything, not just that simple incident.’87 The 
film’s passage, which mapped the internal space, ends in a place that is outside the studio, a 
dramatic change of scale from the definite to the infinite, and in this moment and all those that 
came before it, we reflect on what we are viewing, have viewed, and what it means to be a viewer. 
Also, the evocative, seemingly melancholy, image takes us somewhere else, to a place we 
recognise, feel we may even have visited, and somewhere that now resides in memor 
 
 
 
Fig. 36 Wavelength (1967) 
 
 
Brakhage, an altogether more lyrical filmmaker, also conceptualised his practice in this manner; 
Sitney wrote that he ‘invented a form in which the film-maker could compress his thoughts and 
feelings while recording his direct confrontation with intense experiences.’88 He used film to 
record and discover his own universe, and the audience is offered a manifestation of his familial 
and poetic memories and formulations. By way of contrast, Warhol commented that his film 
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making process consisted of just switching on the camera and walking away.89 This challenge to 
production procedure evidently cut against an artisanal approach and indicated the assent of 
more overtly conceptual concerns, focused on systems and process.  
 
Frampton commented that ‘Much of what I have learned – both what I value and what I have 
not yet learned to value - I have learned from film, which is to say, from its makers.’90 In 1972 
Brakhage produced The Riddle of Lumen91 in response to the challenge of Frampton’s practice, 
particularly Zorns Lemma (1970). Sitney writes that his ‘systemic mode of filmmaking encouraged 
Brakhage, in that instance, to override his obsession with “the three sisters of Fate”.’92 Zorns 
Lemma is composed primarily of shots of words, found on the streets of New York, which are 
arranged in alphabetical order. The words are repeated and then replaced by images of objects 
and actions, which appear in the reverse order of their occurrence as the first letters of English 
words.  
 
 
 
Fig. 38 Zorns Lemma (1970)  
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The film takes its title from ‘set theory, where it seems that “every partially ordered set contains a 
maximal fully ordered subset”.’93 The film’s ‘units’, the letters and the images that replace them, 
are one second in duration, and this progressive sequencing suggest the film’s systematic 
construction. The viewer is prompted to solve its code; to remember what has been, and predict 
its further development. Frampton’s substitution, an image for a letter, suggests more than mere 
representation but seeks to refine what an image can actually mean and/or be. It indicates that 
narrative is but one of many potential structuring formulations.  
 
The Riddle of Lumen positioned the act of remembrance, unlike Brakhage’s earlier more lyrical 
films, with the viewer. It is a visual record of what has been, fragments of a personal archive, 
which is ordered according to colour, composition, movement and avoids thematic 
characterisation.  
 
 
 
Fig. 37 The Riddle of Lumen (1972)  
 
 
Brakhage’s ordering attends to each shot’s composition, which is given form by light’s fall - his 
study of its conditions and phenomena is the usual critical focus, a position that Sitney’s 
appreciation exemplifies.94  The shots all have the sense of being part of an autobiography, which 
is being conducted through association and aesthetic disposition. The images show the artist’s 
environment and the development of his familial world. Brakhage’s film is arranged in bursts of 
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rhythmic montage, which vary in speed and duration, reside beyond predictive facility, as any 
following shot cannot be predicted on the basis of the one currently on-screen. Brakhage, 
concluded his essay Lost Films, by suggesting that sometimes a ‘ghost film’ may ‘break through 
the thought-bounds of language’, and embody ‘the kind of passing image which prompts dreams 
that cannot be verbalised.’95 This entity may exist only in the realm of the imaginary, but 
Brakhage’s empirical reflection is evidently correct; something must make an impression for it to 
be remembered. The images’ procession, in The Riddle of Lumen, may be largely unpredictable but 
a life in non-chronological filmed segments would seem to be revealed, like fragments of 
memory. The relationship between memory and predictability echoes Snow’s invocation of 
‘memory and prophecy.’96 In discussing Wavelength he states that its end is ‘fated’,97 it’s there at 
the beginning but it’s not actually visible and is only revealed through the film’s durational 
progression and the audience’s procedural acquisition of it as space becomes known.   
 
Frampton visited London in May 1972, to show the finished parts of Hapax Legomena. It was at 
this time that he met Peter Gidal and on May 24 they recorded an interview. Gidal was to 
challenge Frampton’s apparent lapse into narrative in parts of Hapax Legomena.’98 They discussed, 
amongst other matters, the omnipresent spectre of narrative. In this respect Gidal suggests ‘It’s 
the whole idea of using the viewer as a voyeur, as a passive respondent to your very abstract ideas 
and feelings. Or do you demand of the viewer a total break with the past cultural system?’99 They 
agreed that narrative tends to be ‘authoritarian’, but as absolute as Gidal’s position was, forsaking 
all identifiable and abstract imagery, Frampton’s relationship with narrative remained a nuanced 
one, a critical reflection underpinned by clear articulated thoughts and structured images that 
emanate from an individualistically defined, rather than a purely theoretical, domain.  
Gidal’s emphasis on materiality negates an encompassing memory, for without narrative and 
figurative representation it is harder to locate. He believed that the ‘visionary’ filmmaker’s 
method, as characterised by Sitney, was problematic, stating that ‘a film is not a window to life’, 
and furthermore it ‘cannot adequately represent consciousness any more than it adequately 
represents meaning.’100 However, even within his reductionist approach there are moments of 
recognisable integration that locate the work and are memorable. He would forego film’s 
identification process and propose a pro-filmic event, a real coming into the presence of film (as 
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it were); this asks can art relinquish what has been, abdicate all connections with disciplinary 
conjecture; can some works, through aesthetic and technological direction, define the terms of 
engagement so completely that memory only exists on its own terms?  
 
Gidal’s film Clouds (1969) is preoccupied with atmospheric emptiness. The film has a total 
duration of 10 minutes, and after 1 minute 40 seconds a plane flies into view, it is gone 5 seconds 
later. The mechanised dissection of natural phenomena, the clouds’ movement across the frame, 
situates the work, and provides a memory that focuses all that precedes and follows this 
movement; anything that might refer to something knowable, and have some meaning, is latched 
on to and becomes a point of reference, because we instinctively make it so. 
 
 
 
Fig. 39 Clouds (1969) 
 
 
Gidal may be against remembrance (no time but the present) but is it possible to compose a 
work that somehow only suggests what has just been (and might come) and not be another point 
of entry into experience and all that precedes it. Film’s linear progress, despite Gidal’s best 
intentions, still initiates a narrative, of sorts, one that resides in memory, for all that we encounter 
make impressions and these are ordered according to cultural awareness and habit; his 
antithetical position, paradoxically, invokes memories, for they are irrepressible.  
 
 
 
  
  147 
This image is memory 
 
In (nostalgia)’s final sequence, the narrator tells of enlarging a photographic detail of, 
‘something, standing in the cross street and invisible to me, was reflected in a factory window, 
and then reflected once more in the rear-view mirror attached to the truck door. It was only a 
tiny detail.’ The blowing-up of the photograph renders it ‘hopelessly ambiguous’, but it still 
retains its hold because, ‘What I believe I see recorded, in that speck of film, fills me with such 
fear, such utter dread and loathing, that I think I shall never dare to make another photograph 
again.’ The narrator, directly addressing the imagined audience, asks, ‘Look at it. Do you see 
what I see?’ The screen is black. In the end, there is no image.  
 
The last narration is different from the other tales that have preceded it, as it is less based in 
anecdotal recall, and the attendant personal relationships, and more concerned with affect and 
consequently seems more contrived. Alex Garcia Duttmann describes the end as a 
‘disappointment’, contending that ‘Frampton’s comment presents itself so much as the last 
comment on photography and art that it proves as incriminatory as the photographs he 
dismisses confounding art with the will to art.’101 Frampton’s method is not symmetrical; he 
leaves the circle incomplete. To repeat his method, or return to the start, would be too rational, a 
knowable memorial scheme, whereas his horrified shaggy-dog story takes the film somewhere 
else, somewhere unexpected. The narrator states he has seen ‘something, standing’, which 
suggests some kind of creature, human or otherwise. What horror could this urban spectre 
suggest? It is a struggle to bid farewell, especially to that which has just been fondly recalled. This 
last tale emphasises the hollowness of a photographic conceit, that there is always some unseen 
secret to be revealed, à la Blow Up (1966). For Frampton, enlargement rendered the image 
completely unknowable, unlike Antonioni’s revealed secret. Is this inability to produce hidden 
meaning unsettling, that magnified inspection offers nothing but indistinguishable grain?  
 
When viewing (nostalgia) there is a point at which its structure is understood, and at this moment 
there is a need to recap and realign all that has been seen. In reappraising the juxtaposition of 
voice and image, there is an implicit examination of perception, in which Frampton’s subjects are 
placed in the realm of finality, ready for eternal examination. Siegfried Kracauer, in his essay 
‘Photography’, drawing upon Freudian ideas, suggests that the ‘last image’ of an individual 
preserves their ‘actual history.’102 This image encapsulates memory, and is like a ‘monogram’ in 
that the image is reduced to the clarity of a symbol. If this method were applied to film, a number 
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of them, such as Truffaut’s 400 Blows (1959) with its defiant freeze frame ending, could be 
surmised in this manner.  
 
 
 
Fig. 40 400 Blows (1959) 
 
 
Kracauer also perceives that in ‘a photograph a person’s history is buried as if under a layer of 
snow’,103 an image of organic archaeology that echoes Benjamin’s metaphor, and suggests that 
photographs are contextual clues in the happenstance of existence. It is not apparent which is 
(nostalgia)’s last image. The last photograph is the only image in the film that is not Frampton’s. It 
is an appropriated newspaper photograph of a ‘middle-aged man wearing a baseball cap’. He is ‘a 
Texas fruit-grower’, and Frampton’s interest is in his interpretation of this ‘slightly indistinct’ 
image. This is followed by a black space, of short duration, which concludes the film; Frampton 
later commented, ‘it might work better to have it simply trail off into darkness.’104 The film’s last 
image is Frampton’s graphic monogram, as if he needed to release himself, and the viewer, from 
this seemingly blank frame, and through using his maker’s mark re-establish his authorial stamp. 
His last photograph is his image of rotting Franco-American Spaghetti (1964), if his last portrait 
were sought it would be Larry Poons (1965) or does his final passage refer back to the initial 
photograph of the darkroom - the end (literally and figuratively) of his photographic narrative? 
This avoidance of a definitive final, and possibly totalising image, emphasises the film’s displaced 
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and elliptical quality, and something of the complexity, suggestibility and subjectivity of memory. 
In choosing to end with mock-horrified observation Frampton tried to avoid the awkwardness 
of declaring this is the end (of so many things).  
 
 
 
Fig. 41 Untitled (appropriated newspaper photograph) (n.d.)  
from: (nostalgia) (1971) 
 
 
In the formulation of (nostalgia) Frampton sought through personal recollection, coupled with 
conceptual intent and narrative slight-of-hand, to make manifest ideas, thoughts, and harness 
film’s potential to suggest a ‘metaphor for consciousness.’105 Frampton defined autobiography as 
‘life, writing itself’,106 an existence located in the relationships that accrue with time, seemingly 
incidental incidents that have personal resonance, whose interest lays in narrative affectation and 
the now famous company that Frampton kept. His sequences have cultural interest and 
disciplinary invention, an experimental disposition, but reside outside of History’s direct shadow, 
the machinations of nations ferment beyond the remit of Frampton’s frame. The work’s 
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criticality necessitates that the viewer re-synch the images and sound, find narrative reason and 
meaning, a task that Frampton ultimately refuses to do. In his recounting of anecdotes Frampton 
is also forgetting, omitting that which is deemed unimportant for his narrative, these absent 
memories may still dwell in his unconscious but, they have been relegated to the unlamented 
past. His bathos allowed a transition from nostalgia and sentiment to a new (unknown) place. If 
a memory is reiterated, altered, it becomes a work of imagination, and as Sartre proposes that the 
past is ‘one mode of real existence among others.’107 This notion, where the past, present and 
future all seem to rest on the same plane, which echoes Bergson,108 is given profound expression 
by Frampton.  
 
In the next chapter Marker’s Level Five reflects on how individual memory is represented and 
processed by technological means. His interest in forms of memory and history’s flow, their 
relationship and representation, is to be repeatedly found in his work and in Level Five he 
engaged with his subjects through a computerized filter. His appraisal of this new informational 
realm asks how can history be re-contextualized - given meaning beyond the repetition of 
received data - and can this facilitate a new commentary that allows divergent voices to be 
recognized.  
  
                                                
107 Sartre, J. P. (2004) The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination, Webber, J. 
(trans.), London/ New York: Routledge, p.181 
108 Bergson, H. (2004) Matter and Memory, Paul, N. M. and Scott Palmer, W. (trans.), New York: 
Dover Publications, p.194 
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VI.  LEVEL FIVE:  
HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY AND THE MELANCHOLIC TURN 
 
 
 
Fig. 42 Level Five (1996) 
 
 
Level Five (1996) was to be Chris Marker’s (1921-2012) last work in the twentieth century’s 
predominant art form, a work that Bellour declared to be ‘a new kind of film, the first cinema 
release to examine the links between cultural memory and the production of images and sounds 
by computer.’1 These areas of interest were recurring concerns for Marker, but his film engaged 
with them with a new conceptual hybridity. The allure of hypertext, not being constrained by 
durational concerns and time’s momentum, were to lead him elsewhere and through computing 
conventions he sought to show his memory’s trace. Through the analysis of Level Five the 
technological possibilities of the reframing of information, computerized databases, search 
engines, which were just becoming well-known with the launch of the first Internet browsers, is 
considered. I also ask whether this manner of archival engagement could develop new forms, 
encounters that bring personal narratives into historical focus, in some way recalibrate History’s 
normative cast and actually be a site of resistance?   
 
                                                
1 Bellour, R. ‘Multiple Cinemas – The Cinema Only’, lecture delivered at Tate Modern, 23 May 
2002, quoted in: Lupton, C. (2005) Chris Marker: Memories of the Future, London: Reaktion Books, 
p.201 
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Chris Marker was born Christian François Bouche-Villeneuve, in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, and 
is thought to have taken his work name shortly after the Second World War. He was 
instrumental in developing the essayistic documentary form over the last four decades, and his 
oeuvre can broadly be characterised in three parts, which at times overlap: reflective travelogues, 
political documentaries, and works of biographical remembrance. Bill Horrigan, in Marker’s 
photographic compendium Staring Back, writes that, ‘It’s by no means reductive to say that 
Marker’s artistic odyssey and vocation, his calling, consists of making and looking at 
photographic images and of using words to puzzle what they mean, and of showing how their 
meaning can be made to change.’2 Marker’s work expanded the documentary’s bounds through 
disciplinary innovation, a bringing together of ideological expression, lyrical individualism and 
formal enquiry, and this was coupled with a creative engagement with moving image 
technologies, as Jonathan Kear writes, ‘self-reflexivity and experiments with intermediality have 
been the defining characteristics of Marker’s cinema since the 1950s.’3 Rosenstone contends that 
filmmakers, like Marker and Godard, are a form of historian, providing counterpoints to 
traditional definitions4 and suggesting the possibility of different histories being written. Marker, 
after Benjamin’s Historian, challenged the march of victors.5  
 
 
 Historical hybridity  
 
Open on:  A hand controlling a mouse accompanied by synthesized sounds.  
Camera move towards a computer screen. 
Dark images of a car on an urban highway. 
Cut to:  Images of skyscrapers illuminated at night (shot from a car’s moving 
point-of-view) projected over a mannequin’s face. 
Laura (VO):  What can these be but the playthings of a mad god who made us 
build them for him? Imagine Neanderthal man glimpsing a flash of 
city at night, all motion and light. He cannot tell what it means, he 
has had a poetic vision…  
Cut to:  The mannequin – camera moves closer – abstract patterns formed by the 
car’s lights tracing patterns in the night.  
… all motion and light.  
                                                
2 Horrigan, B, ‘Some Other Time’, in: Marker, C. (2007) Staring Back, Columbus, Ohio: Wexner 
Center for the Arts, p.140s 
3 Kear, J. (2005) ‘The Clothing of Clio: Chris Marker’s Poetics and the Politics of Representing 
History’, Film Studies, no. 6, p.58 
4 Rosenstone, R. A. (1995) Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: Harvard University Press, p.7 
5 Benjamin, W. (2003) ‘On the Concept of History’ in: Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 4, 
1938-40, Eiland, H. and Jennings, M. W. (ed.), Jephcott, E. and others (trans.), Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p.403 
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Cut to: The mannequin – camera moves closer – car’s POV, driving through 
the urban night. 
Cut to:   The POV raises – a sea of night-lights. 
He cannot unravel the images that land in his mind… 
Cut to:  The mannequin – camera moves closer – car’s POV, driving through the 
urban night  
Like birds, swift, unreachable birds.  
Cut to:  The mannequin – camera moves closer – scanning the illuminated city from 
a high POV.  
Thoughts, memories, visions are the same to him, a scary 
hallucination.  
Cut to:  CU of a waving flag (degraded image). 
 Such was William Gibson’s vision… 
Dissolve to:  The image of a bespectacled black and white image of William Gibson. 
 When he wrote Neuromancer.  
Dissolve to:  A black screen with horizontal interference. 
 And invented Cyberspace.  
Dissolve to:  The city in daylight (from a offshore POV). 
 He saw a Sargasso Sea. 
Dissolve to:  The black screen with horizontal interference. 
 Full of binary algae. 
Dissolve to:  The mannequin is covered in a lattice of lines – interference covers the image. 
On that image we Neanderthals grafted our own visions, our 
thoughts and memories…  
Interference fades out, an intermittent red dot flashes.  
… our pitiful scraps of information.  
Cut to:  An image of criss-cross lines on a blue background is framed within the screen.  
The red dot continues to flash. Other dots highlight the image. 
But none of us knows what a city is. 
Dissolve to:  Laura, a striking young dark-haired woman (dressed in a brown kimono, 
almost Jedi like), talks directly to the camera - She now has a synthesising filter 
applied. Behind her books, photographs (a cat looks over her shoulder), a cut-
out of King Kong carrying Fay Wray (a speech bubble attached to the ape says 
CHANGER LA VIE!) crowd in.  
 
 
Laura (Catherine Belkodja), Level Five’s on screen narrator, mourns her lover, a computer 
game designer, who died ‘mysteriously’ after visiting the island of Okinawa. She is attempting to 
complete ‘The Battle of Okinawa’, the computer game he was working on before his death, and 
her investigation gives the film its structure. The film’s title refers to the levels that Laura and her 
lover assigned to individuals; Level 1: ‘Catholic, Communist or Anarchist or some other bigotry’, 
Level 2: ‘When they were funnier or wittier’, she says the levels ‘never went higher.’ The game 
became their standard, and in time everything in life required a level of assessment, but nothing 
ever reached level 5. Laura poses the question - does someone need to die in order to reach level 
5, forever equating this highest level with her esteemed lover.  
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Level Five was the only time that Marker used an on-screen actor. Laura directs and observes the 
narrative’s progress – she is Marker’s avatar, her character may be genderised and framed by her 
investigation, but her pursuit is Marker’s, she also bears witness and in doing so takes the part of 
the audience. The film sets up a triangulation between actor, the recorded interviews and the off-
screen voice of  ‘Chris’. The relationship between these elements, which all offer different tones 
and forms of engagement - Laura directly addresses the audience in a familiar conversational style 
of a video diary, Chris offers the perspective of a seasoned and well-traveled man commenting 
on the images before him, and the interviewees respond to an unseen interviewer, recounting and 
commenting on Japan’s involvement in World War II - introduce a range of perspectives and 
registers that suggest historical transience and a reflexive inclination; Rosenstone suggests that 
‘History as experiment […] opens a window onto a different way of thinking about the past.’6 
Marker’s practice foregrounds the subjective, reflexive nature of his enquiry - his is a discursive 
mode with notebook-like elements - Rascaroli writes that ‘the enunciator addresses the spectator 
directly, and attempts to establish a dialogue’7 - it is a positional work of fact and fiction, the 
exploration of ideas, thought in motion. 
 
 
 
Laura (Catherine Belkodja) 
Fig. 43 Level Five (1996) 
 
 
                                                
6 Rosenstone, R. A. (1995) Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: Harvard University Press, p.63 
7 Rascaroli, L. (2009) The Personal Camera: Subjective Cinema and the Essay Film, London: Wallflower, 
p.35 
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When Chris is first heard he states: ‘I was readier, now, for other people’s images than my own.’ 
This conceit, for the images are his, differentiates Marker the film’s director from Chris the 
narrator. Laura Rascaroli emphasizes that ‘one of Marker’s key topics is the reflection on images, 
the media and their relationship with memory and with human subjectivity.’8 In the film Laura 
calls on him, an ‘editing wunderkind’, to make sense of the ‘stuff’ that she is encountering, and 
he, once again, submits to the resounding enquiry of his practice’, what distinguishes 
remembrance from oblivion?’ Marker’s faith in the image, his reframing of History, implies his 
Proustian (and Freudian) disposition, that he is appraising a series of invocations, fragments of 
the (near) past. In his earlier film La Jetée (1962) he connected memory and the museum, as sites 
of association and suggestion, repositories of the past, which, like images, allowed for travel in 
time and space. This conception was to become a reoccurring theme and it was directly explored 
in Level Five.   
 
Laura, like Marker, is an assumed name; she reveals that the name was given to her by her lover 
after Otto Preminger’s 1944 film - a work in which memory and dream unlocks a murderous past 
- she says ‘I was amazed you could fall for an image and then have a real lady appear in its stead.’ 
She then poses the question, ‘Can one be as lovely as an image?’ She also evokes Hiroshima mon 
amour’s Elle, quoting her, ‘this is the first time I’ve spoken about you to another’, with reference 
to her deceased lover. Laura, like Elle, desires to know (more), but she is also destined to be 
outside the History she seeks.  
 
‘The Battle of Okinawa’, a game of strategy that Laura thought ‘would rectify malignant fate’, is 
in fact dictated by history’s logic and no matter what strategy is deployed it can only be repeated, 
for the battle’s outcome is a foregone conclusion, a matter of History. She says, ‘strategy games 
are made to win lost wars… I tried the Marienbad game.’ Laura’s allusion, to Resnais’s film 
indicates her fictional affiliation, her desire to divine the game as a perfectible puzzle, a system 
enclosed within time and memory, a proposition that is divorced from the actuality of military 
action and the computer’s programmatic logic. Nagisa Oshima, film director and one of the 
film’s interviewees, comments that the Japanese high command envisaged Okinawa’s sacrifice as 
being ‘Sute-ishi like’, a term from the game ‘Go’ that means to give-up a piece in order to save 
the game. Laura personalises the computer’s presence, implying it has the facility for human, 
emotional, arbitration - a common cinematic trope that is most evidently expressed in 2001: A 
Space Odyssey (Kubrick, 1968) with its malevolent space station computer, Hal – however, word 
plays, entreaties, do not have the power to unsettle artificial intelligence. She attempts to overturn 
its inherent composition, through trying to ‘turn its neurons inside out’ by logging in with ‘a 
noun for a verb’, but this move fails to undo its systematic surety, as her word play literally does 
                                                
8 Ibid, p.64 
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not compute.  
 
Level Five emphasises the limits of the single screen, but also its inescapable influence. The 
information that Laura accesses is largely presented through computerised superimposition and 
reframing, screens within screens within a static frame; the constructed nature of representation 
is constantly being re-emphasised. Cavell writes, ‘The screen is a frame; the frame is the whole 
field of the screen – as a frame of film is the whole field of a photograph.’9 Film is also informed 
by what cannot be seen, as Burch writes that off-screen space is defined by the four edges of the 
frame, the space ‘behind the camera’ and the space beyond the film’s set or some object in it.’10 
Laura’s position, alone in the room with her camera and computer communicating with what lies 
beyond, emphasises the importance of all that is seen, and not seen. She once shared her space 
with her deceased lover, but now only her reminiscences suggest that he was ever present, and 
she resides in pictorial isolation, connected to the external world by computer interface.  
 
The game that Laura plays is a means to personalize (and re-state) History’s indefatigable passage. 
Chris states that, ‘the Game offered a new way’ into World War II, this comment is particularly 
telling as he then confesses, ‘I become so Japanese I shared their collective amnesia. As if the 
War had never happened.’ His first cinematic visit to Okinawa was to be in Sans Soleil (1982), a 
film Lupton posits as ‘a masterpiece of the personal essay film genre.’11 Japan is at the film’s 
center, Stephen Barber writes that ‘from his European perspective, Marker views Tokyo as a 
collective but flawed space of dreaming, always edged with calamity.’12 Tokitsu, martial art expert, 
and Level Five interviewee, says, ‘I’m not nostalgic about that era [WW II]. But those that lived 
through it find something missing today.’ The effects of World War II permeate Marker’s 
practice, since his initial collaborations with Resnais the framing of history has been analysed, 
which Rosenstone writes is ‘part of a search for new ways to express a relationship to the past.’13 
Marker’s approach challenges the narrative of works such as Pacific (2010), an HBO mini-series 
that was based on the recollections of US marines who had served in the Pacific campaign; its 
form is reminiscent of Saving Private Ryan (Spielberg, 1998) and Band of Brothers (2001), another 
HBO series, produced by Spielberg and Tom Hanks, in its verisimilitude and use of interviews, 
which feature veterans, to suggest the reality of the drama. The connection, that these works 
make, between historical participants and the dramatization of events, is proposed as an 
                                                
9 Cavell, S. (1979) The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film, enlarged edition, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts/London, U.K.: Harvard University Press, p.25 
10 Burch, N. (1973) Theory of Film Practice, London: Martin Secker & Warburg Limited, p.17 
11 Lupton, C. (2005) Chris Marker: Memories of the Future, London: Reaktion Books, p.7  
12 Barber, S. (2002) Projected Cities: Cinema and Urban Space, London: Reaktion Books, p.117 
13 Rosenstone, R. A. (1995) Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to our Idea of History, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: Harvard University Press, p.15 
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inspirational affirmation of the depicted History, but as Nichols points out, ‘identification and 
narrative characterization may be attached to historical people, giving them dimensions greater or 
less than their “real-life” measure.’14 Marker comments over images of Okinawa-related exhibits 
in the The Mabuni Museum that ‘Till we get smellies, like talkies, war films don’t exist.’  
 
 
 
‘The battle was lost in Advance. The Japanese army could not win.’ 
Fig. 44 Level Five (1996) 
 
 
The indigenous people of Okinawa were renowned for being a gentle race, but Laura informs us 
that ‘A peaceful isle, out of the world, out of History, would stage the bloodiest battle of all time;’ 
in Sans Soleil, the narrator elucidates that, ‘Americans themselves believed that they were 
conquering Japanese soil, and that they knew nothing about the Ryukyu civilization.’ In returning 
to their story Marker reemphasized his identification with those whose memory is often 
overlooked. The Islanders were not Japanese, but their fate was also to die; Chris states: ‘Mass 
suicide accompanied the advance of US troops. Together with Japanese executions and casualties 
of war, some 150,000 civilians died, a third of the population. No other group suffered so, except 
in the Nazi camps.’ It is estimated that 900,000 Japanese civilians died in WW II, excluding those 
who were killed by the atomic bombs. Marker’s European comparison, invocation of the camps, 
reinforces the Island’s distance, and the islanders’ disproportionate loss of life becomes another 
statistic in a hierarchy of barbarity; numerical insistence, and comparison, ultimately desensitises 
and abstracts suffering.     
                                                
14 Nichols, B. (1991) Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary, 
Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p.249 
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Such events produce unsettling images, which still generate a morbid fascination, that singular 
horror of being caught between curiosity and abhorrence. Laura accesses grainy, black and white, 
footage of a woman running down a slope, she pauses and looks at the camera, before 
continuing and throws herself off a cliff. Laura comments: ‘in slow-motion, you can see that 
woman turn back and spot the camera… Do we know she would have jumped if she hadn’t 
known she was watched?’ She likens the cameraman to a hunter. This is a neat metaphor but 
under the pressure of Imperial ideology the woman did not need the camera to urge her on. 
Laura extends the point further; ‘No book can explain how a teenage boy kills his mother 
because an invisible camera is there and he cannot disobey.’ This camera is a form of cultural 
indoctrination, boys wanting to be fathers, to inherit their position, and the privilege of service; 
however, it may document them but it does not determine their actions. A bespectacled Japanese 
man, Kinjo, calmly conveys how he and his brother, like the other Japanese men on the island, 
murdered their families; Tokitsu explains, ‘Seppuku is not, in the European sense suicide, but the 
act of giving oneself death.’ The Imperial system of self-sacrifice could not contemplate the 
shame of defeat. Kinjo survived the war and became a Christian minister; Chris says, ‘He wants 
memory to be faced, and forgiveness asked.’ In conclusion he suggests: ‘without Okinawa’s 
resistance, Hiroshima would not have been. The century would’ve been different. Which means 
in all respects our lives were fashioned by events between Kinjo killing his family and Ushijima’s 
[Japanese General] self-death.’ His wishful thinking conceives of a moment that would undo the 
atomic age. However, history is never so simply diverted, individualized, for it is a matter of 
sequential consequence, a position that Marker reinforces through the game’s intransience.   
 
 
 Film as essay  
 
Nichols, in Representing Reality, writes ‘Documentary offers access to a shared, historical 
construct. Instead of a world, we are offered access to the world.’15 Whilst Marker was developing 
his own film practice, his first film was Olympia 52 (1952), he was also working with Resnais on a 
number of distinctive documentaries, such as Les Statues Meurent Aussi (Statues Also Die, 1953), 
Nuit et Brouillard (Night and Fog, 1955) and Toute la mémoire du monde (All the memory of the world, 
1956). Their constructive union: invariably Marker’s words found expression in Resnais’ 
direction, developed a pursuit of remembrance, its historical and cultural connotations, and 
through a series of influential works they contributed to a form of accessible modernism; they 
desired to work with form and narrative, rather than against them, to communicate with their 
audience on a range of timely concerns.  
                                                
15 Nichols, B. (1991) Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary, 
Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p.109 
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Statues Also Die, which Marker co-directed, explores the colonial commodification of African 
culture and how the appropriation of art, its removal from the everyday, symbolises a form of 
repression. The film is dominated by a series of striking masks, which are divorced from their 
original significance, as Nora M. Alter observes: ‘Marker's camera treats all subjects in front of its 
lens without differentiating between humans, statues, animals, landscapes, architecture, or signs. 
The magic of cinema both imbues inanimate objects with life and carries out the mortification of 
living subjects.’16 The narration challenges the privileging of European art history and how these 
artefacts, from sub-Saharan Africa, which now reside in European museums, are deadened: 
‘When men die, they become history. Once statues die, they become art. This botany of death is 
what we call culture.’ Colonial imposition has disregarded meaning and negated memory. The 
film concludes that European and African art should not be regarded separately but as part of a 
cultural whole. The film’s radicalism meant that it suffered censorship and was not screened until 
1968.17 
 
 
 
Fig. 45 Statues Also Die (1953) 
 
 
Marker’s Lettre de Sibérie (Letter from Siberia, 1958) begins ‘I am writing to you from a faraway 
country…’ and is a film that endeavors to reveal something of this ‘frozen devil’s island’, but 
where it diverges from most other documentaries of its time is through its personal and critical 
                                                
16 Alter M. N. (2006) Chris Marker, University of Illinois: Illinois University Press, p.49 
17 Lupton, C. (2005) Chris Marker: Memories of the Future, London: Reaktion Books, p.39 
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reflections. Marker’s filmed travelogues also had a literary parallel, his series Petite Planète (1954-
64), travel books with graphic texts and accompanying photographs, are redolent with a form of 
enquiry that corresponds to his films. When Bazin considered Letter from Siberia he wrote that it 
‘is an essay in the form of a film report on Siberian reality, past and present.’18 His defining of 
Marker’s film as an essay is indicative, in many ways, of Adorno’s formulation; it is a 
commentary, a means to associate ideas, make new connections and defines its own form.19  
 
Bazin links Marker’s innovation to Vigo’s À propos de Nice (1930). Vigo’s silent film, ‘an essay on 
the historical and political time, though written by a poet’,20 has distinct authorial directive, one 
that is critical of Nice’s societal inequality, its feckless materiality and escapist preoccupation. 
Other films that could also be seen as Marker’s precursors are Vertov’s progressive manifesto 
Man With a Movie Camera (1929), and Buñuel’s social indictment Las Hurdes: Tierra Sin Pan (Land 
Without Bread, 1933); Vertov’s exploration of an idealised Soviet city (the film was shot in 
Moscow, Kiev and Odessa) was conceived as a Marxist (and technological) declaration, the 
critical unification of content and form was a celebration of Soviet modernisation and 
methodology; Buñuel’s film is introduced by the text - ‘This cinematographic essay of human 
geography…’ - and what follows is presented in the form of an anthropological journey into the 
under-developed region of Las Hurdes, Spain. The film’s mode is indicative of a serious 
ethnographic fieldwork - it was inspired by Maurice Legendre’s ethnographic study Las Jurdes: 
étude de géographie humaine (Las Jurdes: study of human geography, 1927) - but it is redolent with dark 
surrealist humour and social critique, the voice-over and images juxtaposed for absurd purposes, 
a strategy that uses parody, provocation and ironic solemnity, to subvert and mock documentary 
conventions. Bazin believed that Marker’s editing style differentiated him from his predecessors:  
‘Marker brings to his films a completely new assembly I would call horizontal, as 
opposed to traditional assembly that takes place throughout the film, focusing on the 
relationship between the planes. For Marker the image refers to what precedes or 
follows it, but somehow totally relates to what is said.’21  
 
Bazin may have inverted Eisenstein’s original definition of vertical and horizontal montages, but 
in doing so he suggested that Marker had found a way of working laterally with image and text, 
that formulated meaning through a relationship with both elements. This method, with its 
                                                
18 Bazin, A. (1983) ‘Lettre de Sibérie’, Le Cinéma français de la Libération a la nouvelle vague, Paris: 
Cahiers du cinéma, [on line] available at: http://cinefilobar.wordpress.com/2012/07/30/chris-
marker-1-lettre-de-siberie-por-andre-bazin/  [accessed 14 March 2014] 
19 Adorno, T. W. (1984) ‘The Essay as Form’, Hullot-Kentor, B. and Will, F. (trans.), in: New 
German Critique, No. 32, Spring – Summer, p.160 
20 Bazin, A. (1983) ‘Lettre de Sibérie’, Le Cinéma français de la Libération a la nouvelle vague, Paris: 
Cahiers du cinéma, [online] available at: http://cinefilobar.wordpress.com/2012/07/30/chris-
marker-1-lettre-de-siberie-por-andre-bazin/  [accessed 14 March 2014] 
21 Ibid 
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implicit commentary on the documentary form, is perfectly expressed in a sequence, which 
shows a Yakutsk Street, a bus, a Zim luxury car, a gang of road workers, and a pedestrian. This 
sequence of images is repeated four times, without narration, a pro-Soviet interpretation, anti-
Soviet diatribe, and then Marker’s own observations. These four approaches qualify Marker’s 
journey, and indicate the malleability of footage and sentiment, that all raw footage is susceptible 
to a variety of conflicting interpretations. Marker’s commentary stresses that even the ‘objective 
observation is also a distortion’, and a ‘walk through the streets of Yakutsk isn’t going to make 
you understand Siberia’, but ‘what counts is drive and the variety’ of approaches. Bazin describes 
this effect as an intellectual ‘echo.’22  
 
Letter from Siberia’s voice-over focuses the film, as Durgnat writes, in a ‘pseudo-personal’23 
manner; this phrase suggests that it would be wrong to comprehend such a work as a direct 
communication, but as one that is filtered through cinema. Marker’s relating of image and text 
challenges filmic hierarchy, for the image is not enough on its own and needs his commentary to 
be fully comprehendible. Steven Ungar writes that, ‘Bazin reads Marker’s intent in this exercise as 
showing the capacity of words to destabilize the seemingly fixed meaning of images and so to 
promote a more dynamic process of signification in which the role of words is no longer 
secondary.’24 This reversal of normative practice is exemplary of what Nichols defines as 
‘reflexive documentary’, films which prompt ‘the viewer to a heightened consciousness of his or 
her relation to the text and to the text’s problematic relationship to that which it represents.’25 He 
connects this formulation to ‘counter-narrative’ films, ‘‘texts” that embody palpable 
contradictions that engage us diversely [by] dislodging the notion of an origin or center’;26 a 
contextualisation that originated with Wollen’s essay Godard and Counter Cinema: Vent d’Est (1972) 
in which he outlined a set of ‘seven deadly sins of cinema against the seven cardinal virtues’:  
(1) Narrative transitivity/Narrative intransitivity, (2) Identification/Estrangement,  
(3) Transparency/Foregrounding, (4) Single diegesis/Multiple diegesis,  
(5) Closure/Aperture, (6) Pleasure/Unpleasure, (7) Fiction/Reality.27  
 
These declarative pairs propose a radical break with narrative cinema and the codification of an 
oppositional practice. Nichols characterizes each binary, offering examples that exhibit the 
                                                
22 Ibid 
23 Durgnat, R. (1987) ‘Resnais & Co: Back to the Avant-garde’, Monthly Film Bulletin (London), 
54/640, p.135 
24 Unger, S. (2011) ‘Radical Ambitions in Postwar French Documentary’, in: Opening Bazin: 
Postwar Film Theory and Its Afterlife, Andrew, D. (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, P.256 
25 Nichols, B. (1991) Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary, 
Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p.60 
26 Ibid, p.256 
27 Wollen, P. (1985) ‘Godard and Counter Cinema: Vent d’est’, in: Movies and Methods: An 
Anthology, vol.2, Nichols, B. (ed.), Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, p.501 
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required qualities, for instance he lists Sans Soleil as one of the films that use ‘narrative 
intransitivity - episodic construction, digressions, and interruptions’,28 qualities that can also be 
applied to Level Five. But, unlike Wollen, he does not locate the ‘seven virtues’ in one film, but 
finds them within various ‘counter-narrative’ documentaries.29 Nichols concludes his summary by 
noting that in counter cinema fiction is contrasted with reality, but ‘in documentary the reverse 
contrast occurs: a reintroduction of subjective and narrative elements into a domain once 
governed by a canon objectivity.’30 This reversal indicates the specificity of formal relationships, 
and that for documentaries, as with fiction films, the representation of the world is a contested 
and debatable matter and the subjective nature of this realisation allows for enhanced critical 
awareness on the part of the viewer.  
 
In time the cinematic essay was to take on a more populist application, in which the director, 
writer, narrator, in the mode of a personable investigator, such as Michael Moore (iRodger and Me, 
1989), Nick Broomfield (The Leader, His Driver, and the Driver’s Wife, 1991) and Morgan Spurlock 
(Super Size Me, 2004), challenged a conspiratorial and corporate world. Marker’s style has proved 
to be influential (and imitable) and by following his method, at once artful and reflective, a 
cinematic essay can be produced. He was directly part of revolutionary activity and its 
disconcerting aftermath, like a number of his contemporaries, but very few contemporary 
filmmakers offer a similar perspective. Nina Power writes, with particular reference to the 
Otolith Group’s Otolith I (2003) and the work of Hito Steyerl, that the ‘melancholic tone’ of ‘art 
political cinema’ is a ‘feeling that politics can only be gestural in a post-revolutionary era’, and the 
‘relation of political art to this question of time is to reflect the specific capacity of film to move 
at a different speed than other modes of political life.’31 For instance Otolith I is haunted by the 
spectre of inherited failure; its narrator Anjalika Sagar, utilising Sans Soleil’s letter writing self-
reflexivity, states, ‘It is my great misfortune to belong to a generation with no political vision to 
betray or to fulfill’, the words are spoken over slowed-down footage of the march against the war 
with Iraq, London, 2003. In this context activism, and its tilt at power, is but an empty, if 
observable, gesture. The known revolutionary moment, such as Paris 1968, which despite its 
disappointing outcome for the left is still more appealing than contemporary protest, for its 
slogans, barricades, seeming focus have doomed romantic allure. 
 
The filmmaker Lis Rhodes was part of a generation that conceived of an artistic (and political) 
                                                
28 Nichols, B. (1991) Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary, 
Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p.256 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid, p.258 
31 Power, N. (2012) ‘The Melancholic Turn in Contemporary Political Cinema’, Sequence: New 
Artists’ Film and Video, 3, Winter, p.33 
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counterculture, first as part of The London Filmmakers’ Co-op and later as a founder member of 
Circles, which was formed in 1979 to produce and distribute women's film and video. Her In the 
Kettle (2010) draws on experimental and agitprop strategies to interrogate narratives and histories 
of repression and resistance. The film is concerned with 'kettling' as a means of containing 
protesters, and the broader implications of how police tactics have developed, surveying London 
and the Palestinian West bank. The film is a reaction against authoritarian positions and contains 
long textual passages that explicitly critique the legality and justification of such actions, the film 
ends with a text that reveals that a rare Palestine granary has been put out of action by an illegal 
Israeli air strike. She develops a visual and textual collage, which suggests a now rare earnestness 
that is in marked contrast to contemporaneous art political cinema.  
 
Rhodes’ sincerity emphasises a difference in generational perception; she has a political vision, 
which rejects flights of personal fancy, and her film would consider direct issues and communal 
intent rather than selfhood, but her images and words also reinforce the seeming impossibility of 
progressive change. A localised practice, personal and critical, as seen in works such as Light 
Reading (1979), indicated a direct involvement with identifiable issue(s), but national and 
international altercations are a different matter; does the bearing witness through film, to such 
events, raise consciousness or just register personal indignation and ultimately helplessness? The 
Otolith Group would reflect on contemporary matters, but unlike Rhodes’s expansive position 
their commentary offers artistic propositions, forms of theoretically sophisticated defeatism, 
rather than act as a political corrective.  
 
The sentiment of sedition exacts a primary hold, which is not to decry political commitment, but 
to declare its attraction. Straub was interviewed in 2010 about his and Huillet’s film Trop Tot, Trop 
Tard  (Too Early, Too Late, 1981), which explores the connections between the French revolution 
and Egypt’s contemporary social conditions; in discussing their working method, he said,  
‘You need to behave as a filmmaker and not a paratrooper. Filmmakers nowadays are 
paratroopers; they fall from the sky, and show something that they did not have time 
to see, film before seeing anything, and never look at anything before seeing, or look 
again at something after having seen it.’ 32 
 
In ‘The Seeds of Time’ Jameson writes that ‘It seems to be easier for us today to imagine the 
thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than the breakdown of late capitalism; 
perhaps that is due to some weakness in our imaginations.’33 Written in 1996, Jameson’s words 
encompassed a new political sphere, one that had environmental implications. The planet’s safety 
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is no longer beholden to the Cold War’s oppositional binary, but to the effect of global 
industrialization - imagination was being exercised in the pursuit of capital and not communal 
equality. Contemporary protest is largely concerned with single-issue causes, a network of 
overlapping issues that happen on an ad hoc, and often opportunistic, basis, and distinctly formal 
positions, with its accompanying ideology, are distrusted. It is as if the lessons of the past, 
particularly the failed heroics portrayed in films like Marker’s Le fond de l'air est rouge (A Grin 
Without a Cat, 1977), have cast a romantic but paralyzing shadow; the direct translation of the 
original title, The Base of the Air is Red, is an enigmatic reference to the Left’s unsubstantiated 
ambitions. The English title is taken from Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland - ‘I’ve often seen a 
cat without a grin, thought Alice; but a grin without a cat! That’s the most curious thing I ever 
saw in my whole life’34 - which is also enigmatic, but positively playful by contrast; perhaps this 
change of title emphasises a difference in cultural sensibility and relationship to the considered 
history.  
 
 
 
Fig. 46 A Grin Without a Cat (1977) 
 
 
The film was envisaged only a decade after the movement’s radical arrival it revisited European, 
Asian, and South American theatres of conflict, Marker described it as ‘scenes of the third World 
War 1967-77, finding its initial hope but a memory by the film’s conclusion. Marker evokes not 
                                                
34 Carroll’s book also provide the title for the BFI’s 2011 Resnais retrospective, ‘Curiouser and 
Curiouser.’  
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the history of events but subjective remembrance: how events become something different, 
abstracted, through recollection.  
 
The prevalent radical critique from the late sixties onward sought to reveal underlying ideological 
structures, a position that, proposed that with enough awareness, a coming into knowledge could 
occur. However, within a short period of time this endeavour became mired in the impossibility 
of its task; the war in Vietnam continued, Nixon was re-elected in 1972, what had seemed like a 
glorious initial phase was in fact the ‘movement’s high water mark. Advances continued to be 
made, particularly regarding gender and racial issues, but the desire for fundamental political 
change dissipated as the power of capital was resolutely asserted; counter-forces retreated from 
ambitious intention to pragmatic rhetoric and nostalgic attachment. Part of film’s effect is that its 
realness never diminishes, and as it leaves behind its original context, it struggles to resist 
becoming a mere historical bystander. Marker’s films are part of the history that they represent, 
his work is infused with a desire to make his concerns known, but what was originally marked by 
freighted potentiality became a matter of regret. 
 
 
 Towards a better tomorrow, film’s political intent 
 
Sans Soleil features a well-traveled cameraman, Sandor Krasan, and an unnamed woman 
that he writes to; he is known by his words and images, and she is known through her narration; 
she reads his letters, and reflects upon them. Marker’s films invariably feature narrators who are 
all slightly removed from Marker the filmmaker, but they all speak with one voice, as their 
interests are always his. Krasan, has a Japanese ‘pal’, Hayao Yamaneko, a video game designer 
who has developed an image synthesizer, the Zone. Its name pays homage to Tarkovsky’s Stalker 
(1979) – in its Zone there ‘is a certain room in which, we are told, everybody’s most secret wish 
will be granted.’35 Yamaneko’s Zone processes and represents the past, and in doing it de-
naturalises the documented world.  
 
For Marker this Zone allowed a true image to be revealed by paradoxically stripping away all that 
would identify it as being real, as Krasan writes, ‘At least they proclaim themselves to be what 
they are: images, not the portable and compact form of an already inaccessible reality.’ With this 
technological intervention Marker emphasises how representing reality is a complicated matter, 
which is intrinsically exacerbated by film’s realistic facility, the Zone deconstructs the image’s 
direct identification and through its manipulation, meaning, function and authenticity is 
questioned. Catherine Lupton observes that Krasna, 
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‘Fondly dubs Yamaneko a “fanatic”, and there is a sense in which these 
characters represent two conflicting models of history: Yamaneko the truism that 
memory is always a selective reinvention of the past to answer the needs of the 
present, and Krasna a residual faith in Proust’s Madeleine.’36  
 
 
 
Fig. 47 Hayao Yamaneko’s Zone Sans Soleil (1982) 
 
 
Sans Soleil concludes, ‘Hayao showed me my images already affected by the moss of Time, freed 
of the lie that had prolonged the existence of those moments swallowed by the Spiral.’ The 
‘spiral’ is a reference to Hitchock’s Vertigo (1958) a film that is venerated within Marker’s 
universe. In Sans Soleil he states that it is the only film ‘capable of portraying impossible 
memory—insane memory’, that ‘In the spiral of the titles he saw time covering a field ever wider 
as it moved away, a cyclone whose present moment contains the motionless eye.’ The faith that 
Marker places in Proust, and Hitchcock, was to be reiterated in Immemory (1997) and in the 
booklet that accompanied his CD-Rom he writes, ‘I claim for the image the humility and powers 
of the Madeleine.’37 This invocation reiterates Lupton observation and confirms Proust’s place in 
Marker’s firmament.  
 
The promotion and suppression of images from war zones is an inevitable part of their depiction 
and framing. Level Five features a scene, taken from John Huston’s Let There be Light (1944), of a 
psychiatrist attempting to cure a shell-shocked American soldier, who was traumatized by what 
he witnessed on Okinawa. Chris comments that army censors deemed it ‘demoralizing;’ John 
Wayne in The Sands of Iwo Jima  (Dwan, 1949) was more acceptable, however, when it was 
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screened at a naval hospital ‘the star turned up in cowboy garb […] and got booed.’ In a later 
scene American marines raise a victorious stars and stripes, a patriotic tableau that was re-staged 
for the camera at Iwo Jima, 1945. Nichols suggests that ‘The historical domain, open-ended and 
contingent, lies at right angles to the closure of narrative.’38 Laura tells the story of Private Ira 
Hayes. He was one of the six marines who were ordered to partake in this second raising of the 
flag. The original participants had already rejoined the battle; the event’s supreme iconography 
surpassed individuals. Private Hayes struggled with his part in this performance and was later to 
die of alcoholism. 
 
In Pictures From a Revolution (Meiselas, Guzzetti and Rogers, 1991), photojournalist Susan Meiselas 
returned to Nicaragua, to the sites of the images she took during its civil war. Ten years after the 
victory of the Sandinistas she tries to find the original subjects of her photographs and unpick 
the mythologising nature of her image making. Meiselas’s original impulse was to challenge the 
distorted news coverage of the popular insurrection against Somoza and his national guard. She 
acknowledges that her objectivity dissipated in the presence of this very real drama, ‘History was 
being made on the streets and no one knew where it would lead. People believed what they were 
doing mattered. I felt the necessity to witness and document what they did.’ At the film’s end, 
after she has re-visited the now peaceful, but outwardly just as poor, Somoza-less land, and seen 
a number of her photographic subjects, she ponders, Marker-like: ‘If there had been no war, no 
contra war, no cold war, what might the revolution have become. The sadness is that we’ll never 
know. For some of us who watched we lost the luxury of a dream, but for the Nicaraguans it was 
much more.’ In considering the reflexive documentary, Nichols suggests that ‘it rarely reflects on 
ethical issues as a primary concern, other than with the sigh of detached relativism readier to 
criticize the choices of others than to examine its own.’39 He observes that this form ‘shows’ and 
reflects on a situation but remains apart, reinforcing the attendant cultural and socio-political 
differentials.  
 
The photographs that Meiselas took became infused with iconic significance, part of another war, 
‘a war of images.’ She comments that her image, ‘Molotov Man’, ‘Like so many photographs that 
begin as documents of history it ended up as an illustration and then a symbol.’ Images await 
explanation, their ideological reckoning, and Meiselas’s photograph was to become a potent 
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image of political action, both for the Sandinistas, it was the ‘official’40 image of Somoza’s 
overthrow, and also for the Contras, who used it to illustrate communist lawlessness. 
 
 
 
Fig. 48 Molotov Man (1979)  
 
 
Fig. 49 Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima (1945) 
 
                                                
40 Molotov Man, ‘Susan Meiselas: Photographer’ [online] available at: 
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In Level Five Marker indicates the partisan complexity of such graphic representations and that 
these invocations of valour become disconnected from their original contexts and subject to all 
manner of appropriation. As well as the deconstructing WWII myth, he shows footage of 
Gustav, the burning man of many newsreels, beyond its usual conclusion; these extra frames 
show the man walk away seemingly unharmed. Benjamin observed that ‘Articulating the past 
historically does not mean recognizing it “the way it really was”’,41 which he perceived that this 
could only be countermanded through the ‘flash’ of a dialectical image. Lupton, considering Level 
Five’s ‘quaint looking graphics’,42 and her reaction to them, suggests; ‘I also believe that the actual 
experience of the dialectical image, as I think Benjamin and Marker understand it, must involve 
this affective response which locates the viewing subject within a materialist history.’43 Harbord, 
in Chris Marker: La Jetée, also makes favourable reference to Benjamin’s’ dialectical movement as a 
means of interpreting the film.44 But, surely, if Benjamin’s conception is to be found in Marker’s 
work it is in A Grin Without a Cat. Marker’s film begins with footage from Battleship Potemkin 
(1925) in which Eisenstein’s heroic revolutionary sailor Vakulinchuk exults – ‘Brothers!’ These 
shots are accompanied by a voice-over, in which the narrator reminisces about his first memories 
of the film. This is followed by a more contemporary shot of hands held up in victory salutes.  
 
Next, a montage, which is intercut with the film’s titles, of contemporary revolutionaries in 
various global locations being violently confronted by police and militaristic forces, and more 
footage from Battleship Potemkin, in which the Tsar’s guards rend asunder the demonstrators on 
the Odessa steps. The different shots share motifs of revolutionary action as comrades’ battle 
across time, a sense that is heightened by the accompanying stirring march (Luciano Berio, based 
on a theme by Boccherini). The reference to Eisenstein’s film, with its direct dialectical montage, 
also suggests a correlation of forms and the utilisation of revolutionary method to advance 
Marker’s critique. The film offers many other similar instances of critically aligned material, for 
example at one point the Russian tanks that liberated Prague in 1945 become its suppressors and 
occupiers in 1968. Marker is clearly iterating that the struggle continues and that in the first part 
of his film, ‘Fragile Hands’, (the second part is entitled ‘Severed Hands’) this trajectory will be 
traced and analyzed in an attempt to articulate the movement’s context and passage, and 
countermand perceived cultural bias where, ‘one event is swept away by another, living ideals are 
replaced by cold facts, and it all descends into collective oblivion.’ The images, interviews and 
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commentary, culled from partisan and official sources, alike, are juxtaposed and tested in a 
montage that indicates the relationship of what has been to what will follow, which arguably 
produces a dialectical montage of historical, political and critical significance.  
 
 
 
Fig. 50 A Grin Without a Cat (1977) 
 
 
Marker’s film identifies 1967 as the year that the international left came to prominence, but, for 
many, it was the events that happened a year later that defined this up surge. In Paris a series of 
independent newsreels, Ciné-Tracts, were produced in response to May’s violent tumult. One roll 
of film at a time, they sought to challenge societal iconography, the ideological slant of official 
channels and authorial ownership. Each Ciné-Tract was made with 100 feet of silent black and 
white 16 mm film, which equates to a duration of approximately two minutes and fifty seconds, 
and the viability of this technology allowed each film to be a self-facilitated, single- day 
production.  
 
This directness is akin to Alexandre Astruc’s conception of a camera stylo, a means to capture 
images that is ‘just as flexible and subtle as written language.’45 He considered that cinema’s 
fundamental problem was how it could ‘express thought’46 and the camera pen would address 
this. Technology has delivered a hitherto unimagined procedural immediacy, ease of production 
and ubiquity, but Astruc would harness the means of production to produce the appearance of 
thought and this is always a more complex matter. These films were screened across France, and 
abroad, in factories, universities, social clubs and other non-commercial and partisan locations. 
41 Ciné-Tracts were released, all without credits; each reel was preceded by the simple title –  
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Ciné-Tract plus a serial number. Godard, Marker, Resnais and others contributed work 
anonymously, but despite this intention stylistic mannerisms, for instance Godard’s identifiable 
handwriting, have led to the attribution of authorship in some cases.  
 
The Ciné-Tracts are still physically visible, but what kind of trace will modern alternative channels 
leave? They are traces formulated to be an antithetical to History’s march, to be counterweight 
then and now – Benjamin observes, ‘what has been strives to turn – by dint of a secret 
heliotropism – towards the sun which is rising in the sky of history.’47 Digital technologies have 
changed the fluency of personal communications, in many parts of the world, with the Internet 
operating as an efficient means for connectivity and dissemination. However, virtually present 
material has a tendency to appear, and disappear without explanation, there is only a semblance of 
permanence, which leaves a whispered legacy. 
 
 
Re-imagining time in the zapping zone  
 
‘I remember that month of January in Tokyo – or rather I remember the images I 
filmed in that month of January in Tokyo. They have substituted themselves for my 
memory – they are my memory. I wonder how people remember things who don’t 
film, don’t photograph, don’t tape?’  
 
 Sandor Krasan’s rhetorical question, which discounted non-technological forms of 
observation, illustrated his purpose. The twentieth century was documented as never before, and 
technology mediated occurrence. The opportunity to peruse audio/visual evidence aided 
remembrance, but these recordings were not complete memories in themselves, they were a 
prompt, a means to suggest and share the past, and the advent of film afforded the most direct 
way to facilitate this exchange. 
 
By the advent of the 1980s all that had once seemed possible had dissipated. In considering Sans 
Soleil Terrence Rafferty writes that ‘What Marker means to communicate to us is the solitude of 
the film editor at his machinery.’48 This is an isolated fate, a position of contemplation, rather 
than action. Once this recourse would not have been deemed sufficient, for to indicate the 
problem was not enough in itself, for as Situationist graffiti stated in May 68’: 'Action must not 
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be a reaction, but a creation'. The heroics of failure threw into relief the elevation of individuals, 
who invariably would move on, one way or another, from direct activism. History rather than 
politics became the cause for Marker,49 and in time he was to find solace in new media, and its 
ability to map and seemingly interrogate the past, a technology that allowed a semblance of the 
world to be at one’s fingertips.  
 
Laura researches the history of Okinawa through OWL (Optional World Link); this network is 
depicted as a proto World Wide Web, which had only started to gain general usage since the 
introduction of the Mosaic web browser in 1993. OWL’s users all have pseudonyms, and Laura 
reminisces that her lover was ‘part Robin Hood, part Avengers’, that he would leave his 
‘Sherwood’ to raid for information. Laura’s adulation is decidedly romantic, with its transference 
of audacious purloining. Despite Laura complaining that OWL ‘is not what it was’, due to its 
increasing popularity, it is still preferable to the Net, because ‘The knowledge available on the 
Net was questionable’, and in Marker’s online binary it stands for technology’s vacuity and 
potency, and the negation of ethical discourse. His desire to imagine the future, realise it through 
inventive means, was also the subject of his only drama, La Jetée (1962). Working with science 
fiction, he created a near future to survey the present, a place, in his conception, which is always 
past, because this is where his interest really lay. At one point in Level Five Laura dons glasses, a 
virtual mask, which echoes those worn by the time-travelling protagonist of the earlier film.  
 
Level Five deploys new media effects, in the manner of old media. Its invention was rooted in the 
emerging pro-sumer market - Marker favoured the Apple II GS and Hyperstudio software - 
Lupton suggests that his approach ‘offers new technology itself as a historical object of 
recollection.’50 The film’s style, which invokes Sans Soleil’s Zone, may now appear to be dated, but 
so is the Wachowski’s ‘bullet time’ of The Matrix (1999). The latest visions of the future are 
always intrinsically linked to the time of their inception through their use of dateable technology 
innovation, aesthetic and stylistic clues, which is primarily concerned with devising more 
convincing affect. The meaning attached to Level Five’s technological representation has also 
changed with time as its computerised inflection inscribes it with epochal aesthetics and 
significance, however Marker’s depiction is all the more memorable because of its ‘quaint, 
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anachronistic’51 and lo-fi intimacy, because we understand it to be directly authored and imagined 
outside of the industrial regime.  
 
In Level Five, computing is placed at the apex of contemporary remembrance; Laura says ‘It was 
customary for such tribes [of the late 20th century] to address a familiar and protective spirit 
known as the computer. They’d consult on everything. It kept their memory. In fact, it was their 
memory.’ Her computer is the keeper and defender of time. Steedman writes that since ‘at least 
the end of the nineteenth century - the Archive [has been thought of] as metaphor or analogy, 
when memory is discussed’, but this notion is problematic because it ‘is not potentially made up 
of everything, as is human memory.’52 The Archive is not active, it preserves, but time has changed 
the means of storage, and Rascaroli proposes that the digital database has the facility for ‘the 
“creation” of memory, and offers new metaphors to describe the human mind.’53 These terms 
may afford new linguistic and poetic means; however as Manovich observes the computer has so 
far failed to mirror the mind and cinema is still the more capable medium for revealing its 
workings.54 Undoubtedly digital delivery will become more intuitive, imaginative, venturing 
beyond the confines of the frame, but perhaps, certainly for the time being, it is actually the 
frame that gives the form, even in its broadest sense, its purpose. 
 
To regard the work of Marker, Godard and others, is to trace the dislocation of cinematic 
constancy, and the development of other positional means. In many ways it was a generational 
turn, from direct to interior cinema, and their productions came to be found across a number of 
different platforms, with the author at the centre of the work. The museum, archive, gallery, 
collection, creates history, a vision of the past, that is in itself a product of history, and as 
Huyssen writes, ‘modernity is unthinkable without its museal project.’55 Museums are a constant 
presence for Marker - Rascaroli  suggests his films are actually akin to museums.56 But if a film 
depicts a form, which has an archival aspect to it, does it follow that it is in itself imbued with 
and contributing to this experience? Museums offer an answer to History’s questions, whereas, 
Rosenstone states, ‘Historians are people who spend their lives answering questions that nobody 
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has asked.’57 Marker and Godard, if they are considered to be historians, perform this latter task, 
challenging history’s affirmation, re-imagining the archive’s composition, through distilled 
thought, captured memory and intervention. 
 
 
 
‘Other images appear, merge, in that museum, which is perhaps that of his memory.’ 
Fig. 51 La Jetée (1962) 
 
 
Technological innovations, which were once beyond the museum’s bounds, are now imbedded 
within its post-modern rationale; these means have a different materiality and temporality, and 
their historical resonance has introduced a different kind of viewing regime. Marker’s museums 
populated his films and, latterly migrated to sites, initially with his installation Zapping Zone: 
Proposals for an Imaginary Television (‘Passages de l’image’, Centre Georges Pompidou, 1990), then 
more conclusively with the interactive Immemory (CD-ROM, 1998) and his Second Life compound, 
which features a virtual museum, Le Musée de Marker (2003).  
 
Marker’s multi-media presentation Zapping Zone was an assemblage of televisions and computer 
monitors, augmented by photographs and computer generated collages, which suggested a tour 
of various imaginary cultural zones; Bellour, one of the exhibition’s co-curators, writes in its 
catalogue, ‘Zapping Zone is a supermarket, a mini BHV carefully disorganized, where everyone can 
find everything else as needed.’58 Marker’s assemblage can be seen as a physical manifestation of 
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the coming age; an abundance of visual information competing for attention, also an attempt to 
prepare a trove of recollections for external perusal; a desire which would really come to fruition 
with the release of Immemory.  
 
 
 
Fig. 52 Installation view: ‘Passages de l’image’ (1990) 
 
 
La Jetée begins ‘This is the story of a man, marked by an image from his childhood’, and this 
consideration, in relation to Marker’s own life, was to be made known through Immemory. He 
chose to make this work in the form of a CD-Rom, which he also produced using commonly 
accessible software, commenting that ‘With the CD-Rom, it’s not so much the technology that's 
important as the architecture, the tree-like branching, the play.’59 It was one of the first artistic 
attempts to offer a multi-layered mapping of personal experience, and his utilisation hinted at 
future forms of presentation. 
 
The object of the disc was to navigate an inventory of one man’s offered memory; Marker writes 
in the introductory text, ‘every memory with some reach is more structured than it seems’, that 
‘photos taken apparently by chance, postcards chosen on the whim of the moment, begin once 
they mount up to sketch an itinerary, to map the imaginary country which spreads out inside of 
us.’60 This notion resonates with instinctive and organic memory metaphors. He references 
Robert Hooke (1635-1702), ‘who intuitively grasped the laws of gravitation before Newton’, as 
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another thinker who also developed a conceptual interest in mapping memory geographically, 
rather than historically, many centuries before.61 Manovich contended that ‘Computer media is 
understood as something that will let cinema tell its stories in a new way’;62 Immemory’s navigation 
may now seem dated, but its series of screens, images, references and reflections were conceived 
as a non-linear and investigative work to be read rather than watched, considered rather than 
consumed, as Marker suggested, ‘don't zap take your time.’ The relating of information, through 
a compliant form, places it within a particular context, on the cusp of the current digital age; his 
artistic memories are sealed by technology and the form of their mediation foreshadows a now 
familiar solitary engagement. 
 
 
 
Fig. 53 Immemory (1998) 
 
 
In 2005 Marker installed Owls at Noon, Prelude: The Hollow Men, a two-screen loop, at MoMA, New 
York. The museum’s publicity stated, ‘He has been making films for over fifty years, sifting 
through images that play with the concept of memory and exploring the paradoxes of time.63 His 
installation takes as its starting point T. S. Eliot's poem The Hollow Men from 1925, which 
surveyed a Europe decimated by world war; ‘Marker combs a vast beach of images to create an 
echo chamber in which the viewer can either remember or witness for the first time the reality of 
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a civilization's self-slaughter.’64 But as Eliot wrote, ‘Between the idea, And the reality, Between 
the motion, And the act, Falls the shadow.’65 A self-referential shadow that desires space to 
illuminate the portent of what has been.  
 
A work’s perceived relevance fluctuates according to critical attention, and accessibility; Level Five 
was not included in Marker’s first UK retrospective ‘Chris Marker: Grin Without a Cat’ 
(Whitechapel, 2014),66 perhaps its perceived ‘awkwardness’ was at odds with Marker’s visionary 
status - Ian Christie calls him a ‘techno-shaman.’67 It is telling that his retrospective occurred in a 
gallery, not in a cinema. The exhibition was positioned as an ‘unprecedented survey of the full 
range of his creativity’68, his archive was to be curated and enfolded into the museum, and it was 
divided into four sections, that covered ‘key themes that recur throughout Marker’s work – The 
Museum, Travelogues, Film and Memory, and War and Revolution.’69 The exhibition’s thematic 
approach, which cut across historical periodization and from one form of media to another, 
endeavoured to create a receptive environment that emphasized Marker’s technological and 
conceptual curiosity and continuing relevance - its method could be seen as being like a series of 
memories of Marker.  
 
The exhibition featured a number of Marker’s films70, which were shown in various installed 
forms. This re-positioning of work revised intentionality; Marks, considering the staging of single 
screen projections in the gallery, writes that ‘numerous critics of cinematic spectacle’, argue that 
‘the time is experienced in isolation, while space is social.’71 Gallery installation would ideally seek 
to free the viewer from their rapt cinematic reverence, and destabilise what Leighton 
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characterises as the ‘false absolution of time to which cinema is prone.’72 This form of installation 
would emphasise that which is encountered, on and off screen, is an active occurrence, 
socialising the experience,73 a position that may be consistent with work, which has been made 
specifically for this context, such as Zapping Zone, but can it also accommodate work that 
originated elsewhere; Nash states, with reference to installation practice, ‘we are always already in 
cinema, one way or another.’74 What is film’s place in this realm, which already has a distinct 
history and pre-occupations, how is the material encountered and if it is to be re-positioned how 
does this revise its memory?     
 
 
 
Fig. 54 Installation view: ‘Chris Marker: Grin Without a Cat’ (2014) 
 
 
With standard gallery moving image installation a clash of temporalities occurs in which the 
viewer’s time, and their ability to move freely, is set against a film’s durational progress.75 This 
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situation suggests that for galleries that choose to show films in this manner, a film’s totality is 
not of primary importance, but its affect is, with the gallery spectator experiencing rather than 
watching it. Marker’s films were intended to be seen in cinema (like) conditions and this impacts 
on their screening, for instance A Grin Without a Cat has a duration of 240 minutes - should its 
gallery installation be seen as an introduction to the film, an indicator of its importance, a 
fragmentary memory, or is it being reduced to a filmic reference, in the same way that a museum 
might present a manuscript as a venerable relic to be observed rather than as a complete and 
readable text?76  
 
Towards the end of Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ he 
cautions, ‘The public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one.’77An audience works with the 
form that is offered and this becomes part of their abiding memory, in this way a film like A Grin 
Without a Cat becomes a gallery installation when once it would have been only imaginable in the 
cinema. Methods of exhibition are representative of the times that inspire them and to revisit any 
cultural manifestation is to understand something of its historical conjunction. Film’s embrace by 
the art world had been foreseen, and cautioned against, decades earlier by Debord:  
‘As soon as cinema enriched itself with the powers of modern art, it found itself 
encompassed by the total crisis of modern art. At the same time that this step 
brought cinema closer to its freedom, it also brought it closer to its death, to the 
proof of its inadequacy.’78  
 
In becoming an elevated form, that which had differentiated cinema and given it autonomy, was 
forsaken. His critique suggests that in seeking cultural equivalence with art practice, cinema’s 
propensity to aesthetic fetishism, and its commodification, was exacerbated and it became 
distanced from life itself and the possibility of social change. Jameson has observed, ‘life has now 
become part of the institutional realm and the image’s intrusive purchase has expanded so that 
social space is now completely saturated with the culture of the image.’79 This situation, an 
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adulterated universe of images, compacts difference and would actualise substance as a cultural 
(and economic) asset.  
 
The technological understanding, which foresees the meeting of creative needs and although it is 
never merely a tool, it is an implicit part of any work’s methodology and process. Technology, 
and the play of personas, had always interested Marker and his engagement with new media led 
to him to creating a virtual presence in Second Life, and on the island of Ouvroir he constructed a 
museum to his own memory, Le Musée de Marker. ‘Ouvroir the Movie’ is an introduction to his 
island, in which Guillaume-en-Egypt, avatar and mythic cat, was to be Marker’s chosen guide. It 
begins, ‘Building a virtual museum is more tricky than a real one, Marble wood and linoleum, are 
lighter stuff than mind alone.’80 ‘Digitextuality’81 is the coming together of different technologies 
within the digital realm and in this process old material becomes embedded within new media. 
This form of presentation offers a (seemingly) seamless transition and in this manner information 
is ordered and nested, and, in an echo of once progressive practice, suggests that all images are 
potentially usable. New media images are often thought to represent real time operations, the 
present is their primary tense, they are symbolised by a desire to communicate rather than 
contemplate – something that Marker’s more open, ambiguous invitation to explore the work’s 
spaces tries to undo - it’s now ubiquitous framing often flattens time and difference, reducing 
audio/visual discrepancies that pre-date its advent and favouring work that has been produced 
for this form. For Marker medium was always a means to convey ideas, and the potential 
architectural complexity of this form allowed him to revisit his past and reconsider, curate, 
remember all that he would make known, as a interactive proposition, beyond Level Five’s 
imaginings; and considering his practice it seems probable his interests would have migrated to 
the truly virtual environment.  
 
This is a new era, one beyond, but still referencing, its analogue past, and, despite the image’s 
direct meaning being recanted, its effect still denotes some form of temporal passage and 
invariably a form of identifiable representation; there is comfort in image recognition, a sense of 
nostalgic continuity that reassures and familiarises. Anna Everett suggests that the digital medium 
may ‘turn traditional notions of mimesis and diegesis on their heads’,82 an idea which is taken up 
by Mulvey, who observes that the ‘mechanical, even banal, presence of the photographic image 
as index takes on a new kind of resonance, touched perhaps by nostalgia, but no longer tied to 
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old debates about the truth of photographic evidence.’83 Marker’s Second Life creation is an 
adjunct to his other works, in many ways it is an extension of Immemory, and like its predecessor 
Le Musée de Marker is a self-referential inventory and emphasises the subjectivism of his 
purpose; different forms may articulate issues in seemingly new ways, but they all continue to 
service the same preoccupations. His is a model of new media incarnate, with all its 
contradictions; its navigation could only be managed on a digital platform, however its content 
resides in the past, it is a repository of his artistic and cinematic influences, which are all pre-
digital.    
 
Digital media have come to assail the individual with images and messages as never before. In 
this all manner of still and moving images, competing for exposure, are unleashed onto an 
anonymous world, to be discovered, connected and then often discarded. The Remembered Film 
begins with Burgin’s description of André Breton and Jacques Vaché’s cinematic viewing 
strategy, he writes, that they would drop ‘in at random on whatever film happened to be playing, 
staying until they had had enough of it, then leaving for the next aleatory extract.’84 Their method 
was a means to introduce a random element into the controlled flow of film linearity; an avant-
garde derive that is now readily re-enacted online. Burgin borrows Foucault’s term ‘heterotopia’, 
‘a place without place that may touch many places’ (like a ship on the ocean), to describe this 
process, he writes, ‘What we may call the ‘cinema heterotopia’ is constituted across the variously 
virtual spaces in which we encounter displaced pieces of films.’85 The digital erosion of cinema 
time indicates the disassembly of film’s specificity, it becomes part of a universal lexicon of all 
collected and characterised imagistic moments and struggles to find a relevant place in this new 
age and maintain the memory of its progress. 
 
The narrator in Borges’ The Library of Babel concludes that despite the ‘human species’ imminent 
extinction ‘the Library [and by implication the universe] will endure: illuminated, solitary, infinite, 
perfectly motionless, equipped with precious volumes, useless, incorruptible, secret.’86 Borges’ 
library suggests that the unfettered acquisition of knowledge leads to a form of intellectual and 
emotional saturation where learning ceases to have real value; the Librarian dismisses the search 
for ‘meaning’ as being a ‘vain and superstitious custom.’87 But, Marker would attribute meaning, 
because if the past had no discernible significance much of his work would be but a vain 
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conception; this conundrum relates to all those who produce work that would affect, and be a 
commentary on, politics – in the aftermath of World War II this search, for a better, fairer, more 
inclusive way, inspired many (as many of Marker’s films indicate). In confronting his regret a 
shift occurred, however he was not willing to completely forsake the world he knew, because it 
was a place he had made his own.  
 
 
Days of future past  
  
Level Five may hint at a world to come, but how does it re-examine Okinawa, historical 
representation, and the intersection of technological and personal memory? Rascaroli writes that 
the ‘film’s most characteristic strategy is interpellation’,88 Marker proposes questions, offers 
reflections, which are part of an ongoing conversation between works, History and his audience. 
In Marker’s film twentieth century memory has a propensity towards a personal (and communal) 
nostalgia, even the proto-Internet ‘is not what it [once] was’, whereas future memory appears to 
be largely filtered through technology and stored in an ever expandable reservoir, in which 
nothing that is recorded is ever forgotten, and consequently remembrance becomes a different 
proposition, in which human and machine co-habit.  
 
Level Five is a work of future imagining, which would consider the past, and like all works that 
contemplate the future it is truly located in the present. The film’s introduction mentions in 
passing William Gibson and his fictional projections - cyberspace, new data systems, personal 
interfaces and other technological innovations and their effect of human interaction and memory 
– all expressions of things to come, that, one way or another, came.89 This reference suggests 
Marker’s ambition for his film: that its hybridity may indicate a contextual plurality, a new history 
beyond the constraints of a conclusive narrative.  Laura describes her search as a Marienbad 
game, which is part of Marker’s associationism, for he is an avowed Proustian, and is returning to 
whence he came.  
 
In the film Laura – a displaced film heroine – is alone with a computer, a screen, and the 
possibility of accessing the known universe. In the mid-nineties this conception seemed 
futuristic, however its depiction is now a normative operation - her actions, and reactions, are 
now ubiquitous, part of the contemporary vista. The interviews she accesses are part of old 
media, they comply with a recognizable documentary format, that becomes a critical questioning 
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of form through their framing, and Laura’s gaze. Chris’s voice brings all into alignment, his 
presence focuses, contextualizes the material, in the realm of history, technology and his life. 
He’s position is one of omnipotent control, for his hand, vision, is made known in all that we 
encounter. This aspect of the film, its need to explain, share observations, connects this work to 
all that precedes it, roots it in the past and makes it a sad farewell.  
 
The film’s levels concern Laura, she laments that individuals ‘never went higher’ than level 2 - 
perhaps Level 5 is transcendental, a higher level of consciousness, reserved for Marker’s 
pantheon - but the intermediate levels are obtainable, and her and Chris’s interaction, the 
questions they pose, the resolution they seek, hint of these levels, that they require degrees of 
positional awareness, locatable criticality, the desire to ask difficult, direct questions, and pursue 
answers through all means. When she leaves the frame, for the first and last time, the camera 
zooms into her face until she dematerialises, it is as if Marker has also departed; Chris comments 
that after their inconclusive investigation he never encountered her again; ‘Now Laura saw the 
Game couldn’t change history. It would repeat it, in a loop, with respectably futile obstinacy. 
Storing the past so as not to revive it was sheer 20th century.’  
 
In conclusion, one can say that the political narratives that shaped Marker’s world were now in 
retreat, but the lessons, which might have been drawn from the last century, were ignored, as all 
manner of questionable actions, driven by an ideological disregard, were still being countenanced 
and repeated. The digital environment that Marker created and Laura, his and our avatar engaged 
with, hinted at the forms to come. Film’s durational totality is dismantled by new media’s 
malleability, however it does not approach the same direct address; the ability to construct an 
essay, which communicates a position, and is part of a discernible historical discourse. The digital 
realm may offer new metaphorical understanding, ways to describe memory’s function, but it is 
film that still provides the means to establish a human purchase on these notions, as Cavell 
emotes, ‘film and memory are entwined’,90 which change for future generations but it is still so, 
and they are also the means for generating new Historical perspectives.  
 
Yamaneko’s Zone offered a means to re-cast time but its effect only altered reality for those who 
had need of its metamorphosing properties. In the Zone’s effect the future was founded, for 
technology, as the means to survey History, to become as important as real time documentation. 
Marker applied himself to remembering and activated technology to invoke all that had left a 
trace, but realising that he could only observe and not influence events, he became affected by 
the malady of his age and his cinematic farewell indicated all that had preoccupied his working 
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life and why it was no longer his driving concern. His work mapped a route across the globe, and 
that which was originally directed by intellectual curiosity became infused with political 
aspiration, but when this did not come to pass, he would turn his attention to History. Okinawa 
was reinvestigated, to re-contextualise its perceived importance, but Marker’s past 
disappointments influenced his present concerns, and when he looked into the future it was to 
recover the past, for he was a twentieth century man.  
 
The passing from one millennium to another is a distinct point of reflection and projection, and 
Nolan’s Memento was made in the twentieth century and released in the new one. This is to be the 
last case study and Memento references a number of previously discussed memorious filmic 
propositions and reflections, and re-positions them within genre-based narrative cinema. This 
adoption of memory tropes, with their distinct filmic calibration, produces a film, which may 
ostensibly be about its protagonist’s memory loss, but it is also an invocation of film and its 
memorious purpose. 
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VII.  MEMENTO:  
FETTERED AND SYSTEMATIC RECOLLECTION 
 
 
 
Fig. 55 Memento (2000) 
  
 
Memento (2000) marked Christopher Nolan’s arrival in America. It was to be only his 
second feature film and is the work of a young man declaring his artistic ambition. He chose the 
theme of memory, told with narrative invention and noirish sensibility, to announce his 
appearance, and such an undertaking endeavours to suggest a lineage that connects with other 
notable films, such as Citizen Kane (Welles, 1941), Out of the Past (Tourneur, 1947) or Lost Highway 
(Lynch, 1997), that explore what it is to remember and forget, temporality and perception – 
themes that he has returned to in subsequent films. Bordwell contends that Memento is both 
‘novel and conformist’1 within the classic Hollywood tradition; does the fractured appearance of 
Memento and other films such as Pulp Fiction (Tarantino, 1994), Run Lola Run (Tykwer, 1998), 21 
Grams (Iñárritu, 2003), represent a new development of form, a post-classical modular cinema 
that Cameron2 and Buckland3, amongst others, have suggested; even Bordwell, allows, that if a 
‘film does not correspond to the canonic story, the spectator must adjust his or her expectations 
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and posit, however tentatively, new explanations for what is presented.’4 These films offer a 
hybrid account of forms and content - once avant-garde technique situated in recognisable 
narratives - but is a new categorisation necessary or do they represent an adaptive period of 
production that reflects the turning millennium’s tension and uncertainty?  
 
Memento was based on a short story, Memento Mori, which was written by the director’s brother, 
Jonathan. The film’s drama is encountered through a fragmented vision, a realization that 
introduces the notion of a non-continuous temporality, it establishes the film’s reverse linearity, 
and in doing so, the film’s start reveals its conclusion, as Phil Hutchinson and Rupert Read write, 
‘starting from a position of confusion, one tries to puzzle out one’s “condition”, as the viewer of 
this film.’5 The film’s complexity requires an attendant viewer with a willingness to engage with 
its in-built puzzle, but its form does suggest that a resolution (of some sort) can be found. The 
viewer also discerns that despite referring to classic tropes Memento clearly has a post-modern 
composition and its dramatic and temporal orientation suggests that this mystery will not be 
solved through straightforward detection.  
 
The film’s protagonist Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce) has short-term amnesia. He is the viewer’s 
guide, their means of investigation (and disorientation). To aid his recollection he uses Polaroids, 
amongst other techniques, as a prompt, and he documents the environment that he encounters, 
recording the individuals that he meets and the places he visits: he states the ‘camera doesn’t lie. 
Notes can be lost.’ Shelby’s notation constitutes his system of remembrance; but can these 
external notations constitute a reliable facsimile of internalized memory? And does Memento find 
a new balance between involved temporal and memory streams within an accessible form or is it 
a clever variation on classical narrative structure?     
 
 
  Memento mori 
 
Open on:  Close-up of a man’s hand holding a Polaroid. He grips the white 
border, not wanting to touch the image.  
 The image is of a dark-haired man lying face down on a checked floor. 
Beneath his hidden face there is blood. Violent blood splashes can be 
seen on a wall just beyond him.  
 The Polaroid is undeveloping. The man waves the Polaroid; the 
image’s colour and contrast fade.  
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 He waves the Polaroid again; the process of reversal seems to accelerate. 
After holding it still for a while, he once more waves it.  
 The image has almost disappeared.  
  He waves one last time and the image is gone. 
Cut to:  The reverse of the Polaroid. The camera follows the hand as it puts the 
Polaroid back into a camera, and we see the face of a blonde handsome 
young man behind it. He has scratch marks on his left check and he is 
wearing a beige suit. 
 Cut to:  The man replaces the camera under his suit jacket.  
 Cut to:   Close-up of blood flowing on dark concrete.  
 Cut to:   Shell casing on the dark floor.  
 Cut to:  A pair of up turned aviator style glasses, surrounded by blood splatters.  
 Cut to:  The back of a dark haired man’s head.  
Cut to:  A gun jumps into the blonde man’s outstretched hand. There is a bright 
doorway to his left. He kneels down and uncocks the gun.  
 Cut to:  The spent shell casing rolls out of frame.  
 Cut to:  The glasses moving upward.  
 Cut to:   The dark-haired man rises up. The gun is pointing at the back of his 
head.  
 Cut to: The shell casing flies into the gun.  
Cut to:  The blonde man. The gun sucks in a muzzle flash. The dark haired 
man spins round. His face momentarily visible, he is older, with a 
moustache, his glasses are in place.  
 Cut to:   Close-up of the blonde man, in a different interior, and in black and 
white.   
 
 
 In Memento’s opening scene there is evident attention to detail, the Polaroid which depicts a 
bloody corpse, the fetishised mechanics of death, the grubby post-industrial location, the blood 
on the executioner’s handsome face, which contrasts with his peroxide hair and beige suit, 
brooding synthetic music, all the iconography of the modern thriller is present. Even in this short 
sequence there is something about the killer’s demeanor, despite his actions, that makes him 
strangely sympathetic. Shelby is presented as a man of confused action and the ‘viewer must be 
active–and part of that activity consists sooner or later in trying to answer questions’,6 and these 
become Shelby’s driving force.  
 
Memento never diverges from Shelby’s point-of-view, which is expressed through two colour-
coded and inter-cut strands; the narrative rewinds in colour and the narrator’s reflections play in 
black and white. Memento contrives to reverse occurrence, but it still deploys an episodic structure 
that moves the viewer logically towards some sort of narrative understanding. Initially an element 
of temporal doubt is introduced, but ultimately Memento is a self-revelatory puzzle. Its structure 
                                                
6 Hutchinson, P. and Read, R. (2005) ‘`Memento: A Philosophical Investigation’, in: Film as 
Philosophy: Essays in Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell, Read, R. and Goodenough, J. (ed.), 
Houndsmills, Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillian, p.80 
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also separates voice-over and flashback, neither overlapping the other, indicating that reflection 
and memory exist in different realms and are brought together only by the viewer.  
 
Shelby may be a compromised narrator but his recollection is largely unfettered by uncertainty, 
and it is the audience’s privilege to doubt its validity. Greta Olson writes, ‘Cases of unreliable 
narration7 invite the reader to depart from a literal reading’,8 her analysis concerns literature, 
however, this also applies to film; to discern Memento’s rationale requires a constant assessment of 
Shelby’s position and his progress. Shelby may not be deliberately misleading but, despite his 
intentions, his condition, anterograde amnesia (with its short-term characteristics), consistently 
challenges his ability to act reliably (beyond adhering to the symptoms of his ailment).  
 
 
 
Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce) 
Fig. 58 Memento (2000) 
 
 
In the film’s pivotal scene Shelby’s wife is attacked. The scene is rendered as a traditional 
flashback in monotone; it is presented as a definitive memory, one that motivates the 
protagonist’s trajectory. After the initial attack, Shelby fights back and kills the man who has 
apparently raped and murdered his wife, but is hit from behind by a second assailant, who then 
escapes. Shelby’s narrative is dictated by his desire to solve the mystery of his wife’s death 
(despite her dramatic importance she remains unnamed), to discover the knowledge that he lacks, 
and his memory and the subsequent investigation will come to direct his actions. The magnitude 
                                                
7 With reference to Booth, who introduced the term unreliable narrator, Olson describes them as 
‘narrators who articulate values and perceptions that differ from those of the implied author.’ 
Olson, G. (2003) ‘Reconsidering Unreliability: Fallible and Untrustworthy Narrators’, Narrative, 
vol.11, no.1, p.94 
8 Ibid, p.105 
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of the attack, with its violent masked intruders, has formulaic credence; it is as if this episode 
needed to be clearly stated in order to excuse all that follows - Shelby’s murderous pursuit of the 
second assailant. The police investigate his wife’s death, and in the course of the investigation 
they actually dismiss this second attacker as a figment of Shelby’s imagination.  
 
Shelby communicates his disorder, to excuse any forgetfulness on his part, to everyone he meets 
and these characters direct, one way or another, his search. After his wife’s death, his most 
significant relationships are with Teddy and Natalie, a waitress he meets in the course of his 
misadventures.  
 
 
     
Teddy (Joe Pantoliano) and Natalie (Carrie-Anne Moss) 
Fig. 56-7 Memento (2000) 
 
 
Teddy’s death introduces the film. He is a plain-clothes policeman who aids Shelby’s pursuit of 
the second man. It seems that he was originally motivated by duty, even altruism, but he comes 
to manipulate his knowledge of Shelby for his own ends. Natalie embodies many of the attributes 
of a traditional femme fatal. She works in a bar and was the girlfriend of a small time drug-dealer. 
Her relationship with Shelby has romantic potential, but it is never consummated, and ultimately 
she uses him to alleviate her problems. All of Shelby’s relationships leave him open to potential 
compromise, Hutchinson and Read associate this with ‘others’ awareness and exploitation of the 
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fallibility of his system of forming memories’9, rather than being an inherent problem of his 
condition; so he must trust in the faithfulness of those he encounters, however, the nature of his 
search means the individuals he encounters regard the truth as a negotiable position. 
 
In the black and white strand of the narrative Shelby is seen to be a married man, an insurance 
investigator and is working on the Sammy Jankis case. Jankis and Shelby have a number of 
striking similarities - they both have short-term amnesia and their wives are diabetics. In a key 
scene Jankis is seen to be dutifully injecting his spouse with insulin, she requests repeated shots in 
an effort to uncover whether her husband’s memory loss is genuine or not, but the frequency of 
the injections kills her. Towards the end of the film Teddy claims that Jankis was not married, 
and Shelby’s wife survived the attack but actually died of an insulin overdose. This doubling 
suggests that Jankis and his spouse are some form of transposition and/or fabrication, that this 
episode articulates another possible narrative for Shelby; a sub-conscious imagining that is 
presented as evidence of Shelby’s condition and inherent self-delusion. Morrissey writes that 
‘there is no ‘truth’ in [the traumatically remembered] narrative, only endless multiplicity and 
interpretation.’10 Teddy claims that he located the second intruder and Shelby killed him, and all 
that followed was motivated by Shelby’s need to find purpose after his wife’s needless death. 
Teddy claims that the commonality of the dead man’s name, John G, was contrived to ensure 
Shelby’s search would continue ad-infinitum. Ironically, Shelby noted on Teddy’s Polaroid - 
‘don’t trust his lies’ - but he then kills him for telling (some form) of the truth.  
 
The clinical assertion of Shelby’s underlying condition, and its crucial dramatic influence, is 
presented as convincing fact. But Memento’s dramatic centre, the murder of his wife, is 
inconsistent with what is known about amnesia, as sufferers are usually unable to recall the 
trauma that caused their memory loss. The dramatic truth of Shelby’s undertaking, the certifiable 
anterograde memory impairment that he suffers from, is a syndrome understood only from 
within the story arc, and is offered as the reason for Shelby unwittingly becoming a murderer. 
Amnesia has been offered as an excuse, a plausible reason, for many things including murder, but 
never for multiple homicides. Shelby exhibits a degree of self-determination, for instance he 
knows that the only way to destroy a Polaroid is to set it alight, a procedure that erases any 
uncomfortable visual memories. This suggests that Shelby deliberately suppresses evidence that 
                                                
9 Hutchinson, P. and Read, R. (2005) ‘`Memento: A Philosophical Investigation’, in: Film as 
Philosophy: Essays in Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell, Read, R. and Goodenough, J. (ed.), 
Houndsmills, Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillian, p.83 
10 Morrissey, B. (2011) ‘Impossible Memory: Traumatic Narratives in Memento and Mulholland 
Drive’, in: 
Sinha, A. and McSweeney, T. (ed.) Millennial Cinema: Memory in Global Film, London and New 
York: Wallflower, p.99 
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may unsettle his certainty. It never seems to occur to Shelby to simply bring the man he seeks to 
justice. Shelby may protest, ‘I’m not a killer I’m just someone who wanted to make things right’, 
but unfortunately for those deemed guilty no restraint is shown. 
 
 
Noir’s shadow 
 
 A thriller, such as Memento, can be understood as emanating from the sensibility that was 
originally founded in noir. Noir’s time has passed, but its stylistic invocation of America’s 
underbelly still exerts a conceptual and stylistic appeal. It may now be dated from The Maltese 
Falcon (Huston, 1941) but it’s worth was not truly identified until the liberation of Europe. 
Durgnat writes that ‘French critics having missed Hollywood films for five years saw suddenly, 
sharply, a darkening tone, darkest around the crime film’,11 and their championing drew new 
appreciation and appraisal. Paul Schrader observes, ‘the noir period created a new artistic world 
which went beyond a simple sociological reflection, a nightmarish world of American mannerism 
which was far more a creation than a reflection.’12 Noir would unmask atavistic duplicity through 
ambiguities of tone and characteristic intransigence, and according to Mike Davis developed into 
‘a kind of Marxist cinema manqué, a shrewdly oblique strategy for an otherwise subversive 
realism’,13 that probed the lie of America’s materialism and its relentless drive.14 Noir’s dramatic 
Hollywood cycle, which ended with Touch of Evil (Welles, 1958), was curtailed by America’s 
renewed economic and cultural certitude, its critical introspection no longer finding a ready 
audience, but, its influence still exerts a hold as Memento’s Neo-noir invention suggests. 
 
Noir is not a clear set of genre conventions, concerning instead a tone - an invocation of 
personal fatalism, dark times and desperate measures, faints and plays of moral and amoral 
insistence, a restructuring of time (and its remembrance) and the expressionistic visualization of a 
familiar, but paradoxically, fearful place, with specific and identifiable cultural parameters, in 
                                                
11 Durgnat, R. ‘Paint it Black: The Family Tree of the Film Noir’, in: (1996) Film Noir Reader, 
Silver, A. and Ursini, J. (ed.), New York: Limelight Editions, p.37 
12 Schrader, P. (1996) ‘Notes on Film Noir’, in: Ibid, p.63 
13 Davis, M. (1998) City of Quartz, London: Pimlico, p.41 
14 This propensity did not go unnoticed, as Worpole writes, ‘one of America’s most distinguished 
cultural critics, Jacques Barzun’, defended the classic detective story against the ‘nihilistic 
vandalism’ of ‘Hammet and Chandler, noting, with not a little dash of red-baiting, that ‘the tough 
story was born in the thirties and shows the Marxist colouring of its birth years.’ Worpole goes 
on to observe that it was also denounced by ‘Communist aestheticians’, who saw it as a sign of 
bourgeois degeneracy. Being damned by both political extremes is perhaps one the best 
indications of its unsettling worth. Barzum, J. and Taylor, W. H. (1971) ‘Catalogue of Crime’, and 
Zhdanov, A. (1934) ‘Soviet Writes’ congress’, quoted in: Worpole, K. (2008) Dockers and Detectives, 
Nottingham: Five leaves Publications, p.70 
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which a lone investigator sees beyond the surface appeal of America’s relentless procession, and 
seeks truth, often at personal cost. Jacques Tourneur’s Out of the Past (1947), a story of double-
crossing and doomed individuals that largely unravels, as the title suggests, in flashback, clearly 
indicates the form’s scope and formulation. The film’s plot travels from the present to the past 
and back again, more than once: as Schrader writes, the film’s ‘complex chronological order is 
frequently used to reinforce the feelings of hopelessness and lost time.’15 Out of the Past, like other 
noirs, asks us what happens when we act on our primal drives, forces, which, more often than 
not, conspire against affable resolution and where to err is duly punished. The fate of film’s 
protagonist, Jeff Bailey (Robert Mitchum), a former private eye, is bound up in the conspiring 
events of his existence, despite his best intentions, a scenario that Shelby reiterates, which is a 
quintessential Noir experience, as his future is determined by the past, and a sense that no matter 
what, a fateful, dark force will out.    
 
 
 
‘If I’m going to die, I want to die last.’ 
Fig. 59 Out of the Past (1947) 
 
 
In Raymond Chandler’s essay, ‘The Simple Art of Murder’, the private investigator is 
characterised as a ‘man of honour’ (for invariably this is a man’s world), who is a loner by design 
and necessity, and is to be mainly found in urban centres, or new towns, places linked to 
America’s economic growth (and corruption), for ‘Down these mean streets a man must go who 
                                                
15 Schrader, P. (1996) ‘Notes on Film Noir’, in: (1996) Film Noir Reader, Silver, A. and Ursini, J. 
(ed.), New York: Limelight Editions, p.58  
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is not himself mean, who is neither tarnished nor afraid.’16 James M. Cain and Dashiell Hammett 
may have originated literary noir, its venacular and routine, its anti-El Dorado critique of a 
bloated and poisoned state, but it was Chandler who self-consciously refined it.17 Humphrey 
Bogart’s portrayal of Chandler’s private eye Philip Marlowe, in the Howard Hawks’ adaptation of 
The Big Sleep (1946), was to become the definitive exemplar of this hardboiled knight-errant, and 
the reflexive interplay of investigator and investigated became the laconic archetype. Bailey has 
many of the traits Chandler proclaimed, but he fails his ideal. He falls in love, with the wrong 
woman, in noir’s terms, Kathie Moffat (Jane Greer), and in acting out this attraction he seals his 
fate. Realising Moffat’s self-serving intentions he plots their death, knowing he must sacrifice 
himself. In this moment he asserts the ultimate control, and illustrates that he may have strayed, 
but, unlike her, he is still a moral creature; she, like all unrepentant femme fatales, must be 
punished in the final reel, for even this most iconoclastic of forms must belatedly show respect to 
societal mores. Natalie uses Shelby’s inherent uncertainty to her own ends. She, like Moffat, 
convinces a hapless male to act and in doing so he also incriminates himself.   
 
California was noir’s original host. Los Angeles, a ‘bright, guilty place’, as Orson Welles once 
described it,18 only navigable by automobile, sprawls inland, forming a network of 
indistinguishable places linked by freeways. In California’s hinterland the multitude of dwellings 
and commercial spaces that are repetitious and dull, and others, more fanciful, all manage to 
convey the same effect: like mausoleums, sets for demise. The edgelands of San Fernando Valley, 
where most of Hollywood’s studios are to be found, a place that manages to be simultaneously 
modern and dilapidated, developing and forsaken, is where Shelby’s pursuit is located. It is a 
world of non-distinct liminal places that are neither really past nor present.19 Nathaniel West’s 
novel The Day of the Locust (1939) emphasised the disappointment that many people experienced 
in the idea of California, and how Hollywood’s persuasive illusion became malignant and 
damaging; ‘Their boredom becomes more and more terrible. They realise that they’ve been 
tricked and burn with resentment.’20 This place is wrought with struggle and survival, be it 
economic or environmental, a narrative that is expressed in Chinatown (Polanski, 1974), with its 
dark vision of political and moral duplicity, which draws on Los Angeles’s early twentieth century 
                                                
16 Chandler, R. (1950) The Simple Art of Murder, New York: Ballantine Books, p.20 
17 ‘Chandler’s own writing, based as it was originally on admiration for Hammett and 
Hemingway, whom he often cited, became increasingly sophisticated and moved away from the 
popular and demotic.’ Worpole, K. (2008) Dockers and Detectives, Nottingham: Five leaves 
Publications, p.69 
18 Davis, M. (1998) City of Quartz, London: Pimlico, p.18 
19 These locations are much cherished by chroniclers of real America. Whether it is the foreign 
vision of Wim Wenders, from Alice in the Cities (1974) onwards, or the local documentation of 
Stephen Shore’s Uncommon Places, their very non-descriptiveness solicits serious attention.   
20 West, N. (2000) The Day of Locust, London: Penguin Books, p.157-8 
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history, a time of boosterism, land grabs and nefarious deals, which came to characterize the 
seemingly inherent corruption of the city’s expansion and its disregard for individual rights and, 
in many ways, still defines it. 
 
In the late 1950s cinema audiences were falling from their pre-war high and television had started 
to make an impact into the entertainment market. Dragnet was to be the first television police 
procedural; it started as a radio drama in 1949 and transferred in 1957. Every episode started with 
a declaration of authenticity, ‘Ladies and gentlemen: the story you are about to hear is true. Only 
the names have been changed to protect the innocent.’ It offered a simpler message, with its 
refrain of ‘just the facts’, a statement of intent that would have sorely troubled earlier 
investigators, as its protagonists upheld the law without operational or existential concern.  
 
Robert Altman’s The Long Goodbye (1973), adapted from Chandler’s last completed book by Leigh 
Brackett, who also wrote Hawk’s The Big Sleep, relocated Marlowe to a contemporary Los 
Angeles, where he is portrayed as being distinctly out of place and time; Chandler’s world had 
become an anachronism. Altman commented, ‘I think it’s a goodbye to that genre – a genre that 
I don’t think is going to be acceptable anymore.’21 His film would deconstruct the form’s 
conceits, its formalized classicism, and liberate it in the process. He worked with well-rehearsed 
variants, developing a discourse on his age, however The Long Goodbye exists within the confines 
of scenarios that Brackett and Altman found problematic. The referent, in an identifiable 
manner, must remain, precedent can be critiqued but never negated. Patronising genre reinforces 
it, revision serves to indicate its compelling nature, and exemplifies the essence and limitation of 
form, it’s resistance and versatility is illustrated by films such as Total Recall (Verhoeven, 1990), 
and Blade Runner (Scott, 1982)22, which imagine dystopian futures through an identifiable form 
(from the past). 
 
 
 Defeated sleuths   
 
Shelby’s affliction, anterograde amnesia, is relatively unique in film, but all amnesiac 
characters allow plots to unfold out of time, a discontinuity that affords greater structural 
freedom, medical bolster for psychological upheaval, the legitimization of misrepresentation, in 
which the spectator has a privileged awareness. For Freud, a ‘screen memory’, ‘owes its value as a 
memory not to its own content but to the relation existing between that content and some other, 
                                                
21 McGilligan, P. (1989) Robert Altman: Jumping off the Cliff, St Martins Press: New York, p.365 
22 Both films were adapted from Philip K. Dick short stories, We Can Remember It For You 
Wholesale (1966) and Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968).  
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that has been represented.’23 These memories, which mask more painful ones, are ones that often 
afflict the protagonists and the uncovering of the repressed memories delivers pivotal revelation. 
Films like Spellbound (Hitchcock, 1945) and The Crooked Way (Florey, 1949)24 make use of their 
respective amnesiac protagonist’s inability to remember at key plot points, which allows these 
films’ revelatory narratives to be directed by the recovered memory, as the protagonists search to 
realise their true identity, and the films to find narrative resolution.  
 
For Shelby, Hutchinson and Read suggest, ‘Everything is externalised, everything verified’,25 that 
his memory aids actually become his memory, but, they write, ‘why does our interiorising such 
things make them [seem] less surreal and less mechanical […] because of the psychological or 
cultural roots of philosophical delusion.’26 This approach is exemplified by Andy Clark and 
David J. Chalmers research; in ‘The Extended Mind’ they examine the differences between 
interior and external forms of memory. In their hypothetical hypothesis, Otto uses a notebook 
and Inga relies on her memory, and they suggest, perhaps counter-intuitively, that ‘the 
information in the notebook functions just like the information constituting an ordinary non-
occurent belief; it just happens that this information lies beyond the skin.’27 Both examples 
provide a means of navigation, of knowing, a belief in memory. They perceive the differences 
between ‘Otto’s and Inga’s cases are striking, but they are superficial’28 and consider where an 
individual’s interior and exterior begins and ends:   
‘What, finally, of the self? Does the extended mind imply an extended self? It seems 
so. Most of us already accept that the self outstrips the boundaries of consciousness; 
my dispositional beliefs, for example, constitute in some deep sense part of who  
I am […] The information in Otto’s notebook, for example, is a central part of his 
identity as a cognitive agent. What this comes to is that Otto himself is best regarded 
as an extended system, a coupling of biological organism and external resources.’29  
 
Otto could be Shelby’s stand in, for ‘his notebook constitute a single cognitive system’30 and in a 
follow up essay, ‘Memento’s Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended’, Shelby’s plight is directly 
                                                
23 Freud, S. (1914) ‘Screen Memories’, in: Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Brill, A. A. (trans.), 
London: T. Fisher Unwin, p.320 
24 Spellbound utilised psychoanalysis as a narrative device to uncover hidden truths and suggested 
that it is a way of unlocking the mind and film; The Crooked Way indicated something of the 
perceived psychological maladjustment and fear that accompanied servicemen on their return to 
civil life after World War II. 
25 Hutchinson, P. and Read, R. (2005) ‘`Memento: A Philosophical Investigation’, in: Film as 
Philosophy: Essays in Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell, Read, R. and Goodenough, J. (ed.), 
Houndsmills, Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillian, p.80 
26 Ibid, p.82 
27 Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. J.  (2010) ‘The Extended Mind’, in: The Extend Mind, Menary, R. 
(ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p.34  
28 Ibid, p.35 
29 Ibid, p.39 
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referenced, as Clark writes, ‘Mental states, including states of believing, could be grounded in 
physical traces that remained firmly outside the head.’31 Clark suggests that the ‘study of mind 
might, likewise, need to embrace a variety of different explanatory paradigms whose point of 
convergence lies in the production of intelligent behaviour.’32 Furthermore, he questions the very 
production and ownership of memory, speculating ‘If, in the future, science devises a way for 
you to occasionally tap into my stored memories, would that make them any less mine, or part of 
my cognitive apparatus?’33 Shelby’s memory system resides in transcription and these records 
become his memories and as far as he is concerned they are no less reliable than an internal 
resource.  For Clark Shelby’s notebook is a meaningful memory system, but in Shelby’s case this 
is complicated by disposition, his writing is the stuff of his memories and they offer instruction, 
but they seem different from internalised recollection because they lack detail, incidental 
ephemera, all that is seemingly forgotten, till it is remembered, that re-visiting occurrence 
invariably suggests.    
 
 
 
Fig. 60 Memento (2000) 
 
 
Shelby’s environment may be recognisable, but, in many ways, he exists outside the realm of the 
traditional masculine investigator, an individual, like Marlowe, who exhibits a degree of control 
and is entitled to seek closure through investigative prosecution. As noir’s protagonists’ become 
enmeshed in mysteries they communicated, often with surety and uncertainty, all that they 
encountered, because, as Olson writes, they ‘cannot provide their readers with vital pieces of the 
                                                                                                                                      
30 Ibid, p37 
31 Clark, A. (2010) ‘Memento’s Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended’, in: The Extend Mind, 
Menary, R. (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p.43  
32 Ibid, p.51 
33 Ibid, p.57 
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puzzle until they themselves have found them out.’34 In the original The Big Sleep Marlowe says, 'if 
I seem to talk in circles, it just seems that way; he shares all that happens and, like the reader, he 
would make sense of it, his knowledge may be incomplete but his narration is reliable.  
Shelby is also faithful to all he knows, but he is a defeated sleuth; that which he seeks is 
fundamentally unobtainable, and as such he can, in some ways, be seen as a ‘metaphysical 
detective’. Patricia Merivale defines ‘a real metaphysical detective story’ as one ‘where the 
detective hero himself becomes the murderer he has been seeking.’35 Susan Elizabeth Sweeny and 
Merivale write that, ‘The metaphysical detective story is distinguished, moreover, by the 
profound questions that it raises about narrative, interpretation, subjectivity, the nature of reality, 
and the limits of knowledge.’36 They trace a literary tradition that first found expression with 
Edgar Allan Poe’s The Murders in the Rue Morgue (1841). Poe’s locked room mystery is generally 
considered to be the first example of detective fiction; Poe’s narrator writes, ‘As the strongman 
exults in his physical ability, delighting in such exercises as call his muscles into action, so glories 
the analyst in that moral activity which disentangles.’37 This story is a reflexive composition that 
regards the purpose and process of investigation.  
 
The detective story’s normative raison d'etre, or that of any procedural enquiry, is to uncover 
who-done-it, whereas the metaphysical detective story suggests the solving of a mystery owes 
more to mental agility, and the accompanying human narrative, than a desire for justice per se. 
Shelby’s investigation would solve the mystery of his wife’s death, but his analysis is flawed and 
the logic of his actions becomes increasingly confused until the moral difference between ‘John 
G’ and Shelby becomes indistinguishable. 
 
In one of Memento’s black and white sequences Shelby says to his wife, who is rereading a book, ‘I 
thought the pleasure of a book was finding out what happens next.’ The returning to a text 
always carries a different cast and context, and facilitates a reading that is unencumbered by the 
uncertainty of not knowing, it allows another awareness to emerge, one of reflection. Noir’s 
amnesiacs sought to unravel mysteries in order to know the truth. The loss of memory and its 
incremental re-discovery was invariably consistent with the original turn of events. This device 
was not deployed as a means to undermine or question onscreen occurrence but to elucidate 
personal and societal experience, like the confusion of returning from war. But Shelby is involved 
                                                
34 Olson, G. (2003) ‘Reconsidering Unreliability: Fallible and Untrustworthy Narrators’, 
Narrative, vol.11, no.1, p.101 
35 Merivale, P. and Sweeney, S. E. (1999) ‘The Games afoot: on the Trial of the Metaphysical 
Detective Story’ in Detecting Texts: the Metaphysical Detective Story From Poe and Postmodernism, 
Merivale, P. and Sweeney, S. E. (ed.), Philadelphia: University Pennsylvania Press, p.2 
36 Ibid, p.1 
37 Poe, E. A. (1986) ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’ in The Fall of the House of Usher and Other 
Writings, London: Penguin Classics, p.41 
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in an unresolvable mystery, in which all is questionable; Morrissey writes that ‘while memory is 
the bedrock of cinematic representation, allowing us to “see” that which we could never and 
have never seen; it remains a most unsatisfactory foundation for any sort of understanding.’38 
This suggests that the discovery of a clue only unearths another one, and so on, that ‘memory 
cannot be trusted’,39 a perspective that is made conspicuous by Mulholland Drive (Lynch, 2001), 
which challenges ‘memory as a way to made sense of the world.’40 Lynch’s film defeats any 
conventional attempt to decipher its mystery and meaning, and challenges memory, its cryptic 
plot links dream-like sequences, and that which may be real or fantasy is undifferentiated.  
 
 
 
Fig. 61 Mulholland Drive (2001)  
 
 
Lynch’s protagonists, two young women, Diane Selwyn and Betty Elms/Rita (Naomi Watts and 
Laura Harring), the former an amnesiac, investigate a series of mysteries; Morrissey observes that 
‘Rita’s desire for meaning can then be allied with that of Leonard Shelby in Memento: as a 
retrograde amnesiac she is a tabula rasa in a way that Leonard, as an anterograde amnesiac, is 
not.’41 Betty and Rita’s identities are at times interchangeable and alter with the film’s progression 
and according to its own logic, as Betty says, ‘It'll be just like in the movies. Pretending to be 
somebody else.’ The film articulates the allure of Hollywood, its construction of personas, and 
repression of identity. 
                                                
38 Morrissey, B.  (2011) ‘Impossible Memory: Traumatic Narratives in Memento and Mulholland 
Drive’ 
Sinha, A. and McSweeney, T. (ed.) Millennial Cinema: Memory in Global Film, London and New 
York: Wallflower, p.97 
39 Ibid, p98 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid, p.111 
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Nolan and Lynch’s films require the viewer to actively remember all that has happened, and the 
main characters are constantly pushed to remember and question what may have happened, but 
the structures are such that recall, and its subsequent narrativisation, fails to find resolution. 
Morrissey problematizes the depiction of memory in Memento and Mulholland Drive thus: 
‘Narrative memory is made absurd, while traumatic memory, with its impossible remembrances, 
is conceived as the only “truth” any of us are ever likely to know. Reality is up to memory, but 
memory can never be reality, because it cannot include that which cannot be spoken.’42 Lynch is 
willing to liberate the plot and risk real narrative discontinuity, uncanny irrationality, as J. 
Hoberman writes, ‘Characters dissolve. Settings deteriorate. Situations break down and 
reconstitute themselves, sometimes as fantasy, sometimes as a movie.’43 The film’s narrative, and 
the conventions that it suggests, indicate that there is a mystery to be comprehended, but 
ultimately the offered evidence means that the film, and its mystery, remains incomplete. The 
viewer is in the position of being aware of all the knowable information, unlike any of the 
characters, but this is still insufficient.  
 
Nolan’s narrative inclination is derived from working within a particular dramatic form; this 
sensibility was also evident in his first film Following (1998). In this context, narrative boundaries 
can be stretched, but the method that Nolan elects vouches for its need to be within the realm of 
identifiable filmic sense, which is always contained within the diegesis. The camera preys on 
Shelby. His back-story, the history the narrative needs to justify his quest, is occasionally 
ambiguous but always whole; it satisfies the audience’s need to share this knowledge. He operates 
in a narrative, which has a clear structure, and despite appearances this drama inherently 
demands, and expects, understanding - unlike Lynch’s unreliable narrators’, who despite solving 
part of the film’s mystery their unsettled confusion always returns.     
 
 
 Photographs make sense of the world  
 
 The Polaroid the viewer sees first as it un-develops is in-fact Memento’s last act. Polaroids 
are placed at the centre of Memento’s memorious process. They are a means for Shelby to 
orientate himself and as Scruton observes, about the ‘ideal photograph’, it gives him an ‘idea of 
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how something looked’,44 because, by definition, it ‘is incapable of representing anything unreal.’45 
Shelby does view them as indisputable evidential records and prompts, and as his images of 
people and places accrue, over the course of his investigation, they give it a procedural rhythm.  
Shelby’s faith in images is simple, that they hold a direct likeness, as Roger Scruton writes, ‘The 
ideal photograph also yields an appearance not interesting as the realization of an intention but 
rather as a record of how an actual object looked.’46 The Polaroid’s development cannot be 
circumvented, the image is revealed only when it is ready, and the images are presented as 
indicators of real time; they have a physical robustness, destruct is a deliberate act.  
 
 
 
Fig. 63 Memento (2000) 
 
 
Shelby’s collection of images connects him with all he has lived, for instance after he has spent 
the night with Natalie he needs to refer to his collection of Polaroids in order to jog his memory, 
to know who she is, and then ‘his senses send an image of her to his mind, the image is then matched with a 
mental representation of her.’47 The pictures that he takes, the notes that he accrues, are augmented 
and compounded by his bodily inscriptions. His decision to affix, through professional and 
homemade tattoos, his suspicions and investigations onto his body, believing this to be a 
reasonable and dependable manner in which to record his deductions, literally illustrate his 
Investigation and fraying mental deviation. Morrissey suggests that Shelby’s depicted memory 
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‘becomes impossible: we cannot trust it, but we cannot deny it either.’48 His body becomes a 
physical post-it, a testimony to his investigation - ‘If it’s not written, it didn’t happen’. However, 
with time its purpose becomes untenable, as it is a questionable record, one that reflects his lived 
experience.  
 
The physical manifestation of a Polaroid is not instant, it requires a degree of patience and 
depending on the stock the image’s materialisation can take between fifteen seconds and two 
minutes. The Polaroid image appears with a degree of wonder (and now attendant nostalgia) as 
its mechanistic action literally produces tangible results. When Memento’s first Polaroid regresses 
we see that time is literally returning to whence it came, a phenomenon only possible with time-
based images. We also behold a technological mediation, an illustration of the past appearing. 
The first occurrence may be of a dead man, but the manner of its presentation places this scene 
within a recognisable sphere, as the overture to a mystery. The Polaroid’s mechanical 
documentation neatly frames the bloody mess and in doing so sanitises it. Its clinical presentation 
suggests that whatever mystery the scene holds will be solved through careful analysis. Generic 
convention indicates that the study of an image will offer evidence that is not immediately 
apparent, however, even with close inspection, these images fail to deliver anything more; they 
have no extra forensic value.  
 
Marker, in Sans Soleil, asked the question: ‘I wonder how people remember things who don’t film, 
don’t photograph, don’t tape?’ This is variation on a reoccurring concern, how does technology 
mediate memory? A photograph has the quality of seeking out a memory, this sensation can be 
felt even when the image is initially unknown, because being familiar with the medium, and its 
various genres, we identify with, and feel that we know, its value. For Bellour the use of the 
photograph in film indicates awareness and perception, the evocation of things past, as he writes, 
‘the photograph enjoys a privilege over all other effects that make the spectator of cinema, this 
hurried spectator; a pensive one as well.’49 This position is a contradiction of Barthes, who 
believed the fundamental difference between the photograph and film, was one of movement 
(and immersion): ‘Do I add to the images in movies? I don’t think so; I don’t have time: in front 
of the screen, I am not free to shut my eyes: otherwise, opening them again, I would not discover 
the same image; I am constrained to a continuous voracity; a host of other qualities, but not 
pensiveness.’50 Bellour countered that when ‘you stop the film [to view a photograph], you begin to 
find the time to add to the image’,51 and in this pause he thinks Barthes might find pensiveness. 
This suggests that a different viewing regime is being enacted, in which a still that is in motion 
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appears to suspend a film’s movement and this allows repose and reflection. When a photograph 
is seen in this context, as in Memento or Blow-up (Antonioni, 1966), it indicates a change in the 
flow of a film’s linearity: as Bellour writes, filmed photographs ‘freeze for one instant the time of 
the film, and uprooting us from the film’s unfolding, situates us in relation to it.’52 This facility to 
open time allows filmic temporality to have a counter flow, to have a dual movement. Mulvey 
suggested in her paper ‘The Ghost in the Machine’ that if Barthes had lived to see the advent of 
VHS and DVD culture that he may well have revised his opinion regarding film. She contended 
that with the adoption of this technology a version of the punctum can be found in moving 
images.53 Barthes’ termed the part of the photograph that engenders poignancy and ‘pricks’ the 
viewer the ‘punctum’ - ‘Occasionally (but alas all too rarely) a ‘detail’ attracts me. I feel that its 
mere presence changes my reading.’54 This sensation suggests something unexpected that moves 
and alters perception.  
 
 
 
Fig. 62 Memento (2000) 
 
 
The punctum is an enticing proposition, in that it suggests hidden connections with largely 
unknown forces, but is it to always be tinged with sentiment; James Elkins characterises Barthes’ 
arrested moment as ‘a tourism of the over looked’,55 he likens these moments to ‘detective 
stories’ as ‘they put us in mind, just a little, of the fact that people we love will die – but then they 
make it seem that if we are clever, enough, those deaths can somehow be solved.’56 He maintains 
that Barthes’ perception ignores the real pain and anguish that a photograph may be imbued with 
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by regarding it as an unconscious, but safe, adventure of discovery. Elkins allows that Barthes’ 
formulation has romantic allure but it is encumbered with our own familiar memories. What 
provokes our attention is always within a sphere of known reference, but that which is gone can 
never really be known, so can our viewing of it be more than nostalgic intrigue? Images exist in a 
discursive context, which presses upon any meaning and interpretation. Photography shows what 
has been, not as a reproduction of reality, but as a representation of a recorded past. Barthes 
writes, ‘The Photograph does not call up the past (nothing Proustian in a photograph). The effect 
it produces upon me is not to restore what has been abolished (by time, by distance) but to attest 
that what I see has indeed existed.’57 In this contention Barthes’ relation with the photograph is 
restated, not his connection with what is past; it also refers to language’s struggle to produce an 
understanding of a photograph’s position in time. He contends that to imagine and seek ‘what has 
been’ rather than ‘what is no longer’,58 requires the ability to behold and move within time frozen for 
an instance, accepting that this is the only unequivocal aspect of an image’s actuality. It is this 
inscribed moment that offers an image of time past, as Bazin, considering the advent of 
photography, writes, ‘for the first time, the image of things is likewise the image of their duration, 
change mummified as it were.’59 Frampton’s (nostalgia), through its moving stills, emphasises this, 
but this is framed as photography’s somewhat mournful allure; photographs influence, even 
change, our perception of what has been, for its very essence preserves a representation of life, as 
it will never be again.  
 
In taking a photograph the photographer is looking into the future and those who are being 
addressed by the camera look towards the past; Sontag contended, ‘photographs give people an 
imaginary possession of a past that is unreal’,60 that photography is a ‘way of certifying 
experience’ by ‘converting experience into an image.’61 This notion is predicated on our subject 
related interest, as Scruton writes, ‘Typically, therefore, our attitude towards photography will be 
one of curiosity, not curiosity about the photograph but rather about its subject. The photograph 
addresses itself to our desire for knowledge of the world, knowledge of how things look or 
seem.62 The development of the photograph was to be a profound expression of the desire to 
represent and behold an image of reality. Photography has always been a way to better know, or 
at least show, the world, through its seemingly unerring resemblance to that which was and could 
be encountered, that ‘the emotional or “aesthetic” qualities of a photograph tend to derive 
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directly from the qualities of what it “represents”.’63 Vilém Flusser, writing before digital 
convergence, observed that,  
‘Images are needed to make [the world] comprehensible [but] since [people] are  
no longer able to decode them, their lives become a function of their own images. 
[These images] are supposed to be maps but they turn into screens: Instead of 
representing the world, they obscure it until human beings’ lives finally become  
a function of the images that they create.’64   
 
The situation that Flusser identified has only been exacerbated with time and the post-
photographic world, a place of imagistic self-orientation, in which individuals can become 
structured by and through the photographs they take (of life), would seem to support his 
contention. In Memento the physicality of the Polaroid procedure expresses a search for 
knowledge, the exposure externalises memory, which becomes an archival trace to be collated.  
 
Technology affords a degree of permanence and a means of discernible navigation, but when 
time reverses in Memento, and the Polaroid’s image de-materialises, it returns to its pristine state. 
The reverse procedure is a resonant metaphor for Shelby’s condition. Gunning writes, ‘a 
photograph can only tell the truth if it is also capable of telling a lie’,65 but the Polaroid 
emphasises Scruton’s observation that the camera ‘is being used not to represent something but 
to point to it’,66 that its direct relationship with depicted subject gives it evidential authenticity. 
Shelby hoards the images he makes believing that they provide certainty, but once they become 
disconnected from context their meaning becomes even more contestable.  
 
 
 
 Modular time, film and the zeitgeist  
 
Memento’s referential indications, co-opting, is part of the post-modern passage. It is 
difficult to disentangle the film from all that precedes it, because the looking back, being part of 
film’s history, is so self-conscious. Nolan, like his contemporaries Quentin Tarantino and 
Douglas Gordon, is irreversibly marked by his exposure to the domestic VCR. The videotape 
allowed, for the first time, viewers to repeatedly review material. Gordon stated, ‘Cinema is 
young, only a hundred years old, but for us it’s already dead. We’ve grown up with the video-
recorder, perhaps it’s as simple as that.’67 The VCR may have been replaced by other formats, but 
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it was the first domestic device to facilitate the viewing of pre-recorded material. Gordon’s 
statement suggests this immediacy indicated a collapsing of disciplines, flattening of history and a 
change in temporalities. This new controllable appreciation opened-up film’s dissemination and 
consumption and in this new accessibility film’s presence was normalised, in that film’s viewing 
procedure, discernment, was domesticated. 
 
Memento avails itself of a mass of visual and cinematic material that suggests its lineage and 
desired categorization. It is a film about forgetfulness, in terms of plot, but it is also evidence of 
forgetting, whilst borrowing from, film (and cultural) past, its post-modern form being founded 
in myriad film traces; Double Indemnity (Wilder, 1944) looms, with its guileless insurance salesman, 
Walter Naff; neo-noir references are also evident, for instance James Ellroy’s pitiless L.A. 
Confidential (1990); Jackie Brown (Tarantino, 1997) and the small time California of other films like 
Straight Time (Grosbard, 1978); the film’s Polaroids seem to reference Alice in the Cities (Wenders, 
1974); its clever plotting has some similarity to The Usual Suspects (Singer, 1995) and is replete with 
other contemporary thriller tropes; Spellbound and other amnesiacs, and a legion of noirish 
femmes fatales, ladies in lakes, bars and bedrooms; it tries to invoke something of the paranoia of 
The Conversation (Coppola, 1974); the oppression of Don’t Look Now (Roeg, 1973); the menace of 
Angel Heart (Parker, 1987); the precision and cleverness of Chinatown; the temporal complexity of 
Muriel, or the Time of a Return; the reverential enquiry of Blow-Up (Antonioni, 1966); amongst 
others.  
 
 
 
Fig. 64 Blow-Up (1966) 
 
 
Memento moves down already established channels; it requires its audience to recognise its intent, 
in order to tap easily into the kind of collective unconscious of which film is the most heady of 
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exponents, whereas a film like Pierrot le Fou (Godard, 1965) would deploy inter-textual references 
to pursue a creative and social critique, suggesting a memory of what has been, the cultural 
ephemera of the modern world, and the film’s characters endeavour to pull free of this burden. 
This indicates that referential knowledge cannot be undone, that which is known incrementally 
accumulates and has affect.  
 
Does Memento, and other films by directors and writers such as Alejandro González Iñárritu, 
Charlie Kaufman and Tarantino, suggest a new development of form? Cameron writes, that 
‘modular narrative and database narrative are terms applicable to narratives that foreground the 
relationship between the temporality of the story and the order of its telling.’68 This assertion is 
predicated on the understanding that these various works encompass the lessons of Modernist 
experimentation within an accessible form. Alluding to this conception Cameron argues that 
these films, ‘signal the point at which these aesthetics have been accepted by popular culture at 
large.’69 He argues that the temporal and aesthetic experimentation of Resnais, Antonioni and 
other canonical directors has become part of cinema’s lexicon and that modular narratives are 
situated somewhere between them and the mainstream. Memento’s colour-coded strands clearly 
exist on different temporal planes; however, this differentiation actually divides and simplifies 
psychological motivation through its compartmentalisation. Deleuze perceived that films like 
Resnais’s Last Year at Marienbad (1961), could move thoughtfully across time,70 but an integrated 
scheme, which converged occurrence and consciousness, that allowed Shelby’s trackable progress 
and invited identification, would risk real discontinuity. Regarding this modular formulation, 
David Denby asks: ‘Are moviegoers bringing some new sensibility to these riddling movies? 
What are we getting out of the overloading, the dislocations and disruptions?’71 
 
These contemporary films, at the level of content and form, offer something of the zeitgeist but 
does their replaying, relaying, delaying indicate a distinct innovation or just associate them to a 
particular time? Thomas Elsaesser suggests that these films require a high level of viewer 
sophistication, arguing that ‘mind game films’ may have become ‘a mode of performative agency, 
as well as a form of thinking.’72 The themes that resonate through these films indicate millennial 
uncertainty, a world in which twentieth century social definitions and positions were being 
challenge, invariably through economic pressure rather than political agitation. This 
                                                
68 Cameron, A. (2008) Modular Narratives in Contemporary Cinema, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
p.1 
69 Ibid, p.16 
70 Deleuze, G. (1989) Cinema 2, Tomlinson, H. and Galeta, R. (trans.), London: Continuum, p.97 
71 Denby, D. (2007) ‘The new disorder: Disordered narratives in film’, in: The New Yorker, 5 
March, [online] available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/03/05/the-new-
disorder [accessed 21 October 2015]  
72 Elsasser, T. ‘The Mind-Game Film’, in Ibid, p.38 
  208 
understanding is also linked to technological developments and Buckland believes that new 
media has influenced human development, making multi-strand depictions necessary, he writes: 
‘These complex stories overturn folk-psychological ways of understanding and instead represent 
radically new experiences and identities.’73 The genesis of modular work is to be found in the 
multi-channel media environment but does aping its effect only reinforces cinema’s singularity; 
the idea that these database films constitute a new form is discounted by Bordwell, who writes, 
‘most storytelling innovations since the 1990s have kept one foot in the classic tradition. Because 
of the redundancy built into the Hollywood narrative system, unusual devices could piggyback on 
a large number of familiar ones.’74 Bordwell’s theoretical approach desires to make sense of films, 
and that resolution can be found for any narratological issues. This tendency places all narratives 
within an established scheme, one determined by a classic realist cinema. In writing, ‘Nolan’s real 
achievement, it seems to me, is to make his reverse-order plot conform to classical plot structure 
and film-noir twists’,75 Bordwell is expressing the robustness of his definition but also limiting its 
possibility to a number of finite established variations. These narrative-driven explanations dwell 
within textual analysis and are seemingly untroubled by external factors. Challenging this 
tendency, Cubitt states that contemporary Hollywood promotes ‘identification with fictional 
worlds’, and that these self-referential entities negate history.76 Analysis may begin with the 
actualised form of a work, but purely digetic examination with its exhaustive categorisation77 
seems to forget all beyond its near focus, and that sometimes cinema’s component elements are 
combined to make strange, even unintended effect, which exists beyond the confines of diegetic 
functionality. 
 
Database films may be evidence of their technological epoch, a representation of a kind of 
audio/visual encoding, but their method would seem to reflect a received perception of the 
contemporary world, the popular idea of data excess and chaos, with its surface attraction, 
streams of competing information. The invoking of the database draws directly on analogous 
claims to the computer and its facility for storage. A database denotes an accumulation of 
information that can be systematically retrieved. This repository can be accessed from multiple 
points-of-view, potentially each encounter could be uniquely informed by need and habit, a 
method that is at odds with film’s linear flow. Manovich, in The Language of New Media, enlists 
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Man With a Movie Camera (Vertov, 1929) to serve as a guide to new media, as a prototypical 
example of database filmmaking, contending, ‘It proves that it is possible to turn ‘effects’ into 
meaningful artistic language.’78 Manovich’s adopting of Vertov’s film suggests a different 
contextual position to Cameron et al, one that would look to the Soviet avant-garde to find filmic 
equivalence for new media in 2001. 
 
Vertov’s film pertained to society, a Communist ideal, and the ideological necessity to make work 
that encapsulated this progressive ethos. The classic and post-classic critical models both 
invariably seek coherent explanations within the narrative realm; films that must, on some level, 
be comprehensible (within knowable formulations). Cameron, and others, may argue that 
database films represent a type of pragmatic experimentation, but their rationalization forsakes 
the originating impulse of filmmakers like Vertov.  
 
Cameron et al have proposed that contemporary database films are innovative versions of 
narrative cinema, but as Denby proffered, ‘what are we getting out [of] these riddling movies?’79 
Considering their form now, suggests that they depicted a time in flux, the seeming fluidity and 
connectedness of society, but also its confused and evolving positions, these films articulated 
something of the spirit of that age. The form of filmmaking that Nolan and his contemporaries 
espouse has taken on spectacular connotations, as seen in Inception (2010), and now has the 
garlands of Best Picture and Best Director Oscars, for Iñárritu’s Birdman (2014), to its credit. 
From its title sequence, with its homage to Godard, onwards, this is a film about films, but as its 
plaudits indicate this is not just a work for cinephiles, and in this we see the extent of influence, 
but also the manner in which it has been co-opted and its politics neutered. 
 
 
 Memories can change 
 
A predecessor of Memento’s reverse structure was Pinter’s Betrayal (1978); it tells the story 
of a tripartite extramarital affair over the period of seven years, told in receding order, and the 
accompanying fall-out. At the play’s beginning the characters reminisce and assess what has been, 
but even after the affair has ended inconsistencies and untruths prevail. Pinter’s structural 
method follows an event back to its founding moment, but the schema is not akin to a series of 
flashbacks, but is more like one memory invoking another, and so on. Time is ordered through 
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the play’s structural logic, and the microcosm of characterisation, in which all is betrayed, 
including memory and time, by subjective reason.80 To facilitate their affair the adulterers rent a 
flat, a shared secret space that becomes their home, away from home, a haven and burden; 
Malcolm Bull writes, ‘with its uncanny mingling of fear and play, the hidden seems to threaten a 
regression to childhood, a return to some forgotten world of unexplored possibility.’81 This is an 
expression of something being hidden, an obscuring of the truth, for if something is to be 
revealed it must be knowable and whilst it is hidden it is incomplete. Burgin observes, ‘The 
telling of the memory, of course betrays it… in the sense that to tell it is to misrepresent, to 
transform, to diminish it’;82 even with the best intentions that which is remembered alters with 
time and influence. The process of Shelby’s investigation is conducted in a matter-of-fact 
manner, one clue invariably leading to another. He is forever turning over things, a Polaroid, 
note, document, to inspect its worth as if his memory is reinforced through touch and he never 
loses his belief that they can always reveal more. The search for truth is an interpretive 
experience that determines and expresses particular focus and framing.  
 
In Memento all truth is measured against that which is provided by the film; this notion is 
perpetuated by belief that the world can be known by contemplating its image. Work that is 
conceived outside a quizzical, analytic and exploratory position fails to penetrate presumed 
knowledge and Memento is at its most compelling when uncertainty is shown through action; for 
instance, Shelby is involved in a shoot-out and chase, and at its height he forgets whether he is 
the pursuer or the pursued. However, the film is constrained by its structure, and once it 
becomes clear that its chronological reversal is the primary ordering device, all is subordinate to 
this procedure. What is actively known about the past informs the present, as Bergson observed, 
the present connects the past and future.83 Shelby struggles to find new understanding due to his 
psychological condition: ‘I don't have amnesia. I know who I am. I just can't form new 
memories.’ Hutchinson and Read write that Memento ‘depicts the soul of someone whose 
problem, perhaps, is actually that they cannot bear to remember, not that they cannot remember 
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to forget.’84 Shelby is driven by his need to behold all which is absent, something that he cannot 
achieve. He survives through systemised behaviour. He is continually awaking anew, always on 
the verge of being lost, but saved by his procedural, annotated, memory.  
 
In the final scene, after Teddy’s death, Shelby is driving, reflecting on all he can remember, and 
as he does so he imagines he is lying next to his wife, as he is now, and in these images his past 
life and present condition literally combine for the first time. A tattoo reads on his chest, ‘I’ve 
done it’, an affirmation of successful prosecution that would seem to be somewhat incongruous, 
considering all he knows, and we understand, but perhaps this inadvertently relates to his 
bringing these two streams of time together, and in this he has achieved the sense of unification, 
the validation that he has been searching for. The film concludes with him abruptly stopping 
outside a tattoo parlour, as if this vision requires further comment before its memory is gone.   
In considering Memento its structured progression is resolutely to the fore. The film’s formulation 
guides the spectator through Shelby’s tribulations, untroubled by the imperfection of memory, 
sure in the method of its production; there is no place in and beyond the confines of plot, the 
only reflective intrusion is that of the protagonist’s narration, words conceived to keep the film 
on a delineated track. When Selby intones, pondering his position, it is always with the film’s rapt 
attention, this self-edification never waivers. Once the film’s method is revealed, the spectator 
backtracks, connecting what has been with the receding present. This re-synchronisation differs 
from Frampton’s because its purpose is to find reason for the film’s puzzle, some form of 
psychological explanation, as in the classic narrative tradition.  
 
 
 
Fig. 65 Memento (2000) 
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To Shelby, memory is ‘an interpretation, not a record. Memories can be changed or distorted, 
and they’re irrelevant if you have the facts.’ But which facts, those that Shelby believes or the 
facts that the film offers by way of narrative exploration? Nolan may aspire to collate, reclaim 
and recast memory, however his structuring impulse disallows any really contradictory discourses. 
Even though Shelby cannot remember whence he came he still has a sense of self, which is 
derived from his pursuit. Nolan never demurs from Shelby’s subjective quest, the unquestioned 
identification of his plight. Memento’s hybridity, the ambitious combining of temporal forms and 
narrative content, is a testament to the many of the things film can offer, but also an indication 
of its formal limits, that methodology is relationally and contextually tethered and the loosing of 
ties weakens memorious purpose and dulls its more reflective connotations.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Fig. 66 (nostalgia) (1971) 
 
 
Once Freud and Proust were the inspiration for scientific enquiry into memory and now it 
is film directors like Nolan and Verhoeven.1 Imagination, to reiterate Resnais’ assertion,2 is just as 
important as it has always been, and where literature and philosophy once led, now, it would 
seem, it is cinema. Memories Made in Seeing has remembered, contextualized, analyzed films – their 
generic and formal composition, different modes of production, and periodization (from the 
fertile post-war realm to post-modern inter-textuality). These films, when considered individually, 
and together, indicate how memory’s interpretation changes with time and interest, its 
complexity, being reformulated to suit present needs. Their configuration offers new relations 
between film forms and memory, offering interdisciplinary direction. They speak from history, 
are markers that can be returned to and navigate a course through time and practice and all offer 
responses to the original research questions - does this time-based medium offer a unique 
treatment, which makes manifest a distinct form of memory; how, and why, do these films’ seek 
to be part of this compact; how do they make and become memories, part of history?   
 
                                                
1 Suggested by Steve Ramirez with reference to Inception and Total Recall. Cited in: Beck, T. (2013) 
‘Inception-Style Memory Experiment Performed On Mice Was Inspired By The Movie Total 
Recall’, Fast Company labs, 07.08.2013, [online] available at: 
http://www.fastcolabs.com/3015419/inception-style-memory-experiment-performed-on-mice-
was-inspired-by-the-movie-total-recall [accessed 15 July 2014]  
2 Cited in: Monaco, J. (1978) Alain Resnais: The Role of Imagination, London: Secker & Warburg, 
p.11 
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A visualisation of memory can be identified and formulated, for its identifying tropes are well 
known, however, the deployment of these aesthetics and techniques can fail to articulate its true 
reason, because to do so requires accepting a position that acknowledges an involved temporal 
understanding. This suggests that there are different levels of mediated memory. These forms 
have found particular development over the latter part of the twentieth century, an interest that 
concurs with a changing perception of history.  
 
The different films are a commentary on memory’s filmic hold and illusive allure. This critical 
assessment is a matter of aesthetics and technique, and the form that these works take should be 
seen within the contextual breadth of history and the intent of practice. The manner of this filmic 
occurrence is multifarious and accordingly produces a different gradated effect, which 
emphasises narrativization, of some form or other, stimulating the means to remember, the 
always wanting to know more. Memory is ceaseless and its representation is reactive to cultural 
and technological directions that expose its contours, in obvious and nuanced ways, leaving a 
record of occurrence to be revisited and socially processed; it expresses a need to recount, relive, 
reassess all that is thought worth saving from the oblivion of unrecounted time.  
 
The studied films trace memory’s influence, its determinants and contestations, and in following 
this trail all manner of connections occurred, which were sutured by memory. Deren wrote, ‘as 
we watch a film, the continuous act of recognition in which we are involved is like a strip of 
memory unrolling beneath the images of the film itself, to form the invisible under layer of an 
implicit double exposure.’3 If the primary films, and the other referenced works are considered, 
some of the relationships adhere to canonical developments but others are more intuitive, a 
matter of personal association.  
 
The memories that Muriel depicts, and invokes, are communicated without differentiation, in that 
time past and present co-exist in the same frame, as time is experienced as one fragmented and 
imagined stream. Resnais’ formulation was conceived in relation to France’s post-war situation 
and his drama sought to show a country in flux, oscillating between the tragedy of the near past 
and the uncertainty of the future. (nostalgia) emphasises film’s ability to present a conceptual 
composition that indicated something of memory (‘memory function’?) and its audio/visual 
possibilities opened up by the thinking through of how to represent memorious processes. 
Frampton’s film is suffused with personal history, a narrativized version of it in which each story 
creates a different kind of relationship with its accompanying image, thereby demonstrating how 
memory is selective and creative-created, in the process of writing it down, with which he agitates 
                                                
3 Deren, M. (1985) ‘Cinematography: The Creative Use of Reality’, in: Film Theory and Criticism: 
Introductory Readings, 3rd ed., Mast, G. Cohen, M. (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.56 
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memory, his own and the viewer’s. The national issues, with which infuses Resnais’ film, have 
been absented for structural concerns and individual consideration.  
 
In Level Five, Marker, makes available archival material through database examination, but as 
navigable as it is, it still fails to offer anything other than a pre-ordered inventory, any answers - 
to the questions history poses - are suggested by human intervention, Marker’s off-screen, 
knowing, voice. His work was preoccupied with historical memory, the computer’s emerging 
omnipresence, and in Level Five he indicates that the database is no more likely to offer an 
objective history lesson than any other form, but it also emphasised his need to explore the 
potential of other types of media resistance. 
 
 
 
Fig. 67 Level Five (1996) 
 
 
Marker’s film acknowledges technological change, but his perspective is indebted to twentieth 
century narratives, and associated positions, and he struggles, by his own admission, with the 
implications of the coming age. Memento, which would seem to offer a similar realm, but through 
its evident stylisation of time betrays its generic intent, that its portrayal of memory serves 
narrative necessity. Nolan would bring something of Resnais’ invention, Frampton’s method and 
Marker’s enquiry into wider discussion, but in doing so he risks forsaking their originating intent. 
This sequence of films also offers referential composition, the contextual relief of the selected 
work, the process of accrual and the formulation of a new set of conditions and coordinates that 
signal a different and unfolding orientation, another history. 
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All films relate to memory, in its cultural form, but not all films seek to invoke it. The original 
formations, of Resnais, Marker, Frampton and Nolan, are a matter of reference. To view their 
films is to know memory’s concurrent state, all that has been remembered and forgotten and 
how this can alter with time. If the films are traced, from Muriel onwards, a lineage becomes 
apparent that expresses historic pertinence and cultural affiliation, an understanding that aligns 
work and suggests evolving situations, one that is conscious of the draft of time. These 
developments are now known through a work’s historical articulation; this can be seen in the 
forms of enquiry and how they still have a distinct purchase on creative consciousness; for 
instance, Resnais’s narrative examination and temporal imagination, Frampton’s structural and 
memory challenge, Marker’s search to make film a form of reflective history and Nolan’s hybrid 
use of genre and practice, indicate film’s range, connectedness, reflective facility, formative 
positioning.  
 
 
 
Fig. 68 Memento (2000) 
 
 
All these films knowingly engage with the procedure of memory, endeavouring, through their 
own means, to articulate how we remember and the selective, seductive implications and results 
of this process. In this, what it is to remember, why this may be of interest and how this 
undertaking can be realised becomes known by example and this offers models that quantify 
other memorious expressions. The different films consciously provoke and produce thought 
through specific means and are suggestive of more than one tense. The development of an 
accessible Modernism, as practiced by Resnais, founded in an innovative spirit and a need to 
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comprehend (and forgive) the senselessness of contemporaneous human conflict, represented a 
fragmentation of space and time, as all had previously been assured was being deconstructed and 
examined to aid future configurations. This analysis was the foundation (explicitly and implicitly) 
for the work of the new age, a time of prosperity and personal discovery, the place that (nostalgia) 
indicated so deftly. Marker had become a veteran activist by the time of Level Five’s conception. It 
is a work that looked back, wanting somehow to reconfigure the injustice of his age through 
engaging with all that is to come. He knew this was fruitless, but he could not resist the thought - 
what if history could be undone? Nolan looked at film history and saw all that could gild his 
hybrid model and his manifest recollection was to be a memory of a memory, as to see his work 
is to remember all the films he knew. The persuasiveness of these various practices, in that they 
are still seen as referential models, suggests that we still have well-preserved memories of what 
was seen and the form and content of these renditions still has purpose and resonates beyond the 
originating moment, continuing to be instructive and lucid.  
 
All aesthetic and technological methods have the potential to be adopted in unforeseen ways and 
this indicates contemporary preoccupations and emphasises how even (or especially?) the 
vanguard, with the passage of time, becomes a historic entity, and in this unforeseen alignments 
can occur, with works, such as Marker’s, being presented in a new context, one that may differ 
from the maker’s original intentions. There is nostalgia for discernible avant-garde affect; Hal 
Foster observed, ‘Each epoch dreams the next, as Walter Benjamin once remarked, but in doing 
so it revises the one before it.’4 There is a symbolic and epochal reference, and reassurance, in 
older method, technology, as their appropriation and invocation attests to. Film is the ‘art of 
time’5 and film and memory’s generative affiliation is founded in this relation, with films’ 
proposing multiple temporal, sensory, plains, within a set duration that then finds a place in the 
viewer’s imagination (and memory). Bergson reasoned that unknown time, that which follows 
now, can only be disclosed within an understanding that connects it to all that has been, as he 
writes,  
‘It may be said that we have no grasp of the future without an equal and 
corresponding outlook over the past, that the onrush of our activity makes a void 
behind it into which memories flow, and that memory is thus the reverberation, in the 
sphere of consciousness, of the indetermination of our will.’6  
 
Film’s expression, which we as viewers internalise, can be likened to Freud’s ‘screen memories’, 
for film images can come to represent real memories and screen our recollection of personal 
                                                
4 Foster, H. (1996) ‘Whatever Happened to Postmodernism?’, in: The Return of the Real, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p.207 
5 Cubitt, S. (2004) The Cinema Effect, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p.365 
6 Bergson, H. (2004) Matter and Memory, Paul, N. M. and Scott Palmer, W. (trans.), New York: 
Dover Publications, p.69-70 
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experience, for there is a transference, a sense of knowing, that occurs through film’s 
verisimilitude, identification and sensory effect. Technology will undoubtedly change methods of 
production and display, but the intrinsic nature of images in motion is that they will, after 
registration, pass into memory and, by turns, seem somehow real, and mine and yours, for 
memory does more than perpetuate, it changes with time and re-creates and is recreated. The 
systematic relationships between materials and their application are like our evolving synaptic 
connections, in that perceived meanings are not static entities as they relate to and alter with time 
in ways that cannot be reckoned for, and in this they suggest different systems of thought and 
interpretation - it is not possible to completely isolate experience, for associations, references and 
influences, have their own instinctive order and persist, regardless of accuracy or rational 
understanding.  
 
 
 
Fig. 69 Muriel, or the Time of a Return (1963) 
 
 
Some films, like these ones, show, write and examine memory, they articulate its facility, history, 
all that might be remembered. In Muriel final scene Simone inspects Hélène’s apartment. As she 
looks around the abandoned rooms traces of activity, occupation, become evident, however 
contextual awareness is our referential privilege. When the scene is done an end card announces 
the film’s screen time is over, but its attendant and associated memories, which develop with, and 
through, time, continue to stream forth. A filmmaker’s conceptual challenge may still have radical 
effect, but it is not exactly what it once was, as contexts change, History’s resonance alters with 
time, forms evolve through procedure and precedence, and the material means of production 
changes. But, as time passes it becomes, in its own way, more memorable. Time bestows 
longevity and as its stretches it takes on a different perspective, as different associations and 
linkages emerge and recede. In this, certain works appear to take on importance and others 
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seemingly disappear, but are never completely forgotten, because film’s memorious compact 
cannot be undone.     
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